THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE ISSUE OF 'VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN' SALIENT ON THE GENDER IDENTITY OF WOMEN FROM THE WESTERN CAPE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

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Chantal Jeannot
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ABSTRACT

The idea for this dissertation emerged out of my interest in the identity of South African women. A specific area of interest was which part of South African women's identity was more salient — race or gender. Another specific area of interest, based on the proposition of social identity theory that different aspects of identity could be salient within different contexts, was which contexts, if any, would make gender identity more salient than race identity. (The was of interest particularly with regard to black women.)

In an attempt to further explore the identity of South African women, with particular reference to the above questions, Study 1 was conducted. Based on the literature (e.g. Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984), one expectation was that while gender might be more salient than race for white women, for black women, race would always be more salient than gender irrespective of context. A content-analysis of the focus group transcripts for Study 1 did not support this expectation. Both black and white women cited the issue of 'sexual violence against women', specifically rape, as the one factor that made the 'woman' aspect of their identity salient, and engendered a feeling of 'us' (women) versus 'them' (men).

In order to further investigate this result, a second study was conducted. In Study 2, a pre-test post-test experimental control group design was used to examine the effect of the issue of 'sexual violence against women' on the gender identity of black, white and coloured women. Forty black women, 40 white women and 40 coloured women from the Western Cape participated in the study. Gender and race identity were explored using multi-dimensional scales, a social distance scale, a personality attributions measure, and an identity checklist. These measures were administered at both the pretest and the posttest. 'Sexual violence against women' was operationalised as an article about rape which was presented to women in the experimental group while women in the control group received a neutral intervention. The hypothesis was that at the pretest, women (in particular black women) would perceive themselves as 'closer' to other members of their own race (including men) than to other women of different races. Thus race would be a more salient aspect of identity

than gender. Based on the results of Study 1, it was further hypothesised that at the posttest women in the experimental group would perceive themselves as 'closer' to women of other races than to men of their own race.

The results of the study did not entirely support this second hypothesis. The general trend was that although women in the experimental group perceived themselves as closer to women of their own race and to women of other races at the posttest than at the pretest, they still distinguished between women on the basis of race. This would agree with the argument in the literature that their is no unitary homogenous group 'women' with a single unified identity, one of the main reasons for this being that gender and race identity are inextricably bound (see Davis, 1981; Fowlkes, 1992; Griffin, 1996; hooks, 1981; 1984; Lapchick & Urdang, 1982; Walker, 1990). As hypothesised, no difference was found between the pretest and posttest stage for the control group

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. Background to this research

The idea for this dissertation emerged out of my dual interest in women (specifically women in the South African context) and social identity theory. The fact that psychology is a discipline which takes white men as the norm (Burns, 1990; Kitzinger, 1991; Klein, 1983), has led to there being very little research which focuses specifically on women, and even less which looks at women from different race groups.

I have for a long time been intrigued by the deep division between women of different races in South Africa — divisions which are mirrored by the conflict in women's politics and the failure to form a united women's movement or feminist organisation, despite repeated attempts to do so.

The most common and obvious explanation for these divisions is that the agenda, aims and interests of black and white women are too disparate to allow any kind of unity. It has been argued that the feminist movement as it exists today is the result of white women's response to the gender oppression and inequalities in their own personal experience (Friedman, Metelerkamp & Posel, 1987; Joseph & Lewis, 1986). These white women feminists are perceived as holding the viewpoint that gender is the primary contradiction existing in our society, and ignoring the effects of race and class (Essed, 1991) — the effects that are often more directly felt by black women (Clara, 1989). Obviously, this viewpoint is a generalisation. While it may be true of radical and liberal white feminists, Marxist feminists view class as the primary issue and many Marxist feminists have clearly argued that the oppression of women differs significantly from class to class (Rowbotham, 1989).

Nonetheless, many black women have undoubtedly felt that white women's experiences have been constructed as the norm (Lewis, 1992) and that they have consequently been alienated (hooks, 1984; Kemp, Madlala, Moodley & Salo, 1995).

It has long been argued that our group memberships play a major role in our sense of who we are, and in our defining of our own identity (Brown, 1988; Mead, 1934). Thus the groups to which we belong are a source of our social identity (Brown, 1988). In agreement with hooks (1984) and Walker (1990a, 1990b), the disunity between women of different race and cultural groups may therefore be understood as fundamental differences in identity. The differing aims, interests and priorities of these groups may be seen both as the cause, and as the result of the differing identities. A closer analysis of the objectives of black and white feminist movements and their criticisms of each other provides some illustration of these different aims, interests and priorities.

1.2. Traditional divides between black and white feminists

A number of issues have been identified as western (white) feminist concerns. One of the main demands of western white feminism was the right for women to work outside the home, the assumption being that giving women access to the labour market would enable them to find employment that was satisfying as well as enable them to break their financial and emotional dependence on men (Friedan, 1963). This assumption has been criticised by black feminists such as hooks (1984), because it ignores the many black women that were employed outside the home at the time of Friedan's publication. Most of these women were employed out of economic necessity in low-paying, menial positions that did very little to empower them or make them more independent (Davis, 1981). The point is also made that white women employ black women to do the very domestic work that they are rejecting when they seek employment outside of the home (Cock, 1989).

Another area leading to dispute between black and white women is the area of attitudes towards men. Many sectors of the white women's movement describe men as 'the enemy', propagating the viewpoint that all men oppress all women. In contrast to this,

many black women view white racists (both women and men) as 'the enemy', whilst viewing black men as comrades in the struggle against racism (hooks, 1984). In fact, until recently in South Africa black men clearly had less power than white women. Many black South African women made the struggle against apartheid and for national liberation a black women's issue, and were thus directly involved (together with black men) in political struggles such as the demonstrations against pass laws (Kemp et al., 1995). Furthermore, black South African women often restricted their disputes with black men to a sphere known only by their specific communities in order to prevent the white Nationalist Party state from using any sign of division among blacks in order to oppress black people even more (Kemp et al., 1995).

Linked to the above area is the issue of separate organisation. Various feminist organisations, such as Rape Crisis (1989) have argued that women need to organise separately, within separate sex organisations, in order to avoid the gender inequalities that are perpetuated in mixed groups and to provide women with a 'safe space' to explore their experiences and to develop their skills. For many women this separatism extends to their lifestyle, and they choose to interact solely with women. hooks (1984) argues that in this form feminism has become a life-style option instead of a political movement, which again ignores issues of race and class. Criticising the family for its role in perpetuating sex-roles and sex stereotypes, and thus maintaining the status quo (Oakley, 1976) is also perceived as typical of the white feminist movement. This viewpoint is again alienating to many black women, because it does not agree with their experience of the family as a source of support (Davis, 1981).

Yet another area of dispute has been the white feminist movement's construction of femininity. Traditionally, white feminists have criticised the fact that women are seen as the weaker sex - femininity has been socially constructed as maternal, instinctual, soft and irrational (Bernard, 1982). However, this is not true for black women. Black women are often portrayed as strong and are expected to do manual labour type work, which would not be considered suitable for white women (Joseph & Lewis, 1986). Thus, in their critique of femininity, white feminists have again excluded the experiences of black women by their assumption that the white, western definition of femininity is universal

White feminism has also been criticised by black women for focusing on single issues in isolation from their social context. For example, black women in South Africa in the 1980's argued that when examining rape and sexual assault against black women, connected issues such as political violence against black women, which often resulted in the rape or sexual assault of female detainees by state police, also needed to be examined (Kemp et al., 1995). Furthermore, it was argued that in order to understand the social context within which black women were raped, it was necessary to analyse and understand the state's repressive legislation and circumscription of blacks (Kemp et al., 1995).

Finally, black women have criticised white women for their focus on sexual politics and intimate relationships. For black women this focus may be seen as indulgent (hooks, 1984), as many of them have to battle to survive on a daily basis.

In turn, white women feminists also criticise black women, particularly on the issue of the final point above. White feminists have argued that black women's movements have failed to give adequate consideration to the issue of sexual oppression, because they have chosen to emphasise racial oppression at the expense of sexual considerations (Joseph & Lewis, 1986). According to white feminists, the focus of black women's movements is primarily upon "...those priorities for struggle that stem most clearly from racial oppression at the expense of...sexual considerations as if these were totally separate issues that could be resolved on individual terms" (Joseph & Lewis, 1986, p. 6).

1.3. Black and white feminists in South Africa: The South African women's movement

The divide between the interests of black and white women, discussed above, may also be clearly seen within the South African women's movement. Walker's (1990a, 1990b) historical mapping of the oppression of women in South Africa, and her examination of the development of the South African women's resistance movement, illustrates the beginnings of this current divide between the black and white feminist movement in South Africa. More importantly, Walker's work allows one to see how the differences

between black and white women's oppression and subsequently identity became entrenched via this movement, which could have been instrumental in unifying women across culture, race and class.

In South Africa, as in North America and Europe, the South African feminist movement had its beginnings in a suffragette movement — the Women's Enfranchisement Association of the Union (WEAU) — that was chiefly preoccupied with the enfranchisement of women, and was clearly identified with the ruling class (Walker, 1990b). Furthermore, in South Africa, as in the USA, white males saw their chance to exploit white women's desire for the vote and so maintain white supremacy.

Thus, in South Africa, white women's empowerment via enfranchisement was a victory predicated on racial domination. It did not simply exclude black women from the vote; the enfranchisement of white women formed part of a much larger strategy of attack by General Hertzog and the ruling National Party on the already enfranchised black male voters in the Cape Province where a qualified (in terms of statutory education and property ownership) franchise prevailed (Walker, 1990b). Most suffragists in the WEAU resented the delay in their own enfranchisement caused by the struggle over the Cape franchise and ultimately identified themselves with the government's policies of segregation. Therefore, although the language of the suffragist campaign was broadly non-racial in the early years (some radicals envisaged the incorporation of more blacks into the political arena and an even larger percentage of the minority supported a qualified enfranchisement of black women on the basis of property and education in the Cape, making class the division rather than race) the ideology of the movement was saturated with the ideology of white domination and superiority from the beginning (Walker, 1990b).

Within time, the WEAU became more directly segregationalist, justifying itself in terms of expediency; that is, the need for enfranchisement. In fact, the majority of suffragists and white women had no qualms about how they were enfranchised. Their loyalties lay with their race and not their gender. Therefore, in the years of struggle leading up to the 1930 debate, White self-interest in the WEAU was never seriously challenged by its

commitment to women's rights because most members' understanding of 'women' did not extend to women of other race groups (Walker, 1990b).

Furthermore, the claim made by the WEAU in 1930, that white women would use their vote in favour of the unenfranchised majority was merely a rationalisation that was not carried out by the subsequent voting patterns of white women.

Thus, the WEAU was an essentially middle class organisation dominated by educated women of means (their own or their husbands). While the demand for suffrage was not a middle-class one, the priority given it by suffragists as the most important reform needed to improve the condition of women's lives was a product of their middle-class position (Walker, 1990b). Because these women were economically secure, well-educated and part of the ruling class, they looked to the vote to stop the discrimination they suffered by virtue of their sex. Although there were a growing number of wage-earning women and the WEAU did express some concern about the exploitation of women workers, they made little attempt to recruit even white working women into the organisation, and even stronger than this presumption of class was a political ideology dominated by the idea of white superiority. Ultimately, the majority of white suffragists saw race solidarity as a means of protecting their specific class interests, and race and ethnic loyalty pulled strongly on female political consciousness (Walker, 1990b).

A further analysis of the history of the suffragist movement reveals unanimity within white society about certain principles of social organisation regarded as fundamental to its continued existence, for example, the maintenance of white overlordship and of the Christian family as the primary social unit (Walker, 1990b). Suffragism never challenged the prevailing organisation of gender relations in South Africa. Suffragists and anti-suffragists were in agreement that they did not want to upset the existing division of labour between the sexes. Both sides based their arguments on a biologist view of gender, the idea being that there are inborn differences between men and women and consequently 'natural' male and female identities and roles.

Generally, the socialisation theories of gender differences developed by modern feminists did not form part of the debate. Those individual feminists who did challenge this predominant viewpoint were in a very small minority and their arguments had little effect on the direction of the campaign (Walker, 1990b).

Thus, the only difference between the suffragists and the traditionalists in South Africa was around the issue of compatibility between domestic responsibility and political rights. While traditionalists believed that women belonged in the home, and as the weaker sex were unsuited to politics, suffragists believed that women, as homemakers, had a special contribution to make to the political process (Walker, 1990b). Regarding other areas, suffragists and anti-suffragists/ traditionalists were in broad agreement that radical change should be avoided in South Africa. Consequently, the enfranchisement of women did not bring about the fundamental reordering of gender relations that many of its male opponents had feared and a few women had hoped (Walker, 1990b).

It is interesting (if unsurprising) to note that in black politics before World War II, woman's suffrage was not an issue. In addition, relationships between the sexes were not on the agenda, their place being usurped by the more contentious issues of the effect of white power on black living standards and political status. The assumption that politics was a male realm went unchallenged, and black leaders concentrated on matters of race discrimination that were considered more urgent. Thus, while black women were not politically invisible, the question of votes for women was insignificant when measured against the political suppression of black people as a whole as well as the dislocation of black social and economic life in the early 20th century (Walker, 1990b). For black women any experience of gender oppression they might have shared with white women was made peripheral by their experience as members of an oppressed racial group - an experience that was concretised, legitimised and articulated in political discourse in a way that experience of gender oppression was not (Walker, 1990b). For both black and white women, their sense of community with other women, the basis of their perceptions of themselves and their political mobilisation as women was circumscribed by rigid boundaries of language, ethnicity and the broader race consciousness around which South African society was organised. While these boundaries were not totally sealed,

generally early female political organisation in the form of the suffragists conformed with this mapping of the world, which has continued almost unchallenged until recently.

As in other white western feminist movements, one factor which has been argued as being cohesive between black and white South African women is their subordination to men. The argument is that women's separate realms have never involved equal access to the resources and power available to men (Walker, 1990a). However, as noted in section 1.2. of this chapter, this factor is not simply defined, especially within a multi-cultural context such as South Africa. It is basically accepted as a fact that black women in white western cultures suffer a triple oppression - that of gender, race and class (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984; Lapchick & Urdang, 1982; Walker, 1990a). While it is generally accepted that white women are also discriminated against as women, their belonging to a privileged racial group softens the impact of this gender discrimination and creates a barrier against their possible identification with black women as women with shared problems (hooks, 1981, 1984). Consequently, their is considerable disagreement about how to explain women's oppression in contemporary South Africa as well as how to analyse the intricate interrelationship between gender, race and class and their differential impact on women (Walker, 1990a). The effect that the changing social and political conditions will have on this interrelationship is also a point for debate.

From the above it is clear that the interests, aims and priorities of black and white women (at least those within the women's movements) are very different. As argued above, these interests, aims and priorities are both the cause and the effect of seemingly very different identities (hooks, 1984; Walker , 1990a).

However, the point needs to be made that it is not necessarily true that these different identities are fixed. Group identification, and consequently individual social identity, is fluid and changes as different group memberships or aspects of social identity become salient according to the social situation or context (Campbell, 1992). Thus, black feminist writers, for example hooks (1984), who argue that black women find it difficult to identify with white women because as a result of years of racial oppression, their 'blackness' is a more salient part of their identity than their gender, may be challenged to

some extent. While this may be true most of the time, so that generally black and white women have different identities, it is conceivable that certain situations will make one mutual aspect of black and white women's identity salient (specifically their gender). In those specific situations these women would share a common identity. (It should be noted that in fact, hooks (1986) and Ramazanoglu (1989) acknowledge that differences between women do not necessarily preclude a commonality of interests , and that unity may thus be constructed around these specific common issues.)

In a more general sense, it is also conceivable that black and white women could develop a common identity as the result of historical or political change that made issues of race less salient. An example of this is the way in which black women in the South African government are taking up women's issues previously considered 'white' (for example, equal pay and labour practises for women and rape and battery) since political reform has begun to eliminate race discrimination.

In the light of the above, this thesis will attempt to investigate questions concerning the content of women's identity and the contextually-dependent salience of the race and gender aspects of their identity. This thesis describes 2 separate studies, using a sample of women from different race groups in the Western Cape.

1.4. Structure of this thesis

I will begin this thesis by considering certain issues relevant to this type of research (Chapter 2). Firstly, I will set out the characteristics, aims and emphasis of feminist research in order to orientate this thesis as a piece of feminist research. Making this orientation explicit is important, because it has direct implications for the methodology. The aims and characteristics of both social psychology and feminist research will then be compared, and the parallels will be highlighted in order to argue the appropriateness of conducting feminist research within the theoretical framework of social psychology. Finally, the methodological implications of conducting feminist research will then be considered, with reference to the political appropriateness of this research, and the quantitative versus qualitative methodology debate.

Thereafter, in Chapter 3, I will review theoretical approaches to understanding identity in order to motivate my placing of this thesis within the framework of social identity theory.

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Study 1 will be outlined. This is an exploratory study, conducted with women from the Western Cape. The focus group methodology and content analysis are used to explore questions about the content and salience of women's identity.

Study 2, (which will be outlined in Chapters 7, 8 and 9) was designed to experimentally examine one of the suggestions that emerged from the focus groups conducted in Study 1.

In this study, the effect of drawing attention to 'sexual violence against women' in making salient the 'woman' aspect of black and white women's identity is explored experimentally, using a pre-test post-test, experimental-control group design. It was decided to explore this factor after black and white women in the focus groups in study one indicated that violence against women was the one factor which made them identify more strongly with the group 'women', than with their own particular race group.

Finally, in Chapter 10, the results of the two studies will be integrated, discussed and critiqued, and an attempt will be made to assess the contribution of this thesis and its implications for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AROUND THIS RESEARCH

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will begin by orientating this thesis as feminist psychological research. Thereafter, the methodological implications and considerations that result from labelling this thesis as feminist psychological research will be considered.

2.2. Orientating this research as feminist psychological research

As I wish to explicitly classify this thesis as a piece of feminist psychological research, a classification which impacts on the approach, the methodology and the interpretation of this work, it is necessary to explain what I think is meant by feminist psychological research.

Psychological research refers to any research involving the study of the mind and human behaviour. This thesis falls within the area of social psychology (an area of psychology that focuses on social interaction), and more specifically within the area of social identity, which refers to the way in which people define themselves as members of particular social groups. Defining feminist research is a difficult task, as there is no prescribed, unitary feminist research methodology that is considered correct and followed by all feminist researchers (Griffin, 1989). Feminists vary in their perspectives on feminism, and this is turn influences the research they do, and the methods they use (Phoenix, 1990). However, two themes which most feminist researchers would agree are central to the conducting of feminist research, can be identified : (1) The centrality of a female perspective and (2) A critical evaluation of the research process (Phoenix, 1990). These themes emerge directly out of the two main areas of feminist critique of mainstream social science: The theme regarding the centrality of a female perspective emerges out of

the critique with regard to the content, ideology and theory of mainstream social science, and the theme of a critical evaluation of the research process emerges out of the critique with regard to the methodology of mainstream social science. These critiques and themes may be outlined as follows:

2.2.1. The critique regarding the content, ideology and theory of mainstream social science and the consequent theme of the centrality of a female perspective

The feminist critique of the content, ideology and theory of conventional, mainstream social science is based on the claim that these are inherently androcentric (male-centred).

Mainstream social science and conventional research in the social sciences are androcentric in various ways. The first way in which this androcentricism is manifested, is in the adoption of the male as the standard or the prototype (Walker, 1987). This means that men are considered as the norm and women are evaluated in relation to them (Weisstein, 1973). The psychological example of this type of androcentrism given by Walker (1987) is taken from psychoanalytic theory. According to Freudian psychoanalysis, male development, which is based on the penis as a possession, is normal, while females symbolise 'a lack of' or 'the other' in relation to men (Walker, 1987).

Another way in which mainstream social science manifests its androcentrism, is in the research questions which it asks (Harding, 1987). The kinds of topics chosen for research and the types of research chosen for publication are mostly irrelevant to women's lives (Grady, 1981). Harding (1987) and Kelly-Gadol (1987) both use the discipline of history as an example of this. They argue that the male point of view is written as the definitive viewpoint of history, while events that women experience as historical revolutions, such as the advent of birth control, are ignored.

Consequently, the question arises as to what the feminist solution for androcentric research is. Harding (1987) argues very strongly that adding women does not neutralise the androcentric approach. Thus, merely including female subjects in androcentric studies

(i.e. conducting non-sexist androcentric research) is not enough, because this simply involves looking at the role of women in activities that are important to men (Harding 1987). In addition, this type of non-sexist androcentric research still means that women are considered within the traditional approach to knowledge, an approach in which their experience is distorted and misinterpreted because they are considered in relation to a masculine norm (Beckett, 1986; Griffin, 1986) or in terms of male-constructed stereotypes (Wetherell, 1986; Wilkinson, 1986).

Harding (1987) makes two further points concerning the ineffectiveness of simply adding women to androcentric research: Firstly, she points out that female researchers joining existing, male-dominated centres for social science research are generally forced to conform, both by practical issues, such as funding, as well as by the power of the androcentric tradition itself. Furthermore, she argues that research studying women as the victims of male dominance is equally problematic because it suggests that women can only be victims, and ignores the fact that women have not always remained victims, but have fought to improve their own position.

Thus, with regard to the content, ideology and theory of the research, for research to be feminist "a female perspective is to be regarded as central to the research, not as an additional or comparative viewpoint" (Wilkinson, 1986, p. 2). Feminism "implies assuming a perspective in which women's experiences, ideas and needs are valid in their own right", and not evaluated in terms of a male constructed norm (Klein, 1983, p. 89). Therefore, women and topics of relevance to women, need to be considered a valid basis for the content of research, as well as the theory resulting from that research in order for the research to be considered feminist.

2.2.2. The critique regarding the methodology of mainstream social science research and the theme of a critical evaluation of the research process

Both feminist writers (Grady, 1981; Klein 1983; Unger, 1983; Wilkinson, 1986) and other writers (Danziger, 1990) have critiqued traditional social science for its pursuit and claiming of objective, value-free research. Traditional social science research is based on

a positivist approach which views the social sciences as an extension of the natural sciences. As such, factual data may be used to falsify or confirm hypotheses and theories which aim to reflect the truth about reality (Danziger, 1990).

This approach is criticised because it is argued that although research is often assumed to be objective, there are underlying cultural norms and ideologies which inform theory and methodology. Traditional social science research fails to recognise the socially constructed nature of knowledge (Danziger, 1990). For example, as discussed above in section 2.2.1., feminist critiques of traditional social science argue that our society is patriarchal, therefore research is androcentric, taking men as the norm against which women's ideas and experiences are evaluated. Consequently, women's ideas and experiences are seldom seen as valid in their own right (Klein, 1983), because knowledge is constructed and valued in terms of a societal system where men are dominant.

While researchers within the traditional social science paradigm usually aim to avoid imposing their own beliefs on those being studied under the auspices of objective, positivist, empiricist research, Unger (1983) notes that this objectifying process is merely a means of concealing a particular view of the world - knowledge can never be objective or value-free.

Furthermore, Unger (1983) argues that what we look for determines what we find; our beliefs about reality determine what we focus on and what we ignore. Therefore in research we may selectively seek out information that confirms our hypotheses, so reconstructing a reality that is based upon our stereotypic beliefs about individuals and groups. In this way we perpetuate the existing biases that exist in our society.

This idea may extended to argue that how we look also determines what we find. Grady (1981), Trainor, Hartung, Ollenburg, Moore and Deegan (1983) and Unger (1983) point out that methods used in research often look for problems within the individuals being studied, rather than considering social, cultural and historical factors. Grady (1981) also stresses the importance of research design in the information that is obtained. The research topics selected, the subject selection, the operationalization of the variables, the

selection of research questions and the interpretation of results are all research processes which may be subject to the researcher's bias, thus producing biased results and conclusions. Linking this to the feminist critique of mainstream social science, it may be said that working within an androcentric framework cannot reflect a true understanding of women's lives.

Thus, with regard to the methodology employed in the research, feminist research entails a critical evaluation of the research process itself (Phoenix, 1990). The assumptions on which traditional social science research is based (that is the priority given to reliability and objectivity and the necessity for replicability and generalizability (Wilkinson, 1986) are questioned. As a result of this, there is a concomitant move away from traditional quantitative, experimental research methods towards qualitative methodologies. The point is noted that no research can ever be objective or value-free and feminist researchers are required to be reflexive, and acknowledge and state their bias explicitly. Thus, "women's research makes explicit the risk of subjective involvement and the bid to gain new theoretical understanding" (Callaway, 1981, p. 470). Consequently, there is a "conscious subjectivity which replaces the 'value-free objectivity' of traditional research" (Klein, 1983, p. 94). (The practical implications of feminist psychological research will be examined in detail in section 2.4.)

It thus follows from these two central themes of feminist research that a feminist practise of psychology is likely to be very different from a non-feminist one (Phoenix, 1990). As psychology falls directly within the ambit of the mainstream social science critiqued by feminists, and is perhaps the social science that makes the most use of objective research methods borrowed from the physical sciences, it follows that feminist psychology will involve a critique of various traditional psychological practices. Feminist researchers are required to ensure that research problems are not constructed from an androcentric viewpoint (Phoenix, 1990). Taking a female perspective requires attempting to find out what women's views and experiences really are, rather than inferring them from observation and experiments. Consequently, it may be necessary to interview women (Phoenix, 1990). The fact that it is necessary to use methodological tools (such as interviewing) which are considered low status in psychology, as well as to invent tools

when traditional ones are unsuitable, is one of the fundamental reasons which lead feminist psychologists to critically evaluate the traditional social science research practices used in psychology and to focus on the power relations that affect their subjects (Griffin, 1986; Phoenix, 1990).

2.3. A note on the appropriateness of conducting feminist research from a social psychological perspective

Before exploring the methodological implications of conducting feminist research, it is necessary to comment on the relationship between feminism and psychology, and in particular, the relationship between feminism and social psychology. It should be noted that while feminist psychology is often accepted as a well-established field, the two disciplines (that is, feminism and psychology) did not unite without problems. In fact, there has been a lot of debate among feminists about the suitability of trying to combine these two streams of thought.

However, despite these difficulties, and the fundamental contradictions between feminism and psychology, much work has been done on and within the amalgamation of these two disciplines, because there has been a widespread recognition of the positive contribution that they could make to each other. While feminist thought can encourage a broader, more critical practice of mainstream psychology, the contemporary and historical developments in psychology, particularly in social psychology, seem to offer spaces within which to develop new kinds of theory and practice that address feminist concerns (Wilkinson, 1991).

The reason that the amalgamation between these two fields has been widely accepted as appropriate is probably due to the fact that there are direct parallels between the feminist approach and that of the 'new' social psychology.

An analysis of the aims of feminism and the 'new' social psychology reveals that the two disciplines have much in common. The 'new' social psychology arose out of the 'crisis' that occurred in social psychology in the late 1960's and the early 1970's. During this

'crisis', the issue of social influences became a concern for many European social psychologists, and the idea that it is the context that gives the behaviour meaning emerged in much of their work. (The title of Tajfel's critical paper, *Experiments in a vacuum* (Tajfel, 1972), clearly reflects this 'new' concern.).

At the same time, social psychology in the USA also underwent a crisis of confidence (Foster, 1991a). Civil rights campaigns were becoming more active, black power was emerging and student movements were becoming increasingly involved in political activism. In addition, the women's movement was becoming more influential. Within this context of social change, many American social psychologists also began to write articles expressing concern about the state of social psychology (Foster, 1991a).

One area of social psychology which was criticised was that of the methodology employed in social psychological research: it was felt that experimental methods in particular threatened the validity of findings because of problems such as experimenter effects (where the participant's answer is influenced by the experimenter).

Another area that was criticised was the way in which the subjects of social psychological research tended to be regarded as passive objects, rather than as active agents.

Furthermore, there was concern about the fact that most social psychological theories explained behaviour in terms of the individual, and ignored the fact that individuals existed within a social-cultural context. This concern was linked to the concern about the ahistorical nature of social psychology, and the realisation that research findings could be merely the product of contemporary historical events, rather than valid across historical time and events.

Underlying all these criticisms and concerns was the fact that the social relevance of social psychology was being questioned. Students, black activists and women were challenging the existing status quo, and the theories and research findings of social psychology were not relevant to major social and political issues. In fact some writers

even recognised the fact that many social psychological theories with their individualistic bias (whereby behaviour was attributed to the individual, without taking any cognisance of the influence of the individual's environment on the individual) served to reproduce and maintain the social order (Foster, 1991a).

Several elements of the feminist critiques echo the debates around the crisis in social psychology in the 1970's and resemble the viewpoints of the 'new' social psychology that emerged out of the crisis (Wilkinson, 1986). Particularly of note is the strong similarity (discussed in section 2.2.2. above) between the feminist critique of androcentric social science, and the 'new' social psychology's objections to positivism. For example the feminist argument that social-science is not value-free and objective (Griffin, 1986; Unger, 1983) mirrors the critique of social psychology by Harre and Secord (1972). Similarly, the feminist critique of the traditional social science methodology of laboratory experiments and the call for a focus on the social context of research (Kitzinger, 1986; Klein, 1983; Wetherell, 1986), reflect Israel and Tajfel's (1972) concerns with regard to social psychology in the 1970's.

2.4. Methodological issues

It is apparent from sections 2.2. and 2.3. above that classifying this thesis as feminist psychological research has implications for the methodology adopted in this study. In this section, certain ideological and theoretical issues and their impact on the methodological choices made in this research will be addressed.

As this study involves research on women, and is labelled by myself (the researcher) as feminist research, it is necessary to refer to the debates and trends within feminist and women's studies methodological literature and methodological critiques. These debates and trends may be broadly divided into two areas: (1) Political issues and (2) The quantitative versus qualitative methodological debate.

2.4.1. Political issues

As this research was conducted in South Africa with its history of apartheid and political activism, it is necessary to consider the political issues that impacted on my methodological choices.

The methodological area that is directly impacted on by feminist political concerns in general is that of the selection of participants. There has been a long-standing debate in the social sciences about the appropriateness of white researchers conducting cross-cultural research.

As I intended to conduct cross-cultural research, it was necessary to consider the debate around this ethical problem, with particular reference to the South African context.

In South Africa during the 70's and 80's, there was strong pressure on progressive white university researchers to focus their attention on the problems and injustices faced by black working class people under the Capitalist apartheid regime. However, in the early 90's there has been a shift away from this position, particularly in the field of women's studies. Since the issue arose at the Women and Gender in Southern Africa conference in Durban in 1991 (Horn, 1991), it has been fiercely debated whether white middle class women, such as myself, have the ability to understand the experience of black working class women, and furthermore, whether it is appropriate for us to conduct such research. Funani (1992) holds the viewpoint that black women need to be given the opportunity to explore their own realities, before other people can be allowed to conduct research with black women. Furthermore, she states that collecting, analysing and reporting data cannot be equated with living an experience. She argues that even when the data is collected through an interaction where the researcher "is part of a complex interplay of judgement, empathy and sympathy," the researcher "cannot claim to have gone through the experience" (Funani, 1992, p. 68). Therefore, it is necessary to question the meaning of the concept 'knowledge', when white women researchers claim to have knowledge of black women's experiences (Funani, 1992).

Campbell (1992) acknowledges that the political force of this argument, regarding the appropriateness of such research is undeniable. Thus she agrees that one of the legacies of apartheid and capitalism has been that working class black people have been denied access to education and research skills, and that the elimination of race and class in the South African education system and research community must be urgently addressed. Nonetheless, Campbell (1992) finds the argument that people are only able to understand the behaviour and experiences of others of the same race, class and gender group as themselves unconvincing.

I agree that race and class bias within the South African system must be urgently addressed, and that black and coloured researchers need to be given the skills to research their own communities. However, I do not believe that while this is being addressed that white researchers should be restricted to studying their own race group. In fact, I feel that bearing the structure of the South African population in mind, it would be inappropriate and in fact unjustifiable for a white researcher to ignore the majority of the population in his/her research. Merely researching the minority white population would invalidate any such researcher's work, as it would be non-representative. Furthermore, such research would be following in a pattern of oppressive minority group research. As Cannon, Higginbotham and Leung (1991) point out, some feminist researchers may make politically motivated decisions to exclude particular groups from research. However, the pervasiveness of exclusionary practises has a cumulative effect, and has resulted in a prevailing literature which claims to identify social realities, yet merely reflects white and middle-class experiences (Cannon, Higginbotham & Leung, 1991) Consequently, I decided to use a cross-cultural sample of black, white and coloured women. This decision was supported by other methodological factors: As these are the main population groups residing in the Western Cape area where this study was located, such a sample was more representative of women in this area than a sample of white women would have been. Furthermore, race/population group was one of the variables under investigation. It should be noted, however, that I am fully aware that the fact that I conducted research with black and coloured women does not allow me to claim that I have shared their experiences.

2.4.2. The quantitative versus qualitative debate

The second area which came under consideration in the light of the feminist methodological literature, was that of choice of methodology. Fundamentally this became a choice between quantitative and qualitative methodology. The whole of feminist methodology was initiated by the feminist critique of quantitative research (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). Since the late 1960's, this criticism has been plentiful and has focused on a broad range of issues. (It should be noted that some of these criticisms are not a critique of quantitative methodology as such, but of the aims of traditional social science research — see sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. above. These criticisms have however been levelled at quantitative methodology because this methodology has become closely associated with traditional social science research).

One of the main issues was the use of biased research designs in quantitative research, specifically the use of only male subjects (Grady, 1981; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). This was linked to the criticism that quantitative research had generally limited itself to the selection of sexist and elitist research topics (Grady, 1981; Jayaratne, 1983; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991), that is, topics that were only of interest to males and the privileged economic classes, and were completely irrelevant to women's lives (Grady, 1981)

Another criticism levelled at quantitative methodology was that it had become associated with an exploitative relationship between the researcher and subject (Jayaratne, 1983, Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991; Mies, 1983; Oakley, 1981; Reinharz, 1983; Stanley & Wise, 1983). This referred to the fact that the participants in quantitative research had traditionally been used by the researcher to gain information, without receiving anything in return.

Quantitative methodology was also criticised for upholding the illusion of objectivity — that is, the illusion that the researcher is completely unbiased and uninfluenced by any personal beliefs and the illusion that the results of quantitative research reflect reality and constitute the 'truth' (Jayaratne, 1983; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991; Stanley & Wise, 1983).

It was also claimed that quantitative data was simplistic and superficial in nature (Jayaratne, 1983; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). It has been argued that this is largely a result of the fact that most of the research done in the social sciences is carried out in order to produce a quick publication (Jayaratne, 1983). Consequently, such research is often poorly done, and is not comprehensive enough to test theory adequately (Jayaratne, 1983). The most obvious examples of this type of simplistic quantitative research which have been widely criticised by feminist writers are studies which ignore sex differences or studies which only look at sex differences as causal factors, while ignoring other possible causal factors. Very often the latter studies conclude an inherent difference between the sexes (Jayaratne, 1983).

Furthermore, quantitative research has been criticised for the improper interpretation and overgeneralization of findings, including the application to women of theory tested exclusively on male subjects and for inadequate data dissemination and utilisation (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991).

Mies (1983) sums up these criticisms by arguing that there is a fundamental difference between quantitative methodological theory and the goals of the feminist community.

In response to these criticisms, feminist researchers have recognised the need for a research methodology reflective of feminist values that could be generally used in the social sciences (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991; Mies, 1983). The chosen methodology was fundamentally qualitative. Qualitative methodology was promoted for many reasons, generally the opposite of the reasons for which quantitative methods were criticised (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). Underlying all these reasons was the understanding that qualitative research involved a more relaxed, human relationship between researcher and researched, and consequently allowed women to express their experience more fully in their own terms (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). Furthermore, as qualitative research methods had rarely been seen in traditional social science research, and is almost entirely absent from some social science disciplines (Jayaratne, 1983), it had not become associated with the aims of traditional social science research which feminists criticised.

Thus feminist researchers have two options with regard to methodology: either they can reject quantitative methodology completely, or they can extract and use the elements which are useful, while working to change the elements which contradict feminist ideology (Jayaratne, 1983).

While the criticisms of quantitative research methodology are undoubtedly valid, and the value of qualitative research cannot be disputed, I nonetheless do not believe that quantitative research should be rejected out of hand. As mentioned above, it should be noted that the criticisms levelled against quantitative methods chiefly concern the way in which and the aims for which quantitative methodology has traditionally been used, rather than the quantitative method itself. For example, Jayaratne (1983) makes the point regarding the superficial and simplistic nature of quantitative research that simplistic research is not inherent to quantitative research. She points out that in fact it is quantitative methods which make the analysis of complex research designs such as longitudinal designs possible. Thus one may argue that the methodology is flawed, but not necessarily the method.

This argument agrees with the recent feminist swing away from opposition to all aspects of mainstream, quantitative research (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991; Peplau & Conrad, 1989; Wallston, 1981). It has been recognised that quantitative research methods are useful because they allow theories and hypotheses to be tested (Jayaratne, 1983). Theory forms the basis of the quantitative research process. From these theories, specific research hypotheses, which are tested by means of research methodologies, are generated. The development, testing and validation of feminist theories are critical because feminists need to be able to offer alternatives when condemning prevailing sexist theories (Jayaratne, 1983).

Currently, an inclusive viewpoint on methods is increasingly being accepted amongst feminists. This viewpoint promotes the value and appropriateness of both qualitative and quantitative methods for feminist research, and the emphasis is on using the method which will best answer the particular research question, provided it are always used in ways which are consistent with broad feminist goals and ideology (Jayaratne & Stewart,

1991). In fact, Jayaratne and Stewart (1991) recommend that wherever possible designs should combine quantitative and qualitative methods. This approach, known as multi-method, or triangulation, has been recommended (Jayaratne, 1983; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991) because it provides a way of counteracting the disadvantages of one method with the advantages of the other. Where this combination of methods is practical, it should result in more effective and convincing research (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). A philosophical reason for adopting the multi-method approach, is that it provides an effective method for changing the sexist structure of society (Jayaratne, 1983). Jayaratne (1983) argues that feminists need to use quantitative methodology in order to produce appropriate quantitative evidence to counter the influential sexist research which has been and is being produced in the social sciences.

In the light of the above arguments, the multi-method approach to methodology has been adopted in this research. In the first study, women's identity was explored by means of focus groups. The data obtained from these groups was then content analysed (a qualitative approach). In the second study, quantitative and qualitative methodologies were combined, and questionnaires/measures were administered in the form of one-to-one interviews.

2.5. Summary

In this chapter, this thesis was explicitly classified as feminist psychological research. Feminist research was defined as research that regards a female perspective as central and that critically evaluates the research process it employs. Finally, the implications of conducting feminist research for the methodology of this thesis were explored. Various feminist methodological debates and critiques were discussed, and the following decisions were ultimately reached:

(1) So-called black, coloured and white women would be included in this research, despite the fact that I (the researcher) am white, and

(2) The multi-method approach to methodology would be employed, rather than only a qualitative approach.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO IDENTITY

3.1. Introduction and structure

Breakwell (1986) noted that attempting a definition of the term 'identity' is fairly problematic. Partly, this is because the term 'identity' has been used interchangeably with other conceptual terms, for example, character, self-concept, personality and ego. Breakwell (1986) argues that it is consequently impossible to maintain universally applicable distinctions between these terms. She also points out that a particular theorist will choose the term that relates to the philosophical and methodological foundations of their theory — thus, the psychoanalyst may refer to the ego, while the symbolic interactionist may refer to self-concept. Furthermore, she argues that the theory in fact defines the term; this means that the same term, i.e. identity, may have completely different meanings when used by two theorists with different theoretical orientations.

One clear trend that may be identified within the multiplicity of conflicting theoretical approaches to identity in psychology is the shift in theoretical focus from the 'individual' to the 'social'. Early psychological theories of the 'self' (for example, psychodynamic theories, behaviourist theories and humanist theories) were primarily concerned with the structure and development of the individual's personality. In response to the 'crisis' in social psychology that occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970's (discussed in detail in section 2.3.) European social psychologists, convinced that behaviour is given its meaning by the social context in which it occurs, began to focus more on social influences on human behaviour. With regard to theories of identity, this shift in focus to the social was twofold: Firstly, the theoretical concept of identity was expanded to include both the 'personal identity' (the individual's particular personality, likes, dislikes, skills and attitudes) and the 'social identity' (the individual's perception of themselves as a member of a group, for example 'women' or 'whites', and as someone with the characteristics of that group). Secondly, linked to this, there has been a shift from

considering identity development as the product of individual psychological processes, to viewing identity development as the result of societal influences, and as occurring within a social context. (Societal influences may refer either to the influence of other individuals or groups, manifested through social interactions, or may refer to the influence of macro-structures within society, for example, the state.) After this shift in focus, two influential theoretical approaches to identity emerged in the area of social psychology. These were social identity theory and social constructionist theory.

As the focus of this thesis was primarily on the gender versus race identity of women from different race groups in the Western Cape, within the context of South African society, this thesis falls within the theoretical framework of the post 'crisis' social psychological theories of identity. Thus, this chapter will begin with a review of the social identity theory and social constructionist approaches to identity with reference to the theoretical explanations that these approaches posit for understanding gender and race identity. Furthermore, as this thesis has been explicitly orientated as a feminist social psychological work, and as much of the work on women's identity has been conducted within the framework of feminist social psychology, social identity theory and social constructionist theories will be evaluated from within this perspective. Finally, this thesis will be placed within a theoretical framework.

3.2. Tajfel's social identity theory (SIT)

SIT was developed by Tajfel and his co-workers as a response to the dissatisfaction with the 'individualistic' nature of social psychology that was expressed during the 'crisis'. Over the last two decades it has developed into a leading social psychological theory of intergroup relations which also provides useful insights into understanding identity.

Fundamentally, Tajfel and Turner's SIT proposes a three-stage psychological process which explains discriminatory strategies between groups in terms of the individual's striving towards a positive self-image or identity. These three psychological stages are as follows:

3.2.1 Social categorization

The process of social categorization refers to the process whereby people are perceived in terms of categories or groups that have some relevance or meaning to the person doing the classifying . The categories and groups that we use do not arise spontaneously, but are consensual, conventional and socially constructed (Wetherell, 1996a). Tajfel and Turner understood these categories to be the product of human activity within specific historical contexts. In the South African context, the categories of race, religion, language and gender are commonly used (De la Rey, 1991). If one considers the South African history of discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity, it is understandable that race, religion and language have emerged as significant classification categories within the South African context. Similarly, the importance of gender as a classification category may be understood within the context of the gender discrimination that is characteristic of Western, patriarchal society.

Tajfel (1959, 1978) and others (Bruner, 1957; Wilder, 1981) have argued that social categorization is part of the basic cognitive process of categorical differentiation. Categorical differentiation refers to the way in which we categorize objects and people into groups in order to help us to process the infinite amount of information and stimuli present in our environment. We simplify our environment, and make it more manageable, through the principle of accentuation. This principle refers to the fact that we exaggerate the similarities within a group (for example a race or gender group), as well as the differences between groups (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Furthermore, this accentuation of differences between categories is only observed with regard to the differences which define the categorization, and the effects are more extreme when the categories/groups concerned are important to the accentuator (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). The most obvious situation where this occurs is where one of the categories concerns oneself (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). (In terms of this argument it is possible to argue that gender and race are significant as categories because they constitute categories that involve everyone.)

One difference between our perceptions of groups of objects and our perceptions of social groups is that our perception of social groups is characterised by an evaluative

component (positive or negative) and an emotional component (like or dislike). Tajfel (1978, 1981) argued that the addition of these two components to the social categorization process resulted in a greater exaggeration of perceived intragroup similarities and perceived intergroup differences. With regard to gender and race, this theoretical proposition could be used to explain the positive evaluation that has traditionally been given to whites and men within Western society, as well as the negative evaluation that has traditionally been given to blacks and women. Furthermore, it is relevant to understanding the emphasis which Western society has placed on the differences between the races and the genders.

3.2.2. Social identification

Social categorizations perform more than one function — not only do they divide the world into categories and so provide a way of processing information, they also provide a way for us to define our own place in society (Tajfel, 1981).

Through social categorization we identify ourselves with some groups and exclude/distance ourselves from other groups. This group membership becomes internalised as part of our self-concept (Tajfel &Turner, 1979). Our self concept is proposed to have two subsystems: personal identity and group identity. While personal identity refers to the unique aspects of the individual such as personality traits, likes and dislikes, social identity refers to the description of oneself as a member of various groups. (Within SIT, the development of the gender and race aspects of the social identity may therefore be understood as the internalisation of gender and race group membership.)

Based on the theoretical concepts of social categorization and social identification discussed above, social identification may be defined as the process whereby the individual becomes part of a social group and in turn, the group becomes part of the individual's self-concept. Alternatively, social identity may be defined as an individual's knowledge of his/her belonging to one or more social groups coupled with that individual placing some emotional and value significance on that belonging (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Tajfel, 1978). Thus, the process of categorization (discussed above) is central to the formation of social identity in terms of SIT.

Social identity has been labelled as one of the central social psychological constructs that underlie the manifestation of intergroup behaviour. Tajfel (1978, 1981) proposed that all social interaction falls along a continuum. On one end of the continuum is purely interpersonal or interindividual behaviour, which occurs when the social interaction between two or more people is governed solely by their individual characteristics. At the other end of the continuum, there is purely intergroup behaviour which occurs when the social interaction is totally determined by group affiliation. Turner (1982, 1985) theorised that a shift on this behavioural continuum from interpersonal to intergroup behaviours corresponds to and results from a transition in self-concept functioning from personal to social identity. In any social situation a different part of the self concept or a combination of parts of the self-concept may be salient - that is, in some situations personal identity may be salient, while in others social identity may be salient. It is when social identity (for example gender and race identity) is salient that intergroup behaviour (for example, sexist behaviour and inter-race hostility) occurs.

Thus, interpersonal and intergroup behaviour are different types of behaviour that are controlled by different processes in the self-concept. However, these two processes are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Turner (1982, 1985) argues that they operate simultaneously. The result is that most of the time we perceive ourselves as moderately different from ingroup members as well as moderately different from outgroup members. It is this concept of social identity and the questions of how different social identities and different aspects of social identity become salient, that are central to Study 1.

3.2.3. Social comparison

The third central concept of SIT is social comparison. The concept of social comparison may be traced back to Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory in which social identity theory has some of its roots (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). According to social comparison theory, we have an upward directional drive which causes us to constantly

compare ourselves to others who are similar or slightly better than ourselves on relevant dimensions. These social comparisons provide us with a means to evaluate our abilities, opinions and experience. SIT agrees that people clarify their social identity through social comparison, but differs from social comparison theory in its argument that this comparison generally occurs not between individuals, but between ingroups and outgroups.

The basic assumption of SIT is that social categories and hence social identities have an evaluative component and are consequently viewed as either positive or negative. This results in the process of social comparison. Social comparison is the process whereby the evaluative dimension of group membership is determined. People compare their own group to specific outgroups using some or other dimension of comparison. The result of this comparison is a graduation of differences, called a status hierarchy. A group perceived as superior to another on a particular dimension will be high status; a group perceived as inferior on that dimension will have lower status. Thus the more positive the characteristics attributed to the group, the higher that group's status will be (Hogg & Abrams, 1990).

Group membership forms a part of the individual's self concept through social identity, therefore such social comparisons will impact on the self. Perceived status will affect whether or not a particular group membership have a positive or negative effect on the individual's social identity. This means that if the results of the comparison between ingroup and outgroup designate the ingroup as having high status, members of that ingroup will have a positive social identity; however, if the ingroup is awarded a low social status on the basis of social comparisons, the members of that ingroup will have a negative social identity.

A central tenet of SIT is that individuals have a need for a positive self concept, and in fact strive for it. Thus, if their ingroup is conferred a low status, and members consequently have a negative social identity, these individuals will strive for change in order to achieve a positive social identity. A group member's response to a negative social identity will depend on the availability of cognitive alternatives. SIT predicts that

where there is an absence of cognitive alternatives to the status quo, that is, little chance of changing the status of the group, the member will be likely to attempt to achieve a positive social identity on an individual level. Social mobility is usually the result — the individual will attempt to move from his/her low status group to a group with a higher social status. Where actual social mobility is not possible, psychological mobility may occur. This is expressed as a preference for the attitudes and behaviours associated with the higher status outgroup. If low status groups perceive the social order as unstable, social change may occur. This occurs when social change strategies are undertaken in order to change the position of the group in the status hierarchy, and so improve the social identity of the members of that group. Several social change strategies are referred to in SIT. Social action is the most disruptive strategy, and includes action such as political protest, strikes and revolutions (for example the struggle against apartheid in South Africa). A less radical strategy called social creativity attempts to redefine some existing group characteristic in positive terms (Tajfel, 1978). An example of this would be the slogans 'black is beautiful', and 'to be young and black is where it's at' which both occurred in the late sixties with the rise of 'Black Power' politics (Bryan, Dadzie & Scafe, 1985).

Finally, SIT also refers to the phenomenon whereby membership of a high status group no longer provides a positive social identity. SIT suggests that this is most likely to occur when the superior status of the group is based on principles which are perceived as unjust and immoral. A good example of this would be in South Africa, where many whites in the past dissociated themselves with the white ruling class and attempted to align themselves with blacks — outward evidence of this was the wearing of ethnic clothing (De la Rey, 1991).

The concepts of social comparison and social creativity are relevant to this study because they agree with the trend within black feminist literature whereby black feminist writers see themselves as black or as black women but not simply as women. This would be a way of differentiating themselves from other (white) women. These black women writers also view their 'blackness' as positive which would reflect the concept of social creativity. On the other hand, many white women writers emphasise the fact that black and white

women have their gender in common. This could be seen as an attempt by these women to disassociate themselves from the white ruling class by lessening the importance of their racial identity as opposed to their gender identity.

3.2.4. Summary

The above discussion of how discriminatory strategies between groups are linked to the individual's striving for a positive self-concept may be summarised as follows: The individual's desire for positive self-evaluation is the basis for differentiation between groups. Consequently, differentiation is likely to be greater on dimensions of general social value or importance to the ingroup, especially if the dimension forms part of the ingroup's stereotyped identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Social identity is enhanced to the extent that positive distinctiveness is achieved via perceiving the ingroup as both different and better to the outgroup (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Categorization triggers the search for distinguishing features, while social comparison and the striving for positive identity promote the selective accentuation of intergroup differences that favour the ingroup. Furthermore, both processes act together to reduce perceived within-group variation (Hogg & Abrams, 1990).

3.3. Developments within social identity theory: self categorization theory

Self categorization theory (SCT) (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989) developed out of SIT. In SCT the conceptual focus shifted from an investigation of the social psychological dimensions of intergroup behaviour and conflict, to the intra-individual cognitive processes hypothesised to underlie group membership. Essentially, this development of SIT considers two questions: (1) What are the psychological processes whereby the individual comes to identify him/herself as a group member? and (2) What are the processes whereby people come to categorize themselves in terms of social categories? (Campbell, 1992).

Thus, while SIT was concerned with explaining inter-group discrimination, SCT had the following aim:

> The current theory, developed later, is focused on the explanation not of a specific kind of group behaviour, but of how individuals are able to act as a group at all. The basic hypothesis is a cognitive (or social cognitive) elaboration of the nature of social identity as a higher order level of abstraction in the perception of self and others (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42).

The fundamental feature of group membership is that it provides people with a social identity and helps them define who they are. According to SCT, when people identify themselves with a group, they categorize themselves as members of it, and, consequently, mentally associate themselves with the attitudes and norms which they perceive as being part of the group. This self-categorization accomplishes two things:

> It causes one to perceive oneself as identical to, to have the same identity as, other members of the category — it places oneself in the relevant social category, or places the group in one's head; and it generates category-congruent behaviour on dimensions which are stereotypic of the category. Self-categorization is the process which transforms individuals into groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 21).

The problem with SCT is that it is reductionistic. The last sentence of the above quotation clearly manifests the reductionism inherent to SCT. Turner's starting point is that individuals exist; against this background, SCT aims to investigate the psychological processes whereby these individuals become a group. This implies that it is possible to conceive of individuals independently of their group membership. However, Duveen and Lloyd (1986), argue that the idea of an individual existing prior to and independently of group memberships is meaningless. According to them, individuals are born into a pre-existing multi-group system. Campbell (1992) supports this viewpoint.

3.4. An evaluation of SIT

Despite its significance as a theory of identity and intergroup behaviour, various areas of SIT have been criticised.

One of these areas is the theory's clearcut distinction between social identity and personal identity. While this is an important analytic distinction for social identity theorists and researchers it is arguable whether this distinction exists so clearly in real life (Breakwell, 1986; Brown, 1996). Brown (1996) argues that inevitably, social and personal identities are not entirely separate: on the one hand, social identity will affect individual identity, on the other hand, where this is a choice with regard to social identity in the form of what groups to belong to, personal identity will affect this choice. Thus, in real life, behaviour is likely to result from a complex interaction of personal influences, current group identity, previous group identities and co-existing group identities.

Another area of criticism of social identity theory is that as a theory it presents as an 'all or nothing' conceptualization. Brown (1996) argues that within SIT there is little allowance made for individual differences, and consequently SIT would appear to have difficulty explaining phenomena such as the individual differences in conformity that occur in Asch-type experiments. Similarly, SIT does not make allowances for gradations in identifying with a group, or in the strength of a particular social identity.

With regard to gender and race, SIT is problematic in the way in which it formulates gender and race relations. Because intergroup conflict is not perceived as a psychopathology in terms of SIT, or as the result of prejudice, but merely as a form of behaviour involving complex psychological states which are also central to more positive group actions such as group loyalty, group cohesiveness and national belonging, SIT emphasises the 'ordinariness' of sexism and racism. In terms of SIT, sexism and racism are simply the result of the processes of intergroup conflict, within a particular social context where 'racial categories' have become significant and have acquired meaning as group divisions (Wetherell, 1996a). Furthermore, SIT paints a more pessimistic picture of the possibilities for race and gender relations than other theories of group conflict, for example Sherif & Sherif's (1966, 1969) realistic conflict theory. Whereas the Sherifs state that conflict between groups is the result of competition for a scarce resource, and may be resolved through working together for a superordinate goal, SIT claims that conflict may be triggered whenever the minimal conditions for forming social categories and group divisions are present (as in the minimal group studies).

Some of the most telling criticisms of SIT have been the post-modern critiques by social constructionist theorists. Post-modern social constructionist approaches have primarily critiqued SIT for its adoption of the traditional social psychological idea of an objective truth. These approaches criticise social psychology, and in fact psychology as a whole, because of their attempts and claims to have discovered the truth (Parker, 1990). From the postmodernist perspective, there is no objective truth, all we have is subjective accounts. (This post-modernist criticism with regard to social psychology's claim of having discovered certain objective truths reflects the feminist criticism of mainstream social science discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.)

The method of critique used by post-modern critics is known as deconstruction. The aim of this technique is to take a piece of discourse or text (for example the text constituting SIT) and unravel hidden assumptions and repressed meanings (Parker, 1990). Thus the 'truth' of academic writings is questioned, and their subjectivity is revealed.

Michael (1990) presented a detailed deconstruction of what he refers to as IGT. IGT stands for intergroup theory and incorporates chiefly SIT, but also other theories of intergroup behaviour. Michael (1990, p. 173) defines deconstruction as the "technique of teasing out the strategically neglected part of a text". He argues that a text asserts and maintains its objectivity by excluding the objects which in fact shape the objects in the text. (An example of this would be a writer not acknowledging his/her background and the influence it may have on their perspective.) The task of deconstruction is thus to discover the excluded term by which the presented text is formulated (Michael, 1990).

The following aspects of intergroup theory are deconstructed by Michael (1990). Firstly, he points out that intergroup theory focuses on the process of social identity. The content of identity is neglected because it has little effect on how intergroup comparison and competition occurs. By excluding content, Michael argues that process is elevated and the implication is that the processes that are described within IGT are universal. Michael argues that by emphasising the content of identity we demonstrate that process is not the sole origin of the behaviour being explained. Processes are tied to contents

which are in turn dependent on the context (Michael, 1990). Thus, highlighting content, highlights the socially dependent nature of identity.

Secondly, Michael criticises the importance awarded social categorization in IGT. He argues that IGT indicates that categorization and stereotyping are an inherent part of group behaviour The hidden implication of this is that prejudice and stereotyping is inevitable. This argument reiterates Wetherell's (1996a) criticism of SIT, discussed above, as well as Billig's (1985) argument.

Michael (1990) also refers to Williams' (1984) argument that intergroup behaviour is a predominantly masculine concept. The point is that men tend to engage in social identification processes more than women, and that women are more involved in communal processes such as helping other groups. Thus, the argument is that the so-called universal processes of IGT are in fact less applicable to women than to men.

Finally, Michael makes the point that there is a general absence of reflexivity in IGT. Reflexivity refers to the critical review of one's own viewpoint/premises. IGT theorises that the processes of differentiation, competition, comparison and so on are mechanistic, and outside of the concepts of status effects and social mobility, no theoretical allowance is made within IGT for the fact that group members might reflect upon and even take up the outgroup's perspective.

From the above, it is clear that there are some very valid criticisms that may be made with regard to SIT. Nonetheless, SIT has made some very important contributions to our understanding of identity.

Possibly the most important contribution that SIT has made to the understanding of identity is its recognition of the social dimension within identity, which is manifest in the theoretical proposition of SIT that the group is not something external to the individual but is part of the individual's self-concept.

Another important contribution of SIT and SCT has been to establish links between areas of research that have for a long time been separate. As a result of SIT, the relatedness between the concepts of self-categorization theory, social identity, group membership and conformity have become apparent (Brown, 1996).

Finally, SIT is a very active research area which has produced much theoretical and empirical work, and most significantly for this thesis, has provided the theoretical framework for much of the work on women's identity (see section 3.6. of this chapter as well as Chapter 4).

3.5. Social constructionist approaches to identity

The social constructionist approach to identity emerged after the 'crisis' in social psychology at around the same time as SIT. As with SIT, the development of social constructionist theory within social psychology was a reaction to the criticisms levelled at social psychology for its 'individualistic' approach. The broad spectrum of approaches that fall within the ambit of social constructionist theories have not only emphasised the importance of the 'social', but have presupposed that this 'social' (conceptualised primarily as talk and texts or 'discourse') is essential to understand human behaviour and identity (Michael, 1996). Thus, despite their diversity, social constructionist theories of identity are characterised by their shared fundamental assumptions about language, meaning, subjectivity and identity. Firstly, social constructionists view language as the site of social organisation and the construction of subjectivity and identity. Thus language is seen as the constructor or definer of meaning, rather than as the instrument for reflecting meaning. Secondly, social constructionists argue that the idea of the unified, rational individual, should be replaced with the concept of a non-unitary, discursively produced, and precarious subjectivity/identity (Weedon, 1987).

A further characteristic of social constructionist theorists is their concern (shared with psychodynamic theorists) about the experimental method, and the model of the individual (as a unified integrated whole) that is the result of this method (Wetherell, 1996b). Within social constructionist methodology (known as discourse analysis), the

focus is not on the individual per se, but is on the forms of life and activities which make up sociality. Discourse analysts argue that when one analyses texts of real talk, it is apparent that discourse shows variation depending on the context. As there is no objective meaning or reality, and meanings and reality (including identity) are subjective and are constructed through discourse, one needs to study a particular discourse in detail in order to extrapolate the meaning, reality and identities for that context. Consequently, the aim of this approach for the purpose of understanding identity is to identify the practises and narratives (discourses) which characterise life in a particular place, and then to examine how individual identities emerge from these streams of activity and sense-making narratives (Wetherell, 1996b). Therefore, the central issue within social constructionist theory is not how to integrate the 'social' and the 'individual' , but how to conceptualise the social (which is defined as discourse within social constructionist theory) as the producer of the individual.

Obviously, this key shift in focus has led to many areas of debate. Michael (1996) cites the following questions as examples of these debates: Is the social (discourse) simply equal to language? Or does the term discourse have a wider meaning? What about institutions? Or are institutions merely the products of language? Is the 'social' (i.e. discourse) as the producer of the individual active at the local, interactive level, or is it more active within the domains of ideology and culture?

These questions reflect the multiplicity of approaches to identity within social constructionist theory. Within this multiplicity of approaches, two broad categories may be identified for the purposes of simplification. These two categories reflect the micro-macro debate that is central to social-constructionist theories, and which is in turn related to the two separate precedents of discourse theory.

In order to obtain a comprehensive overview of the contribution that the social constructionist theoretical framework has made to our understanding of identity, the work of theorists within each of these categories will be reviewed in this section.

3.5.1. Category 1: Identity as the product of 'acontextual situations'

This first category consists of theoretical approaches to discourse and identity derived from the work on discourse within linguistics. Following the linguistic approach, discourse is understood to imply communication or interaction between two people in an encounter, and specifically refers to any set of statements, spoken or written, verbal or non-verbal (Swartz, 1990). Thus, within these approaches, discourse is limited to micro-social encounters and is seen to have a tangible, analysable form.

Within this approach, the focus is on identity as the product of what Michael (1996, p. 22) calls "acontextual situations" — situations that are essentially interactive encounters without any links to broader historical contexts, such as institutions, macro-social structures and ideologies. (In fact, some theorists within this tradition for example Gergen (1982) would argue these macro-social structures are not fact, but are merely fictions of linguistic usage.) Thus, the essence of this approach with regard to understanding identity is the idea that the 'social' which is the producer of identity in terms of social constructionism, may be defined as interaction between persons within these 'acontextual situations'.

Gergen (1984) represents the extreme of this approach with his argument that identity is the totally fluid product of moment by moment interaction. According to Gergen (1984), identity exists only in talk, in the act of communicating itself to another, and beyond this has no existence. In his paper, Gergen even queries the existence of self-defining characteristics outside of interaction. Reality (including identity) is only seen to exist insofar as it is constructed by the interactants.

In social psychology, the classic work within this approach is Potter and Wetherell's (1987) *Discourse and Social Psychology*. In this work, Potter and Wetherell argue the importance of discourse theory and the practise of discourse analysis from the perspective of a critique of many of the dominant approaches in social psychology.

With regard to identity, Potter and Wetherell critique the traditional understanding of the self that has been used in various theories in social psychology (such as trait theory, role theory and humanist theories) where the self is understood as an entity with an essential 'true' nature which can be known and described. They follow the central radical notion of social constructionism that the individual subjectivity or identity is discursively produced and non-unitary. Following the linguistic approach to discourse referred to above, Potter and Wetherell limit their definition of identity-producing discourse to language used in "all forms of interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 3).

Based on this definition of discourse, Potter and Wetherell and other theorists within this category suggest discourse analysis as a methodology for exploring and understanding identity. The fundamental premise of this methodology is that identity may be accessed through the study and interpretation of verbal exchanges between people. Thus the methodology proposes that identity needs to be studied using an interview technique. This interview technique should be directly reflected upon, while the transcripts should be interpreted. It is posited that under discourse analysis these transcripts of interview sessions yield patterns of representations. The purpose of these patterns of representations is for the main speaker/utterer to generate or impart a particular self-image (Michael, 1996). Thus the prime focus of pure discourse analytic approaches is the processes of accomplishment of the main speaker — that is, how he/she attempts to manage the impression that he/she makes through what he/she says.

3.5.2. Category 2: The influence of macro-social factors on identity

In contrast to Category 1, the second category includes approaches which consider the role that macro socio-economic structures (including ideology and power) and wider contexts such as history, have in the production of discourse and consequently identity. The conceptualisation of the term discourse adopted by these approaches originates from the work on discourse within philosophical and political theory. Within these approaches, discourse does not only refer to language as it is used and produced at the local

interactive level, but includes language that is the product of broader macro socio-economic factors, power, propaganda and culture.

Some of the most complex work within this area is the work of Foucault. Foucault's concept of discourse (the producer of identity) is elaborated in many of his texts, and changes over time. In his earlier work, he focuses on the relationship between discourse and knowledge. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) Foucault challenges the idea of continuity in history, and analyses how particular discourses have emerged in particular historical periods. From this analysis he developed the idea of radically different grounds of thought existing at a particular period. He called these grounds of thought epistemes, and postulated that these epistemes governed what statements/discourses would be counted as knowledge at a particular time. Thus in Foucault's work, epistemes refer to "historical frames that have successively governed Western thought " (Parker, 1989, p. 58). Discourses operate within these epistemes to produce objects of knowledge, therefore it is impossible for concepts to have fixed universal meanings. With regard to identity, Foucault argues that the concept of the human subject and the 'self' was formed as a new object of knowledge in the modern age/episteme and is subject to modern explanatory discourses such as medicine and psychiatry. Psychology is possibly the most important discourse of the subject in modern Western industrial culture, and may be analysed as a discourse in terms of how it produces and constitutes subjects, for example the idea of the subject as unitary individual which is the result of the liberal humanist and positivist influences on psychological thought. Within this theoretical framework different approaches to understanding identity such as the psychodynamic approach, the humanist approach and the social identity theory approach are not facts, but are simply discourse for talking about the self that were considered knowledge within their particular episteme. Slugoski and Ginsburg (1989) reflect this approach in their critique of Erikson's (1956, 1968) theory of identity. Following Foucault's reasoning they argue that Erikson's theory of ego-identity formation may be seen simply as a model of culturally sanctioned ways of talking about oneself and others during a certain stage of life in Western societies.

One of the most important contributions that Foucault has made to the macro-social approach to understanding identity, is his recognition of the relationship between power and identity. The traditional approach to understanding this relationship has been to see power as the possession of the individual or group, a possession by virtue of one's social position. In this view, power may be understood as the property of agents — either groups or entire social classes. People with power have the capacity to influence others, to command resources and to have their rights and wishes respected. At this level, an integral part of identity would be the distinction between those who have power (for example, whites and males within Western society) and those who do not (for example blacks and women in Western society) (Wetherell, 1996c). However, Foucault posits that relationship between power and identity is much more complex, and his work on power has been very influential in developing a more complex view of power as a positive, productive and subjective factor involved with the making of identity. Foucault (1980) challenges the traditional idea of power as the possession of an agent (individual, group, corporation, social class), and suggests that we should see people and their identities as the product, outcome or effect of power. According to Foucault (1981, p. 93): "Power is not an institution, not a structure, neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with, it is the name one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society". Thus, power does not operate as a binary system of ruler and ruled, but as a network in a field of 'force relations'. These 'force relations' refer to the "relations of power which take specific forms in particular societies, organised through relations of class, race, gender, religion and age" and including social institutions (Weedon, 1987, p.110). Within this conception, power relations are multiple and mobile, and power is exercised at an infinite number of points; though power is an immanence within social relations, (such as those between race, class and gender groups), it is also exercised in specific ways at local points for example in the relationship between husband and wife, employer and employee etcetera. Thus, the same individual may be either ruler or ruled depending on the context, and the nature of the interaction that occurs (for example, the black man who constitutes the ruled within the broad context of western society, may constitute the ruler in his interaction as husband with his wife).

Furthermore, Foucault proposes that discourse provides the place for power and knowledge to come together. Thus, in Foucault's work, discourse operates as strategies of regulation and control. In *The History of Sexuality* for example, Foucault (1981) traces how women became inscribed within the discourses of medicine and biology as ruled by their reproductive organs. (See, for example, the work of Freud). He goes on to argue that it was this construction that provided the historical justification for the continued subordination and control of women, at a time in Western society when greater opportunity was beginning to open up to women. In this way he shows how discourse created particular knowledge about women as a social group, which in turn justified a particular power relation in society. Within this framework, the discourse of blacks as 'inferior', as well as other racist discourses based on the idea of blacks as 'different' and 'other' in comparison to whites, may be understood as 'justifications' for racist practises and the social power relations where blacks are subordinated, for example apartheid in South Africa.

Foucault's propositions concerning the triangular relationship between knowledge, power and discourse provide useful insights to our understanding of discourse as the producer of identity. Following the reasoning that discourse creates knowledge and power, one may argue that discourses (as they are acknowledged by the grounds of knowledge/ epistemes of the time) offer particular individuals particular subject positions (with associated power). For example, man, women, lesbian, feminist, homosexual, black and white are all subject positions, with particular power within particular discourses. In this way, discourse becomes the place where the individual's sense of self/subjectivity is formed; in addition, discourse, as a result of the fact that it contains power, will determine where this subjectivity is placed in the multiple power relations of that particular society at that particular historical time. Therefore, discourse may be understood to create power and knowledge, which in turn influence the construction of identity. With regard to this reasoning, Weedon (1987) makes a further point about discourse and identity. Weedon points out that discourses are contradictory — thus while any discourse will offer the preferred subjectivity within its social and historical context, the mere fact of its organisation implies other subject positions and the possibility of reversal. According to Weedon (1987, p.109) "...reverse discourse enabled

the subjected subject of a discourse to speak in her own right." This sets up the possibility of new alternative discourses. An example of this would be the way in which radical feminist discourses offer women an alternative identity, by opposing patriarchal discourse of femininity and by revaluing traditionally feminine subject positions.

Another writer working broadly within this 'macro-social' approach to understanding identity is Wendy Hollway. Hollway (1984, 1989) developed a theory which she called interpretative discourse analysis, and which she explicitly orientated within a feminist post-modernist paradigm of research.

Although Hollway's work in some ways follows the theoretical proposals of Potter and Wetherell (1987), she also incorporates some of the theoretical propositions of psychoanalysis in order to move away from the idea that the individual's identity is completely determined by discourse, and to account for individual choice, agency and irrationality. In addition, she uses Foucault's concept of discourse and recognises the relationship between the discourses or knowledges that form identity and power relations.

Like Potter and Wetherell, Hollway expresses concern with the concept of the 'objective' and 'neutral' observer. However, unlike Potter and Wetherell she explicitly places herself in her research in an active attempt to move away from and challenge this concept. Hollway's theory developed out of her research, which was concerned with the power relations in gender and how they operate through discourse. She analysed taped talk that she collected over a number of years in various situations, from unstructured group discussions and dialogues on gender to informal visits with friends. Drawing on the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan and Klein, she developed the notion of 'investment', or emotional need. This 'investment' referred to a mechanism of individual choice through which individuals, who are the site of multiple, contradictory discourses (for example wife and mother versus feminist) come to take up particular positions of gender within discourses, which in turn operate differentially in terms of power.

Hollway's (1989) complex theorisation of gender identity challenges both the voluntarism of traditional humanist based theories, as well as the determinism of Marxist theories of identity. Her recognition of, and attempt to account for individual agency and irrationality represents a move away from both the economic determinism of Marxism as well as biological determinism. However, her theory still recognises the importance of social structures (specifically power structures) for determining subjectivity, thereby challenging traditional ideas of identity as the result of individual agency and voluntarism (individual choice).

3.6. Evaluating social constructionist approaches

Discourse analysis and identity theory as it is set out by Potter and Wetherell (1987) is accessible and practically useful. However, it is not unproblematic.

Firstly, with regard to the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) there have been critiques regarding the methodology. Bowers (1988) points out that that although Potter and Wetherell criticise the traditional approach whereby the researcher is portrayed as the objective outsider, and call for the interviewers using their methodological approach to be self-reflexive about their position and influence in the production of interactive discourse with their interviewees, they themselves lack self-reflexivity, and when dealing with the interview transcripts they, as interviewers, disappear. Therefore, Bowers argues that they fail to clarify the relevance that their own presence had to the interviewees' discourse.

Secondly, and more significantly, the relationship of discourse and identity to macro socio-economic structures, ideology and power is not considered within Potter and Wetherell's (1987) work. If discourse is the site of power strategies, as is suggested by Foucault, then this is a serious omission, and their theory may be criticised for 'discourse determinism — reducing everything to discourse, without any recognition of the material base of this discourse.

While the social constructionist theory of Foucault with its focus on the relationship between macro-social structures (including power) and discourse goes a long way to meeting the above criticism of Potter and Wetherell's work, Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power has itself faced criticism.

Some writers, (Haug, 1987; Weeks, 1981), have claimed that Foucault's theory of discourse fails to allow for the possibility of change. They argue that if, as Foucault proposes, power is everywhere, there can be no resistance outside power - thus even those who resist "participate in the production of the norm in the very act of opposing it" (Haug, 1987, p. 196). Following this argument, feminism, even though it posits a resistance to the traditional power relations between men and women, is at the same contributing to the continued entrenchment of these relations because it refers to them and acknowledges their existence. The same may be said of all resistance movements; their very existence in opposition to the status quo continues to acknowledge and thus create the very status quo that they attempt to resist.

Nonetheless, social constructionist theory has made some very valuable contributions to our understanding of identity and to social psychology as a whole. The most significant contribution of social constructionist theory is that it challenges many of the traditional ways in which we think about identity as an integrated whole and makes the point that identity is not necessarily stable and unified, but may be fragmented, context dependent and continually reconstructed. Another valuable contribution of social constructionist theory is that it has provided us with valuable methodological insights, specifically with regard to its challenging of the traditional idea of the researcher as the objective outside observer of 'truth. With regard to identity, this means that the researcher is encouraged to acknowledge his/her own role in the formation of the participants' identity within the context of the study. According to social constructionist theories, the researcher only accesses that identity of the participant which is constructed at the time of and within the context of the research — an identity which the researcher is instrumental in creating through their interaction with the participants.

3.7. A feminist evaluation of social identity theory and social constructionist theories

As this thesis is explicitly orientated within a feminist social psychological theoretical framework, it is necessary to evaluate SIT and social constructionist theories from within a feminist framework.

The feminist critiques of SIT are both explicit and implicit in the writings of feminist theorists.Many of the feminist critiques that may be levelled at SIT reflect those that have been levelled at social psychology and at mainstream social science by feminist writers. (For a detailed discussion of these critiques, refer to Chapter 2, section 2.2.). One of the main thrusts of these critiques is aimed at the traditional experimental method used within social psychology, particularly by social identity theorists. Concerns are expressed about the validity of such experiments, the gender-biased approach of such experiments and the fact that such experiments divorce social behaviour from the social and political context in which it occurs.

It is with regard to this last point that many feminist writers have explicitly criticised SIT. Israel and Tajfel (1972) responded to the 'crisis' in social psychology by calling for a socially contextualised view of the person, the group, social behaviour and social psychology in general. The point is made that despite SIT's frequent insistence that the identity of a group cannot be understood independently of the group's dynamic social context, these insights were never formally integrated into the theory or methods of SIT (Baker, 1989; Condor, 1989; Skevington & Baker, 1989a).

Both Tajfel and Turner attempt to justify their failure to account for the interaction between individual and society at various stages in their work by saying that the task of understanding society must be left to other disciplines. Campbell (1992) responds to this by pointing out that then they must not claim to be social psychologists if social psychology is defined as a discipline that examines the individual-society interface. She goes on to outline four inter-related conceptual and methodological obstacles which

prevent SIT from becoming a truly social theory which incorporates a non-reductionistic notion of society into its formulations:

(1) A methodological over-reliance on artificially formulated groups and laboratory experimental traditions,

(2) the reduction of 'society' to 'the group' and a failure to locate group memberships against the background of social power relations,

(3) the failure to take into account the interaction between the individual and society and

(4) the failure to develop a dynamic account of identity that locates the process of identity formation and transformation within changing social conditions.

With regard to point four above, Baker (1989) outlines her requirements for a dynamic account of identity, as originally called for by Tajfel. She argues that if Tajfel's assertion that social cognition and social identity are the products of a dynamic relationship between individual and society is correct, then social identity should be understood by the way in which it is formed and transformed within the social context. The main point here is that social identity is not fixed, but changes with, and is formed by, social context.

Bhaskar (1979), and Leonard (1984) provide a framework which constitutes a useful starting point for the investigation of the way in which the process of identity formation is inextricably linked to and located within a changing social structure. According to Leonard, there is no perfect fit or match between the individual and society. Individuals are born into pre-existing societies which offer them a range of potential group memberships and associated behavioural options. Once an individual has selected or been ascribed a group membership, the behaviour associated with that group is learned through socialisation. These group memberships and associated appropriate behavioural options constitute tools the individual can use to deal with the day-to-day demands and challenges of life. As far as existing group memberships and the behavioural options

which they offer their members appear adequate to deal with life's demands, individuals will adopt them and so reproduce the social order (Bhaskar, 1979). Sometimes the flux of the social world may present individuals with adaptive challenges that cannot be dealt with by those 'recipes for living' associated with existing group memberships. In these instances, individuals may refashion existing group memberships or recipes, or in some cases may even invent new memberships and recipes (Campbell, 1992). In such cases, individuals are, in Bhaskar's terms, transforming the social order.

The major problem with these criticisms and the suggested theoretical developments of SIT, is to develop a methodology capable of examining whether individuals are accepting social groups or reforming them. Condor (1989, p. 30) suggests that an adequate methodology would be an historical investigation of identity whereby identities are compared at 'time 1' and 'time 2'. However, Campbell (1992) argues that comparing social identities at two discrete chronological times is not an informative way of investigating the social psychological mechanisms that underlie the process of identity construction in a changing society. She argues that a Condor-type study would at best reveal whether or not the changes that had occurred in the content of identity from one historical moment to the next, but would not help to illuminate the psychological processes underlying this change. Campbell (1992) thus suggests a methodology that focuses on the content of social identity. She argues that a detailed study of individuals' accounts of their social identity at one moment in time may be a useful way of capturing individuals in the process of weighing up competing recipes for living provided by the range of existing group memberships, and making a decision about whether to accept existing group memberships with their associated recipes for living, or to reject them in favour of refashioned or newly invented groups and recipes for living thereby contributing to the transformation of existing group norms.

The concern expressed by feminist writers about the concept of content of identity (referred to above), also constitutes an implicit criticism of SIT, and has formed the basis for the feminist problematisation of the category 'women'. The assumption of SIT that a particular category of social identity, in this case 'women' is homogenous in content and

has the same meaning for all women has been questioned by many feminist writers, both white and black.

Walker (1990a) points out that trying to define the meaning of the word/concept/ category 'woman' becomes increasingly difficult as one moves backwards in time and away from one's own linguistic and cultural parameters/base. This difficulty is exacerbated if one takes into account the fact that the social meaning ascribed to 'man' and 'woman' is not even the same for both sexes within a particular society — but that as a result of the social power of men in most societies, it is the male meaning that has and does dominate and thus has been most likely to survive in the historical record (Walker, 1990a). According to Walker (1990a, p. 26):

> Even within a single period, the boundaries of the category 'woman' are rendered elusive by the operation of other significant markers of social power.

Furthermore, there are sharp boundaries dividing women of varying cultures, races and classes. While racial division between black and white is the most obvious of these, there are and have been other areas of disunity (Walker, 1990b). In South Africa in pre-colonial times, a woman's social standing varied chiefly according to her age, marital status and husband's rank. Since colonial times, an intersection of race, class and gender has involved not only white versus white and black versus black, but also conflict between black and white women (Walker, 1990b). This conflict in identity between black and white women has been argued to be primarily the result of their differing aims, priorities and interests (see Chapter 1).

Thus, rather than having one essential meaning, in different cultures it means different things to be a woman, and although the term 'woman' is universally understood, the meaning attached to it in different circumstances is not fixed (Charles, 1996).

Clearly, the divided identity of the group 'women', as discussed above, indicates a perceived shortcoming in terms of a feminist framework with regard to the way in which

SIT views reality in terms of a number of large-scale categories such as class, race, sex and nationality.

One thing that is apparent from the feminist critiques of SIT, is that feminist theorists appear to share many of the concerns of the post-modern social constructionist theorists, for example, the objectivity of traditional social science methods, and the problematisation of categories such as 'women'. As the concerns of feminists and post-modern social constructionists appear to mesh, the question arises as to why many feminist theorists have not wholeheartedly adopted the post-modern social constructionist approach to studying identity, but have continued to work within the framework of social identity theory.

The main reason is the social constructionist deconstruction of the subject and its central notion that the subject is not unitary and fixed, but is discontinuous and fragmented. This conceptualisation of individual identity/ subjectivity is opposed to the idea of an essential self or essential identity (Weedon, 1987). As it is constructed within discourse or language, the post-modern social constructionist self has no essential fixed nature. It is in this conceptualisation of the self/identity that the great tension between feminism and post-structuralist/social constructionist theories lie. The post modern social constructionist conceptualisation of self is highly problematic for feminism, which as a political ideology shares many of its tenets with humanism. Post-modernism is a anathema for the political aspect of feminism, which, in its notions of women's oppression and liberation is based on the presupposition that there is an identifiable, bounded subject, that is, woman, who is oppressed and is struggling to be liberated from this oppression (Charles, 1996). Deconstructing the subject, and conceptualising it as a fragmented, contextually bound and created concept, undermines the feminist project - clearly, where there is no defined oppressed subject, there can be no struggle for the liberation of this subject (Charles, 1996).

Charles (1996) points out that this tension between feminism and post-modernism/ social constructionism is most clearly apparent in recent feminist discussions of Foucault. Working within the post-modern social constructionist tradition, Foucault deconstructs

the idea of the active human subject, proposing that it is merely a product of humanist discourse. According to Foucault, subjectivity exists only within discourse and is a product of power relations; thus the individual has no agency. Feminists, such as Collins (1991) who argue that feminism is based on a humanist vision and is concerned with increasing freedom and equality for every human subject see Foucault's work on subjectivity as actively undermining the feminist political project. Hartstock (1990), critiquing Foucault, argues that men may deconstruct the knowing, individual, integrated subject, because it has been constructed as masculine; however, women have not yet achieved the point where they have been constructed as the knowing subject. Furthermore, she argues, deconstructing this conceptualisation of the knowing, integrated subject just as feminism is claiming an active subjectivity for women is damaging for feminism, because where there is no subject there can be no liberation or empowerment. In short, "the structure of feminist discourse is based on the notion of the human, female subject" (Charles, 1996, p. 9). While some feminists have recognised that the claiming of an active subjectivity for women, as well as the naming of men and women occurs within a framework of oppression and opposition that one would want to challenge and reform, it remains a fact that the rejection of these categories of male and female could lead to a complete political silencing for women (Barrett, 1991).

Another area of Foucault's work which has proved problematic for feminism is his conceptualisation of power. To an extent, Foucault's conceptualisation of power has proved informative for feminist theory and research. Foucault's formulation of power as a network of relations in which we are all implicated, rather than as a force which is exercised over one, has enabled us to understand how women are actively involved in the power relations that subordinate them and determine their identity. As mentioned earlier, Foucault did not locate power in agencies (for example the state or economic forces) but saw power as operating at a micro-level, between actors. This formulation of power implies that resistance is possible within the sphere of daily interaction and intimate relations; resistance to power need not be limited to organised resistance against the state. In fact, according to Foucault, wherever power exists, so does resistance. Barrett (1994) argues that this theorisation of power has been useful for feminism because it emphasises that individual social actors are responsible for their power status and therefore also their identity and political status. Despite it usefulness, Foucault's formulation of power has

been rejected by many feminists because of its apparent failure to acknowledge that power may be based in any material reality outside discourse. Hartstock (1990) argues that Foucault's ideas on power are dangerous for feminism as a political project because there is no acknowledgement of systematic power relations and their effects. Thus, in Foucault's work, the domination and oppression of women by men, and the meaning that this has for women's identity is ignored. Instead, Foucault presents an image of a network in which we all participate — this is an image which implies equality and agency.

From the above discussion it is apparent that one of the main reasons why much feminist research (including this thesis) is conducted within the broad theoretical framework of SIT, is because SIT is more compatible with the political agenda of feminism than post-modern social constructionist theories.

This does not mean that no feminist work is conducted within the post-modern social constructionist framework — for example, recent work by Adams (1996) and Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996) is both feminist and located within the post-modern social constructionist framework. In her study of mature-age undergraduates, Adams (1996) explores the non-unitary nature of women's identities. The study focuses on the fact that not only do women differ from each other, but that women themselves have fragmented identities — they are lovers, mothers, workers, black, white feminist, lesbian - and many of these identities conflict. The experience of these fragmented identities that Adams explores falls within the idea of post-modernism that there is no essential female identity that unites women and gives them a shared identity. Within the theoretical framework adopted in this study, identity is socially constructed and contingent. Another feminist writer who works explicitly within the theoretical framework of post-modern social constructionism is Celia Kitzinger. In Kitzinger (1987) and Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996) the post-modern social construction critical technique of deconstruction is used to explore lesbian and heterosexual identity.

However, it should be noted that most feminist writers working within the framework of post-modern social constructionism , although they subscribe to the argument that

identity is socially constructed and not essential, stress the fact that identity is the basis for feminist political practice. In addition, there is an emphasis on women's agency, whether in conforming to subordinating social relations or in confronting and challenging them, as well as an emphasis on the necessity of a sense of active subjectivity for any process of empowerment (Charles, 1996). Therefore, although many post-modern social constructionist feminists use Foucault's concept of power and discourse in their work, they distance themselves from the post-modern deconstruction of the subject, and emphasise that the notion of a unified subjectivity with agency is essential to the political agenda of feminism (Charles. 1996). Even feminists who are most sympathetic towards the post-modern social constructionist approach talk in terms of the subordination of the group 'women', and recognise that power does not only occur in a network, as proposed by Foucault, but is systematically structured to form relations of domination (Fraser & Nicholson, 1990).

3.8. Theoretical approach of this thesis

Within the sphere of social psychology, feminist work on women's identity has chiefly been conducted either within the SIT framework or within the post-modern social constructionist framework.

From the above discussion it is clear that the theoretical framework of post- modern social constructionism, although it is employed by many feminist researchers and theorists, may be viewed as undermining the political agenda of feminism. Primarily for this reason, I elected to place my thesis within the theoretical framework of SIT.

Having said this, it should be noted that this does not mean that this thesis will be approached from the viewpoint of traditional SIT. Various writers, such as Mednick (1991) and Sherif (1987) have observed that much of the feminist work within the sphere of psychology has comprised of a critique of existing theories, and have argued that it is now necessary for feminist writers to develop new theories. One way in which feminist researchers have done this is by attempting to engage with the limitations and androcentric aspects of existing theories in order to produce a new women-centred

approach (Finchilescu, 1995). Thus, in the context of feminist work on gender, clear-cut boundaries between theoretical approaches have often become blurred as feminist researchers may draw on the theoretical propositions and insights of various theories in order to develop the theoretical framework within which they are working. SIT is no exception, thus, the theoretical approach of this thesis will be that of SIT as it has developed and evolved through the work of feminist researchers. This development of SIT within the sphere of feminist social psychology into a theoretical tool that is useful for exploring the identity of women, as well as the effect that this has on the theoretical framework of this thesis, will be considered in detail in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

THE SOCIAL IDENTITY OF WOMEN

4.1. Introduction and structure

In Chapter 3, social identity theory and the social constructionist theoretical approach, which constitute two of the main theoretical frameworks in which work on identity has been conducted in social psychology since the 'crisis', were reviewed. Both theories were critiqued from a feminist perspective, and it was argued that social constructionist theory, because of its deconstruction of the subject, was problematic in terms of the feminist political agenda. Consequently, this thesis was placed, along with much of the work on women's identity, within the theoretical framework of 'feminist' SIT.

This chapter will therefore begin with a review of the work on the identity of women within the framework of SIT. Thereafter, Study 1 will be placed within this theoretical framework. Finally, the variables explored in Study 1, that is, race and gender, will be discussed in order to arrive at definitions for the purposes of this dissertation.

4.2. SIT and the identity of women

Despite the fact that SIT has provided the impetus for much of the work on women's identity in social psychology, the theory has repeatedly and widely been critiqued by feminist researchers. (For a detailed discussion of SIT and the critiques directed at the theory, refer to Chapter 3, sections 3.2 to 3.7.) On the basis of this critique, it is clear that SIT in its original form is inadequate for doing research on women, and has failed to meet the goals and aims of feminist research..

Nonetheless, it may be argued that SIT is "a dynamic and quite flexible theory which presents room for further developments" (Foster, 1991a, p. 19). Many feminist researchers doing work on women's identity within SIT have recognised this flexibility

and have offered new concepts and methods for improving research within SIT, specifically research on the identity of women. This has often resulted in developments within SIT that go beyond its original confines (Skevington & Baker, 1989 a) and a blurring of the distinction between SIT and other theories, particularly post modern social constructionism.

The reason for this is probably twofold: Firstly, feminist theorists have much in common with and share the concerns of both the social identity theorists (see Chapter 2.3.) and the social constructionists (see Chapter 3.7.). Secondly, in many respects, the concerns of social identity theorists and social constructionists are complementary (Wetherell, 1996a).

Wetherell (1996a) points out that both social identity theorists and social constructionists are interested in similar questions. Examples of these questions would be: How are 'we', 'you', 'us', 'them', 'in-group' and 'out-group' defined in particular situations? What is the history of the situation and the groupings? What identities can people take up as a consequence? The primary difference between these two theoretical frameworks is with regard to their foci, which complement each other, together contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of identity.

On the one hand, social identity theorists focus on the strategies different groups and individuals adopt in order to maximise positive group identity and self esteem, and they are also interested in the cognitive consequences of categorization. Underlying any research into these areas within the framework of social identity theory is the assumption that the researcher/analyst is able to occupy a neutral position when identifying and describing these intergroup strategies.

On the other hand, social constructionists and discourse psychologists focus on the structure of people's accounts, and the sense-making, rationalisations and justifications contained in different versions of events. A specific focus would be how these accounts might act as ideology which serves to maintain the position of powerful groups. The assumption underlying work in this area is that discourse in the form of power-

maintaining ideology is central to any inter-group conflict, serving as a means to structure happenings and define realities for participants. Within this framework, researchers are not perceived as objective; they are biased by the discourse/ideology in which they are situated, and they influence the dynamics of the situation which they are observing through their discourse-based interaction with the other participants.

In the following review of work on women's identity within the framework of SIT, I will attempt to trace the emergence of the new concepts, methods, theoretical propositions and foci within SIT, as well as point out the influence that other theories have had on the development of SIT. Furthermore, the methodologies that have been utilised in the feminist practice of SIT, will also be discussed.

4.2.1. Williams and Giles (1978)

SIT provides a way of understanding both the nature and content of women's group identifications , as well as intergroup relations between women and men and their consequences in social action (Skevington & Baker, 1989, b). The first and seminal paper using SIT to theorise about the social identity of women and to explain the intergroup relations between women and men was that of Williams and Giles (1978). According to Williams and Giles women constitute a disadvantaged gender group , who derive their social identity from comparisons with men. They argue that because men are dominant over and more powerful than women, women's group identification results in an inferior comparative status and a negative self-concept. Furthermore, Williams and Giles (1978) argue that in terms of SIT , women would need to take action in order to satisfy their striving towards positive distinctiveness and a positive self-concept. Their paper then explores the options of social change that are available to women in terms of SIT.

In terms of SIT, the options that are adopted in order to achieve social change and the consequent positive distinctiveness and positive self-concept for women are determined by how women (the low status group) perceive the legitimacy of the status quo and the security of status boundaries. Where the status quo is perceived as legitimate and

boundaries between the low status group (women) and the high status group (men) are perceived as secure, it is likely that action of an individual nature (social mobility) will be chosen by the low status group as a means to achieving positive distinctiveness and a positive self-concept. If, on the other hand, women perceive their lower status within the system as illegitimate, action of a collective nature (social change) is likely to be the result.

With regard to the option of social mobility, Williams and Giles (1978) argue that historically, most women have accepted their inferior status within society as legitimate, and have consequently chosen to enhance their status and achieve positive social identity by individual means (i.e. social mobility). An example of this would be the woman who uses marriage as a means of social mobility, defining herself in terms of her husband's occupation and position, and consequently devoting herself to improving his social status in order to enhance her own self-image. Another individual strategy of social mobility would be to leave the group. Since this is very difficult to do literally with regard to gender groups, women may achieve this figuratively through striving to succeed in a 'mans world' (e.g. in their career) and in so doing not identifying with other women (Williams & Giles, 1978). These individual strategies may be questioned in terms of their effectiveness in so far as women who adopt them are still generally perceived as belonging to the group 'women' by most men and other women. Furthermore, this individual social mobility and defining of self in terms of the outgroup leaves the status quo between the ingroup and the outgroup unchanged. However, despite their relative ineffectiveness, these strategies are often adopted by women because they tend to reap societal rewards (such as the respect accorded women who do well in typically male domains) while avoiding the derision directed at the more collective strategies of social change that are adopted by women.

Collective, group based strategies employed by women in an attempt to achieve a more positive self-concept, take a number of forms. If women collectively decide to reject their status as the inferior gender group, collective action is usually adopted in order to establish a positive social identity for the group (Williams & Giles, 1978). One of these group based strategies is the policy of social creativity. Using this policy, feminist writers

have attempted a re-evaluation of women's characteristics and status. Media images of women have been redefined, moving away from notions such as 'sex object', 'dumb blonde' and 'scatty female', the use of sexist language has been reassessed and criticised, and women's work in the home has been redefined so as to be valued in the same way as work in the public sphere. Gilligan (1982) used this policy of social creativity in her work in which she asserts that women need to be seen in their own terms and the validity of their experiences acknowledged beyond a mere comparison between women's experiences and those of men.

The most extreme form of social change and striving toward positive self-concept is that of social action. An illustration of this strategy would be the demonstrations and petitions of certain women's liberation movements. Williams and Giles (1978) argue that this strategy is unlikely to become the norm because of the entrenched nature of patriarchal interaction and the interdependence of interpersonal and intergroup relations between women and men. (Consider, for example, the married feminist.) Furthermore, they argue that the success of such social action is undermined by the trivialisation and ridicule which constitute the male responses to such feminist initiatives.

A strategy that utilises both social mobility and collective action is that of assimilation. This refers to the assimilation of women into societal power structures in order to achieve equality in spheres such as work, the law and politics. This assimilation process has been fairly successful and it has been enhanced by the democratic and egalitarian ethos that became widespread in Westernised countries during the 1960's and 1970's; nonetheless it has not necessarily helped to improve the status of women. Women have become much more involved in the workforce, but the occupations traditionally adopted by women (for example, teaching, nursing, secretarial work) are not of a high status. Furthermore, Williams and Giles (1978) refer to studies that have shown that an increase in the number of women joining a profession leads to the status of that job decreasing. Thus assimilation policies share the same problem as policies of social mobility — the status quo between the sexes is left unchallenged. In addition, assimilation policies depict women to be aspiring to involvement in the 'better' male world, which serves to perpetuate the idea that women and their world are inferior (Williams & Giles, 1978).

Williams and Giles' comprehensive model of the social identity of women has formed the starting point for much of the thinking about women's identity within the social identity theory framework. However the traditional, 'pure' SIT used by Williams and Giles is limited in its ability to provide a theoretical framework for work on the identity of women; consequently the Williams and Giles model is also flawed by certain limitations. Ironically, it is these limitations, which have highlighted the general problems that SIT has in explaining group identifications as they are created within the historical and social context (Skevington & Baker, 1989b), that have led to many of the developments within SIT as applied to the identity of women, as well as much of the groundbreaking work in this area.

4.2.2. Taking Williams and Giles further: Developments in SIT as applied to the identity of women

Skevington and Baker (1989b) argue that the first limitation of Williams and Giles' model is with regard to their description of the ideological intergroup relations between women and men. Williams and Giles approach these relations from a theoretical stance instead of an empirical stance. Underlying this approach is their mistaken assumption that womanhood is perceived by all women in the same way, and that all women use the same consensual and unfavourable dimensions when comparing themselves to men. Thus they present women as a unified social category with identifiable and accepted (negative) characteristics.

The problematisation of the view of women as a unitary, homogenous group that has emerged within feminist theory, in contradiction to Williams and Giles' initial view, has been discussed to some extent in Chapter 3 (see section 3.7.). When examining the many activities pursued by women and the variations of role that occur during the course of their lives, common sense indicates that there are many social identities and social identifications that could fall under the definition of 'women' or 'womanhood'.

The recognition of the differences within women's perceptions of their group is also an important issue, because the perception of women as a homogenous, low-status,

minority group (as compared with men) has had negative consequences. The view of women as a low-status, minority group has led to the suggestion, apparently supported by research, that women tend to identify with the dominant group (men) rather than show ingroup bias; thus, the idea is that women share negative stereotypes of their own group with men (Condor, 1986). The consequence of such a view is the implication that women ought to feel negative about themselves and thus support the status quo. Condor (1986) disputes this view by arguing that much of the research indicating self-hatred and lack of ingroup bias among women is a product of the methodology that was used. Furthermore, she argues that the notion that women have a negative self-image and lower self-esteem than men has not been consistently demonstrated.

Breakwell (1979) was unusual in that she was one of the first writers to stress the differences within the group 'women' in her analysis of the social identity of women. Breakwell theorised that women's unsatisfactory social identity was the result of a lack of agreement about what constitutes 'womanhood', rather than the result of unfavourable comparisons with men. Elaborating on this point, she distinguished between external and internal criteria for group membership. External criteria were identified as social norms that are personified in stereotypes, while internal criteria consisted of personal knowledge and beliefs about group membership and perceptions of how they relate to the self. According to Breakwell (1979) these two categories of criteria for group membership are generally incompatible for women, because there are no fixed, consensually agreed external criteria for womanhood. Consequently, women are constantly struggling to synchronise the 'women that they are' with the 'woman that society says they should be'. Breakwell argues that it is this incompatibility between external and internal criteria, and women's consequent lack of integrated identity that gives rise to women's subjective experience of marginality.

Subsequent writers such as Stephanie Adams (1996) have agreed with Breakwell's argument. In her study of mature-age students at university, Adams argues that fragmented identities are the 'norm' for women in modern society, and that these fragmented identities are responsible for the disempowerment of women because they

deny women a sense of self. The implication of her argument is that it is vital for women to struggle to achieve a unitary sense of self in order to become effective social actors.

(It should be noted that the work of Adams, along with that of many of the feminist writers who have reacted to this limitation of Williams and Giles' application of SIT to the identity of women by arguing that fragmented identities are responsible for women's sense of marginality, may be placed within the framework of social constructionism rather than social identity theory. Nonetheless, she refers to the idea of a unitary, essential identity which is fundamental to SIT, and generally rejected by social constructionist theory. This is a clear illustration of the blurring of the distinct lines between SIT and social constructionist theory within the feminist work on gender, as a result of the theories' influence on each other.)

The second limitation of Williams and Giles' (1978) model, which is linked to the first, revolves around their perception of the relationship between group identification and the dominant (patriarchal) ideology governing intergroup behaviour between the sexes (Skevington & Baker, 1989b). According to Williams and Giles, following the premises of SIT, only those women who reject the sex-role status quo identify strongly as a group and consequently utilise collective strategies of social change to improve the status of the group 'women'.

This is contradicted by Condor (1983, 1986) and Gurin and Townsend (1986) who have argued that the extent of group identification is not necessarily dependent on group consciousness (beliefs about the group's position of power and status in the intergroup context). Condor's (1986) empirical studies on the meaning of womanhood found that so-called traditional women often identified strongly with their group, preferring their roles to those of men, yet as the same time accepting the gender status quo. These women did not conceptualise their relationships with men in terms of intergroup conflict, but as co-operative relationships with husbands in the family context.

An example of this could be orthodox Jewish women, who may be perceived as a low-status, oppressed group by an outside observer, within a modern Western framework.

However these women perform a highly valued position within the traditional Jewish family, and in fact are accorded a high status in a certain sense by their community.

Another example of this would be black women in South Africa who, while they may be argued to occupy a low-status position with regard to their gender, have been accorded a high status within their community as 'mothers of the nation' and key players within the political struggle. Similarly to traditional women, these black women have also conceptualised their relationships with men as co-operative, viewing black men as comrades in the struggle against racism (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.).

The results of Gurin and Townsend's (1986) study of women's group identification and consciousness provide more information on the issues of women's perceptions of their group, women's identification as a group and collective strategies of social change. They found that women may identify with other women in terms of their personal characteristics, or gender group membership may be central to a women's self-concept, without necessarily involving any awareness of the low social status of the group 'women'. Their results also show that the critical variable for group consciousness to develop and trigger collective discontent and social change, was for women to perceive their group as one unfairly treated by society. This is both a challenge to, and a development upon the proposition of traditional SIT which suggests that a realisation of the low status of one's own group is the essential stimulus which triggers the striving towards a positive identity and the employment of strategies of social change.

Another strand of SIT which has developed out of Williams and Giles' (1978) original approach has been with regard to the theorising of intergroup relations between women and men. In a subsequent paper, Williams (1984) has developed her own analysis of these intergroup relations in which she argues that the original version of Tajfel's theory displays an instrumental orientation, which is more associated with masculine behaviour. Following Bakan (1966), Williams calls this instrumental orientation 'agentic social identity' and points out that it accounts for an identity based on the processes of differentiation, comparison and competition. She argues that this constitutes only a partial explanation of intergroup relations because it ignores the processes of affiliation

and attachment to others which form the basis of a women's social identity, and suggests that another way in which a group may be given meaning is communally, through relationships with other groups. Furthermore, she points out that in terms of this co-operative way of relating, self-esteem may be seen to be derived from a communal social identity formed and supported by relationships within the ingroup.

Michael (1990), working within the post-modern social constructionist framework supports Williams' (1984) argument that intergroup behaviour as defined by SIT is a predominantly masculine concept, with men tending to engage in social identification processes more than women, and women being more involved in communal processes such as helping other groups.

Other sources outside of SIT have also provided support for these proposed alternative types of intergroup relationships. Both Gilligan's (1982) work in the field of moral development and Archer's (1984) research on the development of gender identities, provide some convincing evidence that men and women differ fundamentally in terms of the way in which they relate to their world.

Recent work within 'feminist' SIT which further challenges Williams and Giles' (1978) 'traditional' approach and provides a complex theoretical development of SIT is that of Catherine Campbell (1992, 1995a, 1995b). Campbell expands 'pure' SIT in order to take account of the way in which the process of identity formation occurs within a dynamically changing social context. She argues that identity is an adaptive resource used by individuals to deal with the social and material conditions of their daily existence. Within this approach, different social situations are seen as producing different life challenges. Individuals deal with these life challenges by utilising the behavioural options that are available to them in terms of their particular group memberships. Thus Campbell's theory of identity formation is conceptualised as a trialogue (three-way interaction) between life challenges, group memberships and the behavioural options associated with these group memberships.

Applying her theoretical approach to the understanding of gender identity, Campbell (1995b) notes that many social identity theorists (such as Williams & Giles, 1978; Skevington & Baker, 1989) tend to approach gender identity by regarding 'women' as one of a range of group memberships or self-categorizations that constitute the individual's group membership. While Campbell (1995b) acknowledges the subjective group memberships of 'women' and 'men', she argues that regarding gender as nothing more than one of a range of group memberships or social categorizations, is focusing on one very limited aspect of the influence of gender relations on identity. According to Campbell a distinction may be made between Gender (with a capital G), which she uses to refer to gender group membership, and gender (with a small g), which refers to the penetration of patriarchal power relations into many aspects of human social identity, often outside of the individuals subjective awareness. She proposes that even at times when the group membership of gender is not consciously salient, the process of social identity formation of men and women is governed by a systematically differing set of patterns and constraints of which the individual may not be consciously aware. Thus Campbell argues that gender is not simply another possible group membership; instead it constitutes one of the fundamental organising principles of all aspects of social identity within a patriarchal society.

(Campbell, 1992, 1995a, 1995b), based the above theoretical propositions on an analysis of the data of her study on the social identity of South African township youth. This analysis revealed the following:

(1) a range of significant differences in the life challenges that face men and women in the process of identity construction;

(2) significant gendered differences in the range of behavioural options referred to by men and women; and

(3) a number of systematic differences in the range of behavioural options referred to by men and women.

4.3. Contextualising Study 1

While the above review of the work focusing on women's identity within the SIT framework is by no means exhaustive, it nonetheless clearly indicates that the area is still fairly new, and that the amount of research that has been conducted is fairly limited. It is this limitation that provided the space and impetus for Study 1 of this dissertation which looks at the identity of South African women resident in the Western Cape. The specific area of my study is new, therefore Study 1 is exploratory, without formalised hypotheses. Within the context of South Africa, society has until recently been structured in terms of divisions between ethnic groups. Thus, a specific focus of this study is the exploration of the relative salience of race and gender for South African women.

As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, this dissertation, which is explicitly feminist in orientation, is placed within SIT as it has been used and developed by feminist writers working on women's identity. Therefore, factors such as the problematisation of quantitative methodology and the objective observer, and the problematisation of the unitary group 'woman' are recognised and discussed in analyses.

4.4. Defining the concepts: race and gender and race and gender identity

Before outlining study one in more detail (which will be done in Chapter 5), it is first necessary to make some attempt to define the concepts explored in the study — that is, race and gender, and race and gender identity.

4.4.1. Race

Although race groups (for example, black, white and coloured) are often referred to as if they are clearly defined categories, this conceptualisation of race is too simplistic.

Two definitions of race that reflect the mutating meaning as well as the 'difficult to define' nature of the concept are the following:

> The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and decentred complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle (Omi & Winant, 1987, p. 68).

> Like gender and class, then, race must be seen as a social construction predicated upon the recognition of difference and signifying the simultaneous distinguishing and positioning of groups vis-à-vis one another. More than this, race is a highly contested representation of relations of power between social categories by which individuals are identified and identify themselves (Higginbotham, 1992, p. 253).

From the above it is apparent that the concept of race is fairly difficult to define, as it is a concept with a changing meaning. The meaning of the term race may be seen to differ across geographical areas, cultures, societies and historical time (Bhavnani, 1993).

Biologically, all humans belong to the same race group: Homo Sapiens (Bhavnani, 1993). In fact, as a biological and scientific entity, race does not exist (Foster, 1991b). However, race has developed as an alleged scientific category as a result of colonialism and imperialism. As such, it has been used to inform the ideology that race can be the basis of biological inferiority or superiority (Bhavnani, 1993).

Despite this 'non-existence', the social consequences of race are very powerful. Based on this assumption that there are differences between races, humans are categorized as being black, white or coloured in South Africa, as well as in other countries, for example, Britain and the USA (Bhavnani, 1993).

In addition to this categorization on the basis of assumed differences, racism is another very real consequence of these assumed differences. Racism is part of the process of racialisation whereby people attach significance to certain phenotypical human features/characteristics, and then label the people who possess those features as a distinct collectivity (Miles, 1989). As a concept, racism refers to the relationships of power inequality (subordination and domination) and the discrimination that are based on the categories of race and their perceived characteristics. Within Western societies this

usually refers to domination by whites, and subordination of blacks. An example of this would be the apartheid system in South Africa, where race classification was embedded in the legal system and formed the basis for a legalised system of discrimination on the basis of race.

Thus, race may be understood/defined as a socially constructed or imagined phenomena (Foster, 1991b; Collins, 1990) which has a great impact and effect (in the form of categorization, racism and discrimination).

4.4.2. Gender

When defining gender, it is conceptually necessary to distinguish between sex and gender. 'Sex' refers to the biological division into female and male on the basis of XX (female-determining) chromosomes or XY (male-determining) chromosomes. On the other hand, gender refers to the social categorization into masculinity and femininity (Oakley, 1981).

Thus, gender, like race, is a socially constructed concept. Society prescribes appropriate behaviour for males and female (this is masculinity and femininity respectively). People are classified into masculine or feminine gender groups on the basis of the extent to which they display these socially appropriate behaviours.

However, while race and gender are both socially constructed, it should be noted that they are not constructed in the same way (Collins, 1990). According to her argument, constructions of gender are based on much clearer biological criteria than constructions of race: the biological differences between the sexes are much greater and more defined than those between the so-called races. On the other hand, although they share the same biological sex, women do not form the same type of group that is formed by a group with a distinct history, geographical origin and culture (for example, blacks, Jews). Although women do share cultural experiences, they are not generally the cultural and historical experiences shared by 'race' and ethnic groups (Collins, 1990).

4.4.3. The intertwined existence of race, gender and class

It should be noted that while I have defined race and gender as separate entities, race and gender as well as class may be understood as enmeshed and inscribed within each other. (In fact, it is this enmeshing of race and class that led to the specific focus of Study 1 — see Chapter 5, section 5.2.).

Bhavnani (1993) argues that the inequalities apparent in racism, where white people are perceived as dominant and black people as subordinate on the basis of their race category, are also apparent with regard to gender (where women are perceived as subordinate to men). Thus, she makes the point that while a capitalist society is structured in terms of class (by definition), it is also structured racially (in terms of racial inequalities) and patriarchally (in terms of gender inequalities). Therefore, the concepts of race, class and gender are intertwined in a system of domination and subordination within a capitalist society (such as South Africa and most of the Western world).

Fowlkes (1992) refers to this intertwining as the social construction of a complex system of domination. She posits that humans have socially constructed several systems of domination by attaching cultural and political meanings to physical dimensions that they have deemed affect the functional capabilities of human's within society. These physical characteristics are commonly believed to be biological and therefore natural, and include sex, mode of genital relationship, skin colour and bodily relation to material production. These physical characteristics have become linked with constructed categories which are also portrayed as natural: gender, sexual orientation, race and social class. These categorizations are in turn related to patterns of domination and oppression: gender constructs men as dominant over women; sexual orientation constructs heterosexuality as preferable to homosexuality, race constructs white as dominant to black and coloured, and economic class constructs owners as dominant over workers.

The notion of intertwining has been important for the theorising of identity, particularly the identity of black women who suffer under the dual oppression of their race and their gender. It has been argued that for most so-called black women and

women of colour, race is the primary form of oppression compounded by gender and class (Fowlkes, 1992). (For a detailed discussion of this point, see Chapter 1).In terms of this argument, because race is the primary oppression for black women, race identity will always be salient above gender identity and black women will never be able to identify themselves as women in isolation from their race. For black women, issues of gender are always connected to race; consequently, race and gender identity are inseparable (McKay, 1993).

On the other hand, for middle-class white women, gender oppression is the only oppression, and therefore the primary oppression. Thus, it may be argued that it is possible for these women to conceive of their gender identity in isolation from their race identity, because, as they do not suffer under racial oppression, their race identity is not necessarily salient. Furthermore, white women find it more easily possible to conceive of a common unified group women, because they fail to acknowledge the fact that black women have different concerns to white women as a result of their multiple oppression (McKay, 1993).

4.4.4. Race and gender identity

For the purposes of clarity, it is necessary to make a theoretical distinction between race and gender identity versus race and gender. While race and gender (discussed above) refer to the categories of race and gender (i.e. race groups and gender groups), race and gender identity refer to the extent to which a particular individual perceives themselves to be part of a particular race or gender group. The origin of this perception of the self as belonging to particular groups is complex, in that it is both chosen and imposed. To some extent, individuals may choose the groups with whom they identify and in terms of which they define themselves. However, certain group memberships ands their associated identities may also be imposed on the individual. To some extent, both race and gender identity are imposed upon people by societal structure, and both identities form the basis for domination by the white, male group within Western patriarchal society.

4.5. Summary

In this chapter, the work on women's identity within SIT was reviewed, and an attempt was made to trace the developments in this area since Williams and Giles' seminal paper (1978). Thereafter, Study 1 was placed within the framework of a feminist practice of SIT. Finally, the concepts of race and gender, and race and gender identity, which were explored in Study 1 were discussed.

CHAPTER 5

STUDY 1: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE IDENTITY OF WOMEN IN THE WESTERN CAPE

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the methodology of Study 1 will be outlined. After setting out the rationale for the study, the focus group methodology and its application to this study, will be discussed.

5.2. Rationale for Study 1

As noted in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, very little of the work in the area of identity has focused on the identity of women — least of all on the identity of women within the South African social and political context. The idea for this study began with an interest in women's identity in South Africa. Specifically, I was interested in what part of their identity was more salient: race or gender. The trend in the black feminist literature has been to argue that there can be no common female identity (and consequently, no single unitary women's movement) because the racial divide between black and white women is too great and their concerns too vastly different (hooks,1981, 1984). (See also Chapter 1, section 1.1. to 1.3.) Joseph and Lewis (1986) found similar opinions expressed in their study of black women. While white women have suffered oppression by men, black women have suffered a double oppression by men and the ruling white class of which white women form a part (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981; Walker, 1990a, 1990b). Consequently, it has been argued that race is more salient than gender for black women (hooks, 1984).

In order to explore the content of South African women's identity, and specifically, the relative salience of race versus gender for South African women, I decided to conduct focus groups with black and white women from the Western Cape. As this was an

exploratory study, there were no formal hypotheses. However, based on the literature, there were certain expectations. The primary expectation, based on the black feminist writings referred to above (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984) was that gender might be more salient than race for white women, but for black women, race would be more salient than gender. Based on this expectation, and on the theoretical proposition of SIT that social identity (group membership) is contextually dependent, it was further decided to explore what contexts, if any, could make the gender aspect of identity salient, specifically for black women.

5.3. A note on focus groups

As a form of qualitative research, focus groups are essentially group interviews. However, they do not constitute an interview in the sense of alternation between the researcher's questions and the research participant's responses. Instead, the reliance is on interaction within the group, which is based on topics supplied by the researcher (who typically takes the role of moderator/facilitator). The fundamental data that groups produce are transcripts of group discussions which are commonly analysed by content analysis (Morgan, 1988).

I decided to use focus groups, because as a self-contained research method, focus groups are particularly useful for exploratory research within new research areas (Morgan, 1988). Furthermore, as a methodology, focus groups are in accordance with the feminist move towards more qualitative methodologies, which are designed to focus on the participants' subjective interpretations of their realities (including their identity).

5.4. Participants

Participants were 24 women (12 black and 12 white). Six of the black women were domestic workers aged between 28 and 43, and 6 were students at the University of Cape Town aged between 20 and 31. All the black participants were Xhosa home language speakers. Six of the white participants were English speaking and the other 6 Afrikaans speaking. All the white women were middle class and middle aged (between

37 and 52 years). All the participants were resident in the Western Cape and were recruited by word of mouth.

It should be noted that as Study 1 was an exploratory study, and acted as the forerunner to Study 2 in that it informed the research question for Study 2, a limited number of focus groups (i.e. four) was conducted. Consequently, focus groups were only conducted with black and white participants, whereas in the main study (Study 2), black, white and coloured women participated in the study. Within these limitations, I aimed for as representative a sample as possible, which is the reason for the marked demographic differences between the participants in the four groups. Unfortunately, the variable of class proved a problem. As race and class were inextricably linked in South Africa by the apartheid regime, it proved difficult to access white women of so-called 'lower-class' with regard to socio-economic and educational factors. Furthermore, black 'upper-class' women were more easily accessible amongst the current generation of my peers, which has emerged during the recent time of political reform in South Africa, than amongst the older generation of black women.

5.5. Rationale for dividing the women into groups in terms of race, class, language and age:

It could be argued that intragroup variation within each of the focus groups would have been so much that race, class, language and age divisions were worthless lines to draw.

However, Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) point out that demographic details including age, sex, income, occupation, education, religion and race have a pervasive effect on group dynamics. They argue that varying socio-economic backgrounds of individuals, such as differences in income, occupation, education and family backgrounds, can affect the dynamics of group interaction. In general, interaction is easier when individuals with similar socio-economic backgrounds comprise the group. Furthermore, it is easier to encourage member participation in culturally and racially homogenous group situations.

Following the above argument, the division of white women into English and Afrikaans groups was also decided upon as a distinctly different culture is associated with each of these white language groups in South Africa.

Similarly, it was necessary to limit the age-range within each focus group, because it has been found that a great variation of age within a focus group inhibits group discussion (Morgan, 1988). Thus, these divisions were necessitated by the practical requirements of focus group methodology.

5.6. Rationale for the size of the group:

In this study, the number of participants in each focus group was limited to six, because it is argued that groups should be limited to between six and ten participants — this constitutes a moderate sized group (Morgan, 1988). Smaller groups tend to be awkward and do not generate enough output, while larger groups are difficult for the moderator/facilitator to control. The group size was kept to the lower limit of six, rather than the upper limit of ten, because, substantively, small groups demand a greater contribution from participants which tends to produce a higher involvement in the life of the group. Thus, Morgan (1988) suggests that when the researcher desires a clear sense of each participant's reaction to a topic small groups are more likely to satisfy this goal. In larger groups there is the possibility of social loafing — that is, each individual participates less because they rely on the rest of the group to carry the discussion (Morgan, 1988).

5.7. Procedure

Four focus groups were conducted with six participants in each: one with black Xhosa-speaking domestic workers, one with black Xhosa-speaking students, one with white English speakers and one with white Afrikaans speakers. Despite their varied home languages, all the participants said that they felt comfortable speaking English, and agreed that the focus groups be run in English.

I (the researcher) acted as the group moderator/facilitator. The focus groups were conducted at my home. Transport was arranged for those participants who needed it, and a friend of mine was available to care for participants' children at my home for the duration of the focus groups. Before conducting each of the focus groups, the participants were introduced and refreshments were served. This was done following the suggestion of Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) who argue that introducing group members is a good way to build rapport and a sense of group.

After the introductions were concluded, the focus group was conducted. There were four broad areas of interest:

(1) Which group memberships formed important parts of South African women's identity?

(2) Did membership of the group 'women' constitute an important part of South African women's identity?

(3) If so, what meaning did South African women attach to the concept 'women'?

(4) Was gender or race more salient? Was there ever a time that race could be less salient than gender - that is, was there any cohesive factor between black and white women? (Cohesive factor refers to any factor which would make the 'woman' part of identity salient over race).

In order to explore these areas a pre-determined focus group schedule was followed. I decided that it was necessary to have some sort of schedule to ensure that all the topics of interest were discussed, and to ensure that the same material was covered by all the groups. (For a full outline of the focus group schedule refer to Appendix A).

The duration of the focus groups was planned to be one and a half to two hours — which is the maximum concentration span of participants according to Stewart and Shamdasani (1990). However, in all four the groups, the group members were eager to

participate and the focus group discussions took between two and a half and three hours each.

The focus group discussions were conducted in English and the sessions were taped, with the participants' permission. (Permission was obtained upon recruitment, to avoid the problem of participants not wanting to participate on the day of the focus group.) These tapes were later transcribed and the transcripts were analysed by means of a content/thematic analysis[1].

[1] The interview transcripts were not included as an appendix to this thesis because of their length. Copies of these transcripts may be obtained from Chantal Jeannot, c/o The Psychology Department, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, Cape Town.

CHAPTER 6

STUDY 1: RESULTS

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter the results of the focus groups are presented, following the focus group interview schedule question by question. All the names of participants used in this presentation are fictional, in order to protect their privacy, and preserve the confidentiality of the focus groups. The results are related to the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter 3 and 4, and the way in which this study informs the research question of Study 2 is outlined. Finally, the limitations of the focus group study (Study 1) are addressed.

6.2. Results of Study 1

The focus group interviews detailed in Chapter 5 were taped and transcripts were made of the tapes. A content analysis of the interviews, working question by question, revealed the following main points:

Question 1: Tell me about the different groups to which you belong.

In response to this question, black and white women differed considerably. White women, both English and Afrikaans tended to approach this question personally, giving the main groups to which they belonged as the church, the PTA and various sports clubs. Most of the white women also seemed fairly unsure as to what exactly was meant by this question.

Meryl: Groups....what exactly do you mean by groups....oh, I suppose you mean church groups and stuff like that.....

Colleen: I don't really belong to any groups....well, I do belong to the PTA and the tennis club....is that what you mean by groups?

Marie: I don't belong to any women's groups if that's what you mean....I'm not a feminist.

Despite the fact that these focus groups were run just after the April 1994 elections, during which their was extensive political coverage in the media, only 1 white woman expressed her group membership in political terms, by stating that she was a member of the Democratic Party (a South African political party).

Furthermore, none of the white women described themselves in terms of their race group. This relates to the issue of the invisibility of the identity of dominant groups to themselves. It has been argued that men and white people are generally unaware of the specificity of their own gender, 'race' or ethnicity until it has been pointed out to them (Griffin, 1996); for these dominant groups, their identity is simply accepted as the norm.

In contrast, the black women all answered this question unhesitatingly and in predominantly political terms. All the black women named the African National Congress (ANC), a predominantly black, South African political party, as one of the groups to which they belonged. All the black women also stated their racial/population group as a group to which they belonged. This supports the writings of black feminists, for example hooks (1984) who argue that for the politically dominated racial group, their race will be a salient feature of their identity. Various labour unions were also mentioned, and 3 of the 6 black participants mentioned the church.

Interestingly, neither black nor white women perceived 'women' (their gender group) as a specific group to which they belonged. One black women stated that she was a black woman, but she emphasised the fact that she was black, not that she was a woman.

Mpho: The group I belong to is the group of black women, black South Africans.

Question 2: Which of the groups to which you belong has the most influence on your life —your actions, your decisions, your expectations?

Understandably, the answers to this question reflected the answers to Question 1. The white women who had named the church as one of the groups to which they belonged, claimed this group as the most influential in their lives.

Jacky: My home group has the most influence on my life, but this is probably because the church is fundamental to my life in any event. I try to base my life on Christian principles — not that I always succeed. Anyway, I see the people at my home group as people who I can confide in, because they share my beliefs. I take the guidance that I receive from people in this group seriously, so I suppose it is the most influential group in my life.

Anneke: Definitely the church. I come from a traditional Afrikaans family where the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church is very strong. Our whole family life is structured around church teachings....my husband is head of the household, and my role is in the home. On Sundays we don't do anything except go to church, because I have been taught to observe the Sabbath.

The rest of the white women seemed ambivalent and unsure towards this question.

Moira: Well, I wouldn't say that any of them really influence my life....I just sort of belong to them....you know....

Rosemary: I don't know — the only way I can think of in which the Health and Racquet influences my life is with things like lifts, and who can look after the baby or fetch the kids from school — you know, things like that.

Again, the black women seemed a lot more sure about their answers. All the black women unequivocally stated that their membership of the ANC had the most influence on their lives. It should be noted that for the black women who took part in this study,

the ANC seemed to be equated with the black political liberation cause within South Africa.

Mpho: I think, undoubtedly, the ANC. You must understand that for us the ANC is not just a political party, but a voice for the people of this country.

Thandile: The ANC. Since the ANC was unbanned I have been able to hope for equality for my people, for housing and employment and education. It is a wonderful thing to be able to hope.

Margaret: The ANC's policy has definitely had the most influence on my life. Through our leaders in the ANC our people have claimed their liberation. I have sacrificed everything for the cause. When the ANC said fight, I gave my family. I lost two of my children in the liberation struggle. Now the ANC is leading our people to equality and democracy.

Question 3: Of the groups to which you said you belong, which group membership do you enjoy the most? What group do you most enjoy being a member of?

Again, the split between white women's answers (personal) and black women's answers (political) may be perceived.. White women answered this question in terms of which group membership they, personally, enjoyed. For most of them this was their sports club or gym. Black women's answers to this question reflected their political involvement and commitment.

Mpho: I enjoy being a member of the ANC. This does not mean enjoy like have a good party like white people. For me, life is not a party. I mean that belonging to the ANC is valuable and that is why I enjoy it.

Thandile: I most enjoy belonging to the ANC. The ANC speaks the needs of my people.

Sophia: I enjoy belonging to the ANC because for the first time in my life I am allowed to vote and I am going to vote for the ANC.

Margaret: The ANC ... the ANC has given my people power.

Black women also explicitly stated that they enjoyed being black, in response to this question.

Mpho: I enjoy belonging to my people because we are the real people of this country.

Thandile: For the first time in my life, I enjoy being black because the white men see that we are people and not animals and slaves. I used to be so ashamed that I was black, then I became angry and now I am proud.

Thandile's remark reflects the process of social creativity which is proposed as a strategy of social change by SIT and which refers to the redefining of a group characteristic (in this case 'blackness') in positive terms.

Question 4: Consider the group 'women': What different kinds of women do you get? Which kinds of women are similar to you? Why? Which kinds of women are different to you? Why? Which kinds of women do you like/feel comfortable with? Why? Which kinds of women do you not like/make you feel uncomfortable? Why? Which kinds of women do you most admire/do you most want to be like? Why? Which kinds of women do you least admire/do you least want to be like? Why? (This whole battery of questions were obviously not all asked together in every focus group but were integrated into the discussion.)

In response to this set of questions, there was again a definite difference between the answers of white and black women. White women chiefly distinguished between women on the following criteria: whether they were career women or housewives, whether they were educated or not and whether they were liberated/feminist or not. As the white women whom I interviewed were all middle-class and generally

housewives, this was the type of women whom they tended to like and felt comfortable with. Successful career women were admired by some of these white women, but feminists were not..

Meryl: You get women who work...have careers.... you know....and you get women like me who stay at home. Not that looking after the home is not a full time job — and I only have a char once a week to help me with the ironing — the rest of my housework I do myself. I often wish I could have a career especially now the children are growing up, but I could never have managed when they were small and I suppose it's too late now.

Marie: You get women who verkies — what is verkies in English — choose — choose to go to university and have a career and you get women like me who are happy to make a home for my family.

Colleen: Well you get ordinary, normal women like us and you get those feminist types. They don't know which side their bread is buttered. I mean, why do all the hard work when you can get a man to do it for you?

Interestingly, Colleen uses the word 'normal' to indicate the opposite of feminist, suggesting that she perceives a clear division within the group 'women' between 'normal women' and 'abnormal women' who are feminists.

Black women also made the distinction between women who work and women who stay at home, but this was very clearly linked to the racial division and inequality between black and white women. For black women work was not a career and working women were not to be envied and admired, for these black women, work was a necessity to survive. Some of the opinions expressed by black women in response to this question reflect the criticisms by black women of the white feminist movement's demand for the right of women to work outside the home (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.)

Sophia: You get the women of my people who slave to put bread in the mouths of our children and you get the rich white women who don't have to work. Who is going to clean their houses when things change?

Mpho: You get black women and you get white women. We black women have always worked hard to feed our family especially since our men have been involved in the struggle. White women don't have to work — their men feed their families and we work in their homes. We don't have anyone to clean our homes but ourselves. Some white women do go out and work, but they do it for money to by nice things and to go out to eat and we are expected to do their dirty work in their houses.

Thandile: I think that the different kinds of women that you get, it is mainly black and white women.

Thus, the main distinction made by black women was a kind of 'us versus them' distinction between black and white women. Obviously, black women did not identify with white women. White women did not make this distinction and in fact not one white women referred to black women when they were considering other women, even women different to themselves. Theoretically, this may be explained by the possibility that for white women, as the dominant social group, their prototype of the group 'women' is white. Thus, when they envisage the group 'women', it is a white group. The possibility of black group members is not even considered. These differences in distinctions also reflect the different interests of black and white women discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.2.

In response to the questions about which women were admired and not admired, the personal approach of white women versus the political approach of black women can again be noted.

Most white women said that they admired someone that they knew personally, a family member or friend.

Rosemary: The kind of women I most admire are women like my mother. She brought up a family of six children after my father died when I was twelve. She is an incredibly strong woman.

Meryl: I admire my mother very much and all her friends. They lived in London during World War two — my mother still lives in England — I was born there. Anyway, those must have been the most terrifying times and yet she carried on and had a family, you know, life as normal.

Rosemary: I also admire my friend Antoinette very much. Her husband divorced her and left her with two teenage children, boys, and boys need a father. She's managing remarkably; I admire women like her.

Again, black women approached this question politically. The women they said that they admired were generally political figures. At the time just after the election, when this study was carried out Patricia de Lille was a favourite with black participants. Other non-political figures were generally still admired within a political context.

Mpho: I most admire my sisters who have lost families in the liberation struggle, and yet have continued to care for those left behind, and have never stopped supporting the cause.

Margaret: I admire the women who have struggled to keep their families together through the violence caused by the police and the army and the apartheid government.

Interestingly, while some white women admired women because of their involvement in a particular political context (for example Meryl, who admired her mother for having lived through the second World War), not one of the white women made any reference to the South African political situation.

Question 5: What situations make you aware of the fact that you are a woman/ make you remember that you are female? What situations make you want to defend all women? What situations make you feel angry on behalf of all women? (As with question four this series of questions was not all asked at once, but was used to stimulate discussion.)

As a result of these questions, in both the black and white focus groups a discussion evolved about women's rights groups. The white women in this study (perhaps reflective of their background) were generally sceptical about the idea of women's rights and associated groups, the general tendency being to label anything remotely linked to feminism as undesirable. However, the white women agreed that if such groups were to exist membership should be racially integrated. While black women also thought that it would be desirable and beneficial to form a racially united 'women's group', they doubted whether it would be possible to overcome years of entrenched racial differences. In accord with black American feminists (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984) the black participants felt that the concerns of white women in South Africa were too different from those of black women to make any kind of united women's rights' group viable. Regarding their specific answers to the questions, this was the first question where black and white women shared common viewpoints. Interestingly, both black and white women identified the context of violence against women, specifically sexual violence, as being the one situation that made them aware of their womanhood and made them want to protect and defend all women. All the women, black or white, agreed that experiencing or hearing /reading about or seeing violence towards a woman/women in general made them feel a solidarity and closeness with other women and a strong sense of them (men) and us (women). This is in contrast to the writings of black feminist writers such as hooks (1984) who argue that the race aspect of identity will always be most salient for black women.

Rosemary: When I see or hear about violence towards women — you know, like when women get raped, I feel angry towards men. Maybe that's what feminists mean by sisterhood and solidarity.

Carol: When I see women being abused, I realise just how physically defenceless women are. I wish there was some way, I could protect them. Every day you read about women getting raped in the papers, yet the police do nothing and the courts let the rapists out on bail so that they can do it again.

Meryl: When I hear about a women being raped, I feel a sort of hatred towards men. Obviously, I don't hate all men...I mean, I love my husband. But I still feel this anger. My next door neighbour got raped and she's never been the same since. She used to be a friendly, attractive woman. After the rape she pulled back into herself and she has put on loads of weight. Her husband tries to be supportive, but I can see that it is ruining their relationship.

Anneke: Rape is the one thing that makes me so aware of the fact that I am a woman....of how vulnerable I am as a woman. It makes me so angry towards men, I just want to round up all the women I know and declare war.

Margaret: So many women get hit and raped by men. Some of them are still children. I just pray it does not happen to my daughter....I wish I could protect her.

Thandile: When I hear of a woman getting raped, I feel very much for her, and I also feel scared. I am also a woman....it could so easily happen to me. I wish there was something that we could do, but the white people in the police and in the courts don't care about us black women.

Mpho: It is terrible....all the violence against women and the police do nothing. Maybe it is because they are men that they do not help, or maybe it is because we are black and they are white.

The last two quotes again raise the interesting question of whether 'women' includes women of all race groups or only women within the participants' own race group. It has been argued within black feminist literature that white women, as the dominant racial group, mean white women when they refer to all women (Griffin, 1996; hooks, 1984).

However, here black women seem to be making the assumption that when they refer to women they mean black women. One possible explanation for this may be the particular political background in South Africa, where the divide between the races is so very deeply entrenched, that black women may find it impossible to conceive of having anything in common with white women.

Question 6: Are there situations where you feel closer to (own race) males than to (other race) women? What are these situations? Are there situations where you feel closer to (other race) females than to (own race) males? What are these situations?

Despite the fact that when answering the previous question, most of the women said that they felt a solidarity with other women in the context of violence against women, in answering this question black and white women agreed that they generally felt closer to males of their own race than other race women. This seems to suggest that when referring to 'other women' in answering the previous question, the women were in fact referring to women of their own race. Both black and white women's answers to this set of questions reflect the deep divide between black and white race groups within South African society at the time of this study.

Carol: I suppose I always feel closer to white males. I mean, I never really think of black women as having anything in common with me — although I suppose they do.

Rosemary: I know its not true but I always think of all blacks, men and women, as being different from me or us. I definitely think that I am closer to white men than to black women.

Mpho: White women think they are better than me - how can I feel close to them?

Sophia: Black men are our comrades, white women are our enemy.

Question 7: What does the term 'women' mean to you? If I ask you to think of 'women', what comes into your mind ? Who do you think of? Do you think of women of your own race only or do you think of all women?

Again both black and white women's' answers to these questions reflect the personal versus the political approach, as well as the deep divide between black and white women with regard to their perceptions of their group. For white women thinking of 'women' brought to mind women close to them; women that they knew. Black women were more inclined to think of women in general, although this was still specifically black women.

Colleen: I don't know — I mean woman is what I am — it's me. When I think of 'women' I think of myself and my daughter and my mother ... all the women I know.

Moira: When I think of women, I think of all the women that have gone before me in my family and how they ended up at me and my sisters and my female cousins, and how we also have daughters ... you get the idea, a sort of female continuity. If you hadn't mentioned it I would not have thought of black women.

Mpho: To me, 'women' means all the black women who live with me in the violence. I do not think of white women, because they are white — they are not my people.

Thandile: I seldom think of women alone, I think of my people as one. White women and white men are the same; so are black men and women. Trying to create unity among women is just a way in which the white women are helping their men create divisions among my people.

6.3. Conclusions

As this was an exploratory study no general conclusion can be reached. Furthermore, because of the age and class differences between black and white participants, caution needs to be exercised when making generalisations with regard to the differences between participants of different races. However, one apparent trend, is that black women tended to define themselves in terms of their social identity, specifically that of their race group and groups related to their race group within the South African context, for example the ANC. On the other hand, white women tended to focus more on their personal identity. As mentioned previously, this may be linked to the argument that as a result of racial oppression, race is a salient aspect of black women's identity.

Another trend to emerge from the analysis of the focus groups is the diversity of perceptions that women have of their own gender group. Women of both races divide the group 'women' into black and white women, and women who work versus women who don't. White women further distinguish between feminists and non-feminists. This diversity of perception about what constitutes 'women' suggests support for the feminist problematisation of and development upon the traditional SIT concept of 'women' as a unitary, homogenous group (see Chapter 3, section 3.7. and Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.).

The most interesting result of this study is that black and white women appear to view 'sexual violence against women' (specifically rape) as the one thing that made the 'woman' aspect of their identity salient. It is particularly interesting that black and white participants in Study 1 perceived rape to be an issue that made them feel a solidarity with all women, as the literature suggests that rape is an issue that has led to hostility and division between black and white women. This is largely due to the fact that there has been a long history of black women being raped by white men, and is exacerbated by the violent punishment (for example lynching in the USA) that black men suffered as a result of allegations of black-on-white rape (McKay, 1993).

Rape has also served to deepen the divide between black and white women because it is one of the issues with regard to which white feminists have been perceived as being racist.

Omolade (1985) argued that the definition of rape as formulated by these white women has excluded black women. She points out that white women define rape in terms of brutal sneak attacks that occur late at night, but they ignore the daily 'business rape' that occurs when black women are raped by the white owners of the factories where they work, and the white heads of the households where they are employed as domestic servants. Furthermore, she points out that white women may prosecute rapists. On the other hand, black women raped by white men are not taken seriously, and where black women are raped by black men, their 'racial loyalty' precludes them from reporting the assault to white policemen.

Because of the potential challenge that it provides to the above arguments, as well as to the idea that the concerns, aims and interests of black and white women are so different as to preclude any unity (see Chapter 1), and to the suggestions of some black feminist writers (e.g. hooks, 1984) that race would always be the most salient aspect of identity for black women, it was decided to conduct a second study to investigate this result further.

6.4. Limitations of the focus groups

It should be noted that there were various limitations to the focus group study.

(1) The first problem is that the focus groups were made up of non-representative, non-random samples. Participants were recruited by word of mouth and in many cases knew each other. Morgan (1988) points out that while friends converse easily, using them as the participants in focus group discussions can be problematic because they usually rely on taken-for-granted assumptions which the researcher wishes to investigate. Furthermore, Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) point out that including friends/acquaintances in focus groups impairs the anonymity and consequently the openness of the participants.

(2) The second problem is the fact that the black and white women differed considerably with regard to age and class. As discussed in Chapter 5, this was chiefly due to the fact that the age and class of the participants of different races

was dictated by the availability of participants. However, the implication is that similarities and differences between the focus groups with different race participants cannot be generalised without caution, as their are various factors (most obviously class and age) which may impact on these differences and similarities.

(3) The third problem is that I, (the researcher, group facilitator and author) am a young, white, English-speaking woman. Previously, the importance of the homogeneity of the focus group was emphasised. Research on the impact of group homogeneity and compatibility on group dynamics seems to suggest that the more homogenous and compatible the group members (including the facilitator) the greater the group interaction and the more open the communication within the group (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). I was considerably younger than most of the participants in the groups which may have destroyed group homogeneity and interaction to some extent. In addition, and more importantly, in the South African cultural context, where as a result of historical and political events there is a lot of inter-racial suspicion, it is impossible to assess the effect that a white facilitator had on the dynamics of the focus groups consisting of black women.

(4) Related to the above problem is the problem of language. As the focus groups involved cross-cultural research, language was inevitably a problem. I am fluent in English and Afrikaans, but I do not speak Xhosa, which constituted a problem for the interviewing of the black focus groups. Obviously, it is ideal to interview participants in their home language. However, an attempt was made to circumvent this problem by only including black women who said that they felt comfortable discussing issues in English. In order to keep the interview schedule constant across groups and avoid the problems of translation, the same criteria was used to screen Afrikaans participants and only Afrikaans women who stated that they felt comfortable being interviewed in English were included in the focus groups.

It should be noted that I did consider the option of employing facilitators to conduct the focus groups in the participants' home languages and then having the transcripts translated into English. This option was rejected for two reasons. Firstly the cost involved did not seem warranted for pre-study exploratory interviews. Secondly, I wished to analyse the interview transcripts myself. Campbell (1992) argues that it advantageous that the person who analyses in-depth (group) interview material is also the person who conducts the (group) interview. She points out that first-hand acquaintance with informants as well as familiarity with the way in which the interview proceeded is an invaluable aid to interview analysis. Presence at the interview thus makes the difference between a 'live transcript' and a 'dead transcript' when it comes to analysis (Campbell, 1992).

(5) Finally, the practical problems of the study should be noted. Despite the fact that all the participants were aware of the fact that they were being taped and agreed to this, the presence of the tape recorder may have inhibited participation in the group discussions. Another problem is that of location. All the focus groups were run at my home. It is possible that some of the participants may have felt intimidated because their surroundings were unfamiliar, although an attempt was made to let participants feel comfortable and at ease through informal introductions and serving refreshments.

However, despite the above limitations the focus groups proved very useful and informative, providing a lot of insight into the area of proposed research and fulfilling their role as an exploratory measure.

CHAPTER 7

STUDY 2: THE EFFECT OF MAKING SALIENT THE ISSUE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ON THE GENDER IDENTITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN WOMEN

7.1. Introduction and structure

One of the interesting results that emerged from the content analysis of Study 1, was the fact that black and white women agreed that the issue of violence against women, specifically sexual violence such as rape, made the gender or 'woman' aspect of their identity salient. As discussed in Chapter 6, both black and white women said that when they heard/ saw/ experienced or read of an instance of violence against women, they felt a strong solidarity with other women, as well as a sense of division in terms of us (women) and them (men). It was not specified whether their sense of solidarity with other women extended only to other women of their own race or to other women in general. If one accepts the arguments in the black feminist literature (such as hooks, 1984) one could conclude that female solidarity would never extend across race for black women. As discussed previously, hooks (1984) argues that for black women, race is always more salient than gender as an aspect of their identity. However, the results of Study 1 suggest that this argument may be questionable. The aim of Study 2 was therefore to explore the effect of making salient the issue of sexual violence against women on the gender identity of South African women of different race groups.

In Chapter 3 and 4, theoretical approaches to identity (specifically women's identity) were reviewed, and this thesis was placed within the theoretical framework of 'feminist' SIT. In this chapter, the focus will be on sketching a framework for Study 2 (the main study of this thesis). In order to do this, the chapter will begin with a review of some of the methodologies used to explore identity within the theoretical framework of SIT. Thereafter, as the focus of Study 2 was the salience of gender identity, the work on salience will be considered. This empirical work will then be evaluated, specifically from

a feminist perspective, and in the light of this evaluation the choice of methodologies for this study will be motivated. Finally, the use of the issue of 'sexual violence against women' as the basis for the experimental intervention in this study will be discussed.

7.2. SIT and identity: the methodologies

7.2.1. Identity versus identification:

Before looking at the methodologies used to explore identity within the framework of SIT, it is necessary to make a comment on the terms 'identity' and 'identification'. While these terms are often used interchangeably in the literature, it is worthwhile making a distinction between them. As argued in Chapter 3, the concept of identity is very difficult to define. However, in simple terms, an individual's identity may be understood as the individual's sense of themselves (Brown, 1996). Thus identity may be understood to encompass the entire range of an individual's group memberships (and their related behaviours and mores), as well as that individual's personality traits, skills and characteristics. On the other hand, identification may be understood as one of the processes via which identity is formed. It is only after an individual identifies with a particular group, that she/he may internalise that group membership as part of his/her identity. Obviously individual identifications are easier to define and thus research; as a result of this identity is often researched empirically by looking at the individual's specific group identifications.

7.2.2. Methodologies for exploring identity within SIT

The dominant research paradigms for exploring identity within 'pure' SIT have traditionally focused on the three processes of social identification, social categorization and social comparison and their consequences for behaviour using small groups in the experimental laboratory setting (Skevington & Baker, 1989b).

The classic example of this approach is the set of experiments which formed the basis of SIT. In 1969, Tajfel hypothesised that intergroup bias may be the direct result of

individuals' perceptions that they belong to a common social category. A set of experiments, which have come to be known as the minimal group studies (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971), were designed to investigate this hypothesis.

The term 'minimal group' refers to the methodology employed in the set of experiments which aimed to determine the minimal conditions under which intergroup bias would emerge. To create this minimal group condition, all variables associated with real life group membership were removed, and participants were led to believe that they were assigned to groups on the basis of an unimportant reason such as art preference. Actually, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups by the experimenters. Group members were strangers to each other and there was no face-to-face interaction. Thus the groups were differentiated from each other on minimal grounds. Participants were then given a task in which they had to divide monetary rewards between an ingroup member and an outgroup member. Participants had a variety of options for this allocation: they could divide the money on the basis of equality, and give both ingroup and outgroup members the same amount, they could treat group membership as irrelevant and maximise the total amount awarded with out regard to group membership, or they could favour their ingroup at the expense of the outgroup. The results of the minimal group studies consistently showed that participants were biased in favour of the ingroup, and in fact often chose to maximise the difference in rewards allocated to the two groups even though this meant a smaller sum of money for the ingroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). Thus, the mere division of individuals into groups was found to constitute a sufficient condition for identification with the group and the emergence of intergroup behaviour.

In follow-up studies the procedure was repeated, but possible confounding variables were eliminated. In 1973, Billig and Tajfel, repeated the study taking into account the possible effect of perceived similarity between group members and Billig (1973), Doise and Sinclair (1973) and Tajfel and Billig (1974) repeated the study taking demand characteristics into account. The initial findings were re-affirmed.

Despite their proven reliability, the results of these experiments are of limited generalisability. The group memberships under study, which are assigned for the duration of the experiment only, are very far removed from the participants' actual group experiences. Thus, these and similar experiments provide little insight into the meaning and operation of group memberships and the identification of individuals with social groups in the real world.

After the initial 'minimal group' studies, much work was done in the area of identity. In this earlier work, the methodologies employed were primarily quantitative, and various prescriptive measures modelled on constructed scales were commonly used to explore identity.

Condor (1983), in her study of the meaning of womanhood used 2 scales to explore the relationship between sex group identification and sex group ideology: a sex group identification scale containing items related to feelings of loyalty, empathy and solidarity with other women, and a sex group ideology scale that contained statements expressing either acceptance or rejection of the sex-role status quo. Respondents were classified in terms of high or low levels of group identification and traditional or radical directions of sex role ideology. On the basis of this classification women could be placed in 1 of 4 response categories: high group identification and accepting of status quo; low group identification and accepting of status quo; high group identification and rejecting the status quo and low group identification and accepting the status quo.

Other studies, such as Skevington's studies of the intergroup relations between high status State Registered Nurses and low status State Enrolled Nurses (1980, 1981) have used scale-type measures designed to focus on the strength of group identification. Skevington's methodology required participants to consider thirty-one subjective characteristics found to be relevant to nurses from previous interviews and then rate them in terms of their application to 'ingroup', 'outgroup' and 'self'.

In 1986, Gurin and Townsend used another variation of the constructed scale in their study of gender identity and group consciousness. Female participants were given 16 categories, including 'women', and were asked which of the categories they felt

particularly close to, and which of the categories of people they perceived as being the most similar to themselves in terms of their ideas, interests and feelings about things. Thereafter, the participants were asked to rank the categories that they had chosen in terms of how close they felt to each group. In terms of this methodology, the higher the rank of a group (in this study, specifically women), the stronger the identification.

A more recent study employing scales as a methodology is Bargad and Hyde's (1991) study of the effects of women's studies courses on women students' feminist identity development. In this study, feminist identity was measured using a thirty-nine-item, self-descriptive, feminist identity development scale (the FIDS). This scale was based on factor and reliability analyses performed over two studies after the operationalisation of a five-stage model of feminist identity development.

A quantitative scale-type methodology that has proved very useful for exploring identity is multi-dimensional scaling. Multi-dimensional scaling refers to procedures which may be used to transform unidimensional expressions of relationships into multi-dimensional expressions of the same relationships (Hair, Anderson; Tatham & Grablowsky, 1979); thus, the primary aim of multi-dimensional scaling is to express the relationships between various stimuli spatially (Green, Carmone & Smith, 1989), and to identify the dimensions used by individuals to distinguish between stimuli. The principal assumption underlying the use of these multi-dimensional scaling techniques is that psychological distance/ similarity between various stimuli can be represented and analysed in terms of Euclidean distance formations. As such, multi-dimensional scaling allows the researcher to quantify and analyse complex psychological phenomena which would normally only be accessible through descriptive, qualitative methods.

In their 1976 study, Christian, Gadfield, Giles and Taylor used multi-dimensional scaling to explore the ethnic identity of Welsh adolescents. Participants were presented with stimuli including certain Welsh and English social groups, and were required to make judgements about the similarity between the various stimuli. The results of the multi-dimensional scaling indicated that participants conceptualised the stimuli multi-dimensionally in terms of two dimensions: a Welsh versus English culturalist dimension

and a radical separatist versus conservative integrationist dimension. While participants felt themselves to be similar to the stimulus 'a Welsh nationalist', on the Welsh versus English culturalist dimension, the same participants perceived themselves as different from the 'Welsh nationalist' stimulus on the separatist versus integrationist dimension, indicating that while Welsh culture was important to participants, they still associated themselves with the concept of British unity. Furthermore, Christian et al. (1976) found that increasing the salience of intergroup conflict resulted in participants identifying more strongly with ingroup stimuli (such as 'Welsh nationalist') on the Welsh versus English cultural dimension.

Other researchers have also used multi-dimensional scaling to explore identity. In the first of two studies exploring perceptions of categories of identity, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier (1995) found that participants clustered sixty-four social identities into five types of social identity on the basis of perceived similarity. These five types of social identity were personal relationships, vocations/avocations, political affiliations, ethnic/religious groups and stigmatised groups. In the second study, multi-dimensional scaling indicated that participants perceived differentiation within each type of social identity in terms of various dimensions.

The results of these studies using multi-dimensional scaling are particularly informative because they provide support for the argument that perceptions of categories of identification are not homogenous and uniform. (See, for example, Brown & Williams, 1984; Deaux et al., 1995; Skevington & Baker, 1989b).

Some qualitative methodologies have also been employed within the theoretical framework of SIT, in order to explore individuals' subjective accounts of their social identification and categorization, and their own conception of their group memberships.

In their 1984 study, Brown and Williams revived the Twenty Statements Test first used by Kuhn and McPartland (1954). This methodology involves repeatedly asking subjects "who am I?" , and then content-analysing their answers for references to personal and social identities. Thereafter, in order to ascertain which group identifications were

subjectively important to participants, participants were required to rank their responses. While this methodology has the advantage of being able to consider a range of social identifications, and their relative subjective importance, Brown and Williams (1984) found that its usefulness was limited because the open-ended nature of the task resulted in participants not understanding what was required of them.

One qualitative methodology widely used in studies focusing on the content of social categorizations (for example, women), as well as how social categorizations are constructed from social experience, is interviewing. One researcher who used open-ended interviewing in this context was Condor (1986), in her exploration of the basis of group membership for traditional women. Campbell (1992, 1995a, 1995b) also made use of open-ended, semi-structured interviews in her research into the social identity of township youth in South Africa. It should be noted that while interviewing has been used within SIT, the strongest proponents of this method have been the social constructionist practitioners of discourse analysis.

7.3. Salience

7.3.1. Defining salience

Before reviewing the work conducted on salience, it is necessary to define the term by differentiating between the two ways in which it has been used in the literature.

The first way in which salience has been used is in the sense of a 'salient group membership'. This refers to a group membership in terms of which an individual defines him/herself at any specific time, and which consequently acts as the immediate influence on that individuals' perception and behaviour (Turner et al., 1987). While the individual may have internalised a number of self-defining social categorizations which could potentially influence his/her behaviour, not all of these will be salient at the same time..

Alternatively, a 'salient group membership' may also refer to a group membership which serves to increase the influence of another person's identity as a group member on the

individual's impression of that person, and hence their behaviour towards that person (Turner et al., 1987). An example of this would be race group membership in South Africa's apartheid era, where an individual's membership of one race group would have a great influence on how he/she was perceived and treated by people of other race groups.

The second way in which the term 'salience' has been used, chiefly in the empirical literature, is in the sense of 'stimulus salience'. In this context, salience refers to some attention-commanding property of a stimulus (Turner et al., 1987)

While these two usages of the term 'salience' refer to different concepts within the literature and therefore need to be distinguished from each other, they are also conceptually linked to the extent that stimulus salience may function as the causal antecedent of the psychological salience of a group membership (Taylor, Fiske, Etcott & Ruderman, 1978). It is precisely this relationship which is being explored in Study 2 of this thesis, where the aim is to determine whether the salient stimulus (sexual violence against women) results in the gender group membership becoming psychologically salient.

7.3.2. A review of the work on salience

The central concern of researchers working in the area of salience has been to understand the determinants of salience. They have attempted to address questions such as: What processes are responsible for increasing the salience of specific ingroup/outgroup classifications? What makes an individual choose a particular category of identification for self-definition at a particular time or in a particular context?

Early researchers on salience started with the proposition that the key factor that would make a category salient for an individual was simple 'awareness' of that category. A series of early studies concentrating on religious group memberships attempted to manipulate salience through what Charters and Newcomb (1952) call 'vivid reminders'. In these studies (Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Festinger, 1947; Kelley, 1955; Lambert,

Libman & Poser, 1960), participants were made unambiguously aware of a particular group membership through procedures such as being told that they were participating in the study as a representative of that particular group. The salience of group membership was operationalized as variables such as ingroup bias and conformity to ingroup norms. Theses studies provided convincing evidence of the 'salience effect' because participants' social attitudes and behaviour did change when their awareness of group membership was increased. However, the results also revealed that the salience effect is a complex phenomenon in that even the strong salience manipulations used in these studies did not always produce the predicted increase in ingroup bias and conformity to group norms. In an attempt to explain this, Kelley (1955) suggested that the effects of 'vivid reminders' may depend on an interaction with other factors such as the strength of group identification or the specific content of relevant group norms.

Another early study (Bruner & Perlmutter, 1957), looking at the salience of nationalist identity tested and confirmed the hypothesis that social categorizations would become more salient in a 'comparative context' (where 2 or more categories appear simultaneously, either actually or symbolically) than in a context which does not allow or encourage group comparison. Other research exploring ands confirming this hypothesis includes Bochner and Oshako's (1977) study of ethnic identity and Bochner and Perks' (1971) study of nationalist identity.

Research in 3 distinct areas in the 1960's and 1970's further explored the issue of a 'comparative context'. The results of this research may be expressed as the generalised proposition that the sharper the contrast afforded by an intergroup comparison the more salient the ingroup identification becomes. Another way of phrasing this is to say that the relative 'separateness and clarity' (Rosch, 1978) of a categorization (i.e. the extent to which individuals may be perceived as different between categories and similar within categories) is positively related to its salience.

The first area of research on which this proposition was based explored separateness and clarity in relation to competition and co-operation. The hypothesis was that competition would increase the salience of group membership, while co-operation would result in

decreased salience. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that competition between group reliably increased the salience of those group memberships (Myers, 1962; Ryen & Kahn, 1975). However, contrary to the hypothesis, it was found that co-operation between groups did not always decrease the salience of group memberships. In fact, it was found that ingroup membership could be as salient in co-operative intergroup encounters as in competitive intergroup encounters (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Rabbie & Wilkins, 1971). The extent to which competition and co-operation worked to enhance or diminish the separateness and clarity of the relevant categorization was identified as the general mechanism underlying these various findings (Brewer, 1979; Dion, 1979; Turner, 1981; Worchel, 1979). Co-operation was therefore only found to decrease salience to the extent that other factors which could maintain awareness of the intergroup distinction were not present (Worchel, Andreoli & Folger, 1977; Worchel, Axsom, Ferris, Samaha & Schweitzer, 1978).

The second area of research which provided evidence for the influence of separateness and clarity on salience is the research on 'collective' versus 'individual' group encounters. Doise and his colleagues reliably found that group membership was more salient in a 'collective' encounter (an encounter between two or more members of each of two groups) than in an 'individual' encounter (an encounter in which only one member of each group is present) (Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Doise & Weinberger, 1973).

The third area of research providing support for the relationship between separateness and clarity and category salience addresses this issue more directly. Treating 'separateness and clarity' as a trait, Buss and Portnoy (1967), found that a comparison between America and Russia made American participants' national identity more salient than did a comparison with Canada. On the basis of this they conclude that the greater the difference between the individual's reference group and the comparison group, the more salient the individual's group identity as a member of the reference group will be.

A very influential hypothesis which emerged in the work on salience in the late 1970's was the 'distinctiveness hypothesis' (McGuire, McGuire, Child & Fujioka, 1978; Taylor, et al, 1978). In terms of this hypothesis, 'distinctiveness' refers to the relative numerical

infrequency, rarity, or novelty of a stimulus within a given context; the more novel or infrequent the stimulus, the more distinctive it is said to be (for example, Taylor, 1981). Based on the work on object perception, it is assumed that novel (distinctive) stimuli have an inbuilt capacity to attract attention (McGuire et al., 1978; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). In terms of social category memberships, this means that where a cue to a category membership is a novel stimulus it attracts attention, consequently making the relevant membership salient. Thus the general hypothesis is that numerical minority category memberships should be particularly salient; the smaller the minority in relation to the majority the greater the salience of minority (but not majority) group membership. In line with information processing explanations for social behaviour, it is assumed that the psychological mechanism underlying minority salience is the automatic perceptual bias directing perceivers' attention to novel stimuli. Results consistent with this hypothesis were produced by McGuire and Taylor's research on the effect of novelty on the salience of ethnic category membership (McGuire et al., 1978) and on the effect of novelty on the salience of sex category membership (McGuire, McGuire & Winton, 1979; Taylor et al., 1978).

Despite the large amount of empirical work conducted in the area of salience in the 1960s and 1970s, there was very little theoretical development. Turner and his associates (Tuner et al., 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986), relying heavily on Burner's (1957) approach to perceptual categorization, attempted to remedy this by formulating a hypothesis of salience which integrated the empirical findings with regard to salience in the context of self categorization theory. They hypothesised that the salience of group memberships may be understood as the product of 'accessibility' x 'fit'. In short, given two equally accessible categories/group memberships, the one with the input that has the best fit will become salient; given 2 equally good fits, the more accessible category/group membership will become salient.

'Accessibility' refers to relative 'readiness' of a category to become activated. The two major determinants of this 'readiness'(taken from Bruner's original theory) are the current goals and purposes of the perceiver and the likelihood of particular types of objects/events occurring in the perceiver's present/ situation/ environment/ context; for

example, the category/group 'French' would be particularly accessible to the individual on holiday in France. Drawing on empirical work, Turner et al. (1987) outline various other factors that may affect the accessibility of social categories. Research by Higgins and King (1980) identifies information-processing factors, such as recency, and salience (i.e. prominence and attentional distinctiveness) which may be added to Bruner's original determinants of accessibility. Boyanowsky and Allen (1973) suggest that because categories play a role in self-conception, the relative centrality of importance of a particular group membership for an individual's self-definition will be a major determinant of its relative accessibility for that individual. A similar point is made by Tajfel and Wilkes (1964). They argue that the current emotional or value significance of a given ingroup/outgroup categorization is likely to influence its relative accessibility. This effect may be apparent throughout a culture, for some groups within a culture or for individual group members. The example given is that of the black/white categorization. In South Africa, particularly during the apartheid regime, this categorization was apparent throughout the culture; in other countries it may be more accessible to groups involved in race relations politics, or to racially prejudiced individuals (Turner et al., 1987).

'Fit' refers to the match between actual stimulus characteristics and the category specifications, and ensure that perceptions are linked to reality. For example, no matter how much the individual in France expects to see a French person, the will not perceive a French person until someone with the requisite characteristics (for example, an ability to speak French) appears. According to Turner et al., (1987), in defining fit for social categorizations, the task is therefore to specify the characteristics of social invariances to which the ingroup/outgroup (social) level of categorization corresponds.

Turner et al. (1987) go on to hypothesise that fit for social categories may be understood in two ways. Firstly, from a cognitive-structural aspect, fit may be seen as comprising the degree to which the people under observation maximise the perceived differences between and similarities within categories. One way of operationalizing this idea was set out by Tajfel (1969). He proposed understanding fit as the degree to which observed similarities and differences between people (or their actions) are perceived as correlated

with a division into social categories. Social categories are commonly defined in terms of similarities and differences with regard to race, gender, class. Other dimensions of similarity and difference include language (Giles, 1978), common fate (Campbell, 1958), and power and status ((Sachdev & Bouris, 1993). According to Tajfel, of these various possible ways of categorizing a collection of individuals the categorization with the best fit will be that with which observed similarities and differences in individual characteristics, expressed attitudes and behaviour correlate most highly (Turner et al., 1987).

Secondly, Turner et al. (1987), argue that for the purpose of defining fit, it is also necessary to consider the behavioural content or social meaning of ingroup/outgroup categorizations (normative fit). They point out that defining a person as a member of a social group, for example 'English', does not simply define that person as similar or different from other people; in addition, it defines similarities and differences on specific, normatively appropriate dimensions (stereotyped dimensions associated with a particular social category). In other words, fit may be understood as the degree to which observed similarities and differences between people or their actions are perceived to correlate in a stereotype-consistent manner with a division into social categories. The results of two studies by Oakes & Turner(1986) supported the idea that the salience of group memberships (as reflected in both category membership attributions and the degree of category differentiation)would be maximised under conditions of structural and normative fit.

Finally, Turner et al., (1987) make the point that the fitting of input to a social categorization is situation-specific. Given social categorizations are not theorised as being correlated with differences or similarities in attitudes and behaviour in an acontextual sense, nor is it proposed that a given attitude or behaviour is always perceived as the norm for one particular social category. Structural fit is always dependent upon the differences and similarities between and within categories for the individuals and behaviour currently under observation at any one time. Likewise, the normative fit between a given characteristic or action and a given categorization depends on both the intergroup comparison being made and the context; what is normatively

associated with one group membership in one context, may be irrelevant or associated with a different group membership in another context. This is an important link between salience theory and categorization theory, because one of the distinguishing features of social categorization is that its object can transform itself. Thus, individuals who may be categorized as members of one category in a particular context, may behave differently in different situations, varying the cues available for categorization and resulting in them being classified as members of a different category dependent on context. Furthermore, this proposition may be linked with Deschamps' (1977) work on crossed categories which suggests that crossed categories (for example, race and gender) attenuate the differentiation deriving from an initial simple categorization (for example in terms of race) and may result in a reclassification based on percieved similarities (for example, in terms of gender.

7.3.3. Evaluating the work on salience

From the review on salience in 7.3.2, it is clear that there is a large literature on the empirical determinants of social category membership salience, and that the issue of salience has been approached and understood in a variety of ways. Nonetheless there are certain limitations within this research area.

One major limitation is that much of the data in studies of salience concerns the perceptions of others as group members, rather than as perceptions of the self as a group member (Turner et al., 1987). Within this context, this Study 2, which focuses on individuals perceptions of themselves as members of race and gender categories makes a useful contribution.

Condor (1989) evaluates the work of Turner and his colleagues from a feminist perspective. She acknowledges that their work on gender salience (Oakes, 1983; 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986), which assumes that the category 'woman' constitutes asocial identity category to all people some of the time rather than to some women all the time, is important because it recognises the fluidity of social categories and the relationship

between categorization and context. However, despite this acknowledgement, she argues that there are problematic areas within their work.

Firstly, she points out that an assumption underlying their empirical work on salience is that the flexibility of salient categories may be best understood quantitatively. Based on this assumption there is a tendency to distinguish between presence (salience) or absence (non-salience) rather than more subtle gradients of strength of ingroup categorization. Condor goes on to raise the question of whether it is ever the case that gender identification is simply 'not salient'. She argues that even when an individual is not explicitly defining themselves as a man or a woman, he/she may still be implicitly aware of his/her gender, simply taking it for granted.

Linked to the above criticism, Condor (1989) makes the point that salience research has also tended to limit its conceptualisation of psychological flexibility across contexts to the presence or absence of one particular social category. Referring to Oakes and Turner's (1986) research in which they pose the question. 'When does a black British woman feel strongly 'British" as opposed to 'black' or 'female'?', Condor argues that empirical work within salience reflects a commitment to a positive research tradition in which it is assumed that the world may be carved up into discrete independent variables in this case gender, race and nation. This is in direct opposition to the argument within feminist literature on women's identity that concepts/identities such as race, class and gender are inextricably intermeshed (Bhavnani, 1993; Fowlkes; 1992; McKay, 1993).

Finally, Condor (1989) refers to the assumption underlying much of the work on the salience of gender categories, that gender categories are associated with a fixed stereotype that is evoked every time gender becomes a salient aspect of social or self-categorization. This assumption is evident in the way Turner et al., (1987) explain the salience of a particular ingroup/outgroup distinction partly in terms of the fit of this predefined stereotypical category to the particular situation. It is also evident in the experimental research setting where the salience of gender distinction has been operationally defined as the description of the self or others in terms of predefined structures of sex stereotypes. (See, for example, Oakes & Turner, 1986). Condor argues

that this sort of assumption ignores the fact that the meanings of the category 'woman' may vary from individual to individual and context to context. Her criticism is congruent with the work of feminist writers such as Charles (1996) and Walker, 1990a) who also stress the heterogeneity of the meaning of the group 'women' (see Chapter3, 3.7.) .

The choice of the methodology for Study 2 may be motivated in terms of the above argument. Apart from being grounded on previous empirical methodologies used within the SIT framework to explore identity (see section 7.2.), the choice of the multi-dimensional scale, social distance type scale, personality attributions questionnaire and identity checklist as measures/scales for Study 2 may be justified in terms of the fact that they are not limited to simply identifying the presence or absence of gender and race identity salience. On the contrary, they were specifically designed to be able to explore the relative strength/importance of race and gender identity for the participants.

One criticism that may be levelled at the methodology employed in this study is that it primarily consists of scales which are quantitative, and are not in accordance with the feminist call for more qualitative ways of exploring women's identity.

However, Skevington & Baker (1989b) point out that although scale based methodologies do not correspond with the feminist move towards qualitative research, they should not be dismissed as irrelevant. Where scales have generally been carefully designed to be relevant to the research question, or have been based on pilot studies which utilised qualitative methods such as interviews (as was the case in this study), scales may provide valuable information on how the mechanisms of social identification, social comparison and social categorization operate outside of the laboratory setting. Furthermore, it is clear that if one is to accept the idea that a mixed method may be most beneficial and informative to feminist research (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.), we cannot simply discard quantitative methodologies, such as scales.

7.4. A note on the use of the issue of 'sexual violence against women' as the experimental intervention

Before discussing the methodology of study two in detail in chapter eight, it is necessary to briefly consider the use of the issue of 'sexual violence against women' (specifically rape) as the experimental intervention in this study. Primarily, this issue was chosen as an intervention based on the results of study one, which suggested that this issue may make gender identity more salient for women.

However, in addition to the results of Study 1, there is also evidence in the literature that the issue of sexual violence against women may affect women's identity/self-concept. Research by Bohner, Weisbrod, Raymond, Barsvi and Schwarz (1993) and Schwarz and Brand (1983) indicates that when women read reports about sexual assault, they experience a lowering of self-esteem. Similarly, Reid and Finchilescu (1995) found that exposure to violence against women in film media resulted in feelings of disempowerment in female viewers.

7.5. Summary.

In this chapter, a framework was constructed for Study 2 The methodologies used to explore identity within SIT were reviewed, as was the work on salience. Based on these reviews, the focus and methodologies of Study 2 were motivated. Finally, the issue of 'sexual violence against women' as a variable for manipulating the salience of gender identity was considered.

CHAPTER 8

STUDY 2: METHOD

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the methodology of Study 2 will be discussed. The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the aims of the study, the research design, and the methodology used. Thereafter, the participants in the study will be described, and the materials used in the study as well as the operationalisation of the variables will be discussed. Following this, the research design and the methodological procedure used in study two will be outlined in detail. Finally, the data analysis will be detailed.

8.2. Overview

In order to explore further the possibility (suggested by the results of Study 1) that 'sexual violence against women' might constitute an issue that would make the gender aspect of identity more salient for women of all races it was decided to conducted a second study (hereafter referred to as Study 2). The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of making salient the issue of sexual violence against women on the gender identification of women of different race groups.

As the aim was to assess the effect of a specific variable (i.e. the salience of sexual violence against women), an experimental design (pretest posttest control group) was used in order to control for extraneous variables (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith & Gonzales, 1990). The pretest posttest control group design was chosen because any change in race and gender identity within the control group between the pretest and the posttest would indicate that extraneous variables might be having an effect on results. Controlling for extraneous variables was particularly important in this study as the results of the study (race and gender identification) could have been greatly affected by contextual factors, such as historical happenings and what was being published in the

media. This was a particular concern as the study was conducted during a time of great political change in South Africa. (This study spanned the time period after the first democratic, non-racial elections held in South Africa in April, 1994.)

The participants were told that they were taking part in a study about personality attributions. There were equal numbers of black, coloured and white participants. The participants from each race group were randomly divided into experimental and control conditions. The pretest measures (multidimensional scales, social identity scales, personality attributions, identity checklist and post-experimental questionnaire) were administered to all the participants. After 1 month, the interventions and the posttest measures were administered. The women in the experimental condition received an intervention to make sexual violence against women salient. This intervention consisted of an article concerning rape, followed by a discussion of the article. Women in the control condition received a neutral intervention, concerning natural healing. Immediately after the interventions, all the participants completed the posttest measures (again, the multidimensional scale, the social distance scale, the personality attributions and the identity checklist). Based on the literature as well as the results of Study 1, the following was hypothesized for Study 2:

(1) At the pretest, women would identify more closely with their own race group than with their gender group - that is, women would perceive themselves as closer/more similar to men of their own race group than to women of another race group. (This hypothesis specifically applied to black women. It was less certain whether white and coloured women's race identity would be fundamentally salient, or whether they would identify with their gender group at the pretest, with those white and coloured women in the experimental group identifying more strongly with their gender group at the posttest).

(2) At the posttest, women in the control group would not change their gender and race identification from the pretest. However, women in the experimental group would identify more closely with their gender group than with their race group at the posttest- that is women would perceive themselves as closer to or more

similar to women of other race groups than men of their own race group. (Again this move from race to gender identity was hypothesized to apply more specifically to black women than to white and coloured women. As mentioned above it was hypothetically possible that coloured and white women in the experimental group would not move from identification with their race group to identification with their gender group, but would identify with their gender group at both times, albeit more strongly with their gender group at the posttest than at the pretest.)

(3) In general:

- gender identity would be more salient for women in the experimental group at the posttest than at the pretest

- for women in the experimental group, gender identity would be more salient than race identity at the posttest.

8.3. Participants

One hundred and twenty women between the ages of 24 and 45 participated in the study. As the study was investigating the effect of making the issue of sexual violence against women salient on the gender identification of women in the Western Cape, the sample included equal numbers of women from each of the 3 main race groups in this area (i.e. black, coloured and white). Thus, there were 40 black women, 40 coloured women and 40 white women who participated in the study. Each of these 3 groups of women were randomly divided into the experimental and control condition. In an attempt to control for the extraneous variable of socio-economic class to some extent, only women who had completed matric and had some form of post-matric qualification were included in the study. Furthermore, all the women who were included were either employed or married to a husband who was employed.

Participants were recruited using door-to-door canvassing. No monetary payment was given. All the participants could speak English, and the research was conducted using the English language medium. Participants were only recruited if they agreed to be interviewed in English, and if they said that they felt comfortable expressing themselves in English. Here it should be noted that I (the researcher) am a 26 year old, white, English speaking woman. Thus I am of a different race to two thirds of my sample, and I am not able to speak Xhosa, which is the home language of the black participants. The implications of this are fully discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.

8.4. Materials

8.4.1. Introduction

The following materials were used in Study 2:

(1) Curriculum vitaes
(2) Multidimensional scales (MDS)
(3) A social distance scale (SDS)
(4) A personality attributions questionnaire
(5) A social identity checklist
(6) A post-experimental questionnaire
(7) An experimental intervention
(8) A control intervention

These materials may be divided into 4 categories on the basis of the function they performed.

The function of the first category, which included the curriculum vitaes, was to present the race x gender stimuli used in the study. The curriculum vitaes were used to give descriptions of 6 people (a black male, a black female, a coloured male, a coloured female, a white male and a white female), which represented these race x gender stimuli.. The MDS, SDS and personality attributions questionnaire were constructed using the representations of race x gender stimuli presented in the curriculum vitaes.

The second category, which included the experimental and control interventions served to establish the experimental versus control conditions.

The third category included the materials which were used to measure the dependent variables of race and gender identity: the multidimensional scale (MDS), a form of the social distance scale (SDS), a personality attributions questionnaire, and an identity checklist. It should be noted that the MDS and social identity checklist were used to measure the participants' race versus gender identifications (that is, which race x gender group subjects perceived themselves as similar to), while the SDS and personality attributions questionnaire was used to measure intergroup orientations (which race x gender group subjects preferred/ viewed favourably).

Finally, the post experimental questionnaire in the fourth category served as a means to obtain feedback from the participants about the study, and in so doing, to attempt to ascertain whether various extraneous variables may have affected the results.

8.4.2. Curriculum vitaes (See Appendix B)

The measurement of race and gender identity in this study centred around the participants' ratings of 6 stimuli of different races and genders. As explained in 8.4.1., these stimuli were presented using curriculum vitaes.

As race and gender were of interest in this study, not class, it was important to present the stimuli so that it was apparent that all the stimuli shared a similar socio-economic class. It was therefore clearly stated on the curriculum vitaes that all the stimuli had a tertiary education of a similar level. Race was not directly indicated on the curriculum vitaes, but was intimated in terms of the high school attended by the stimuli — in the Western Cape, there are certain residential areas which for a long time have been associated with particular race groups. To some extent, race was also indicated by the name of the stimulus; while this did not help to distinguish between white and coloured stimuli, Xhosa names certainly indicated black stimuli.

It should be noted that in order to control for pretest effects, pre- and posttest measures were varied. There were two sets of curriculum vitaes — A and B (see Appendix B). The stimuli remained the same in both sets of curriculum vitaes — i.e. black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male and white female, but details such as name, address and tertiary education were changed. An attempt was made to keep residential area and tertiary education (ie socio-economic class and status) on the same level for both sets of curriculum vitaes. Some of the participants were given set A at the pretest and the other participants were given set B. This was alternated at the posttest — those participants who had received set A at the pretest received set B at the posttest, while those who had received set B at the pretest received set A at the posttest. Three of the measures (the multidimensional scale, the social distance scale and the personality attribution measure) used the 6 stimuli from the curriculum vitaes directly. Thus there were two forms of each of these measures, in order to correspond with the two forms of the curriculum vitaes (see Appendices C to G). Participants were therefore given the measures/scales that corresponded with the stimuli on the curriculum vitaes that they had been given at either the pretest or the posttest.

8.4.3. The multidimensional scales (MDS) (See Appendix C)

In this study, the aim was to use the MDS to measure perceived similarity between stimuli, as well as 'identification with', or 'perceived closeness to' these stimuli. In order to do this, similarities data was collected.

Seven stimuli were used for the MDS in this study. Six of the stimuli were race and gender stimuli representative of particular groups (black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male, and white female) and the seventh stimulus was the stimulus of self. Thus there were 21 items, consisting of all the possible paired combinations of the 7 stimuli. Participants were required to rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, whether the 2 stimuli in each pair were very different (a rating of 1) or very similar (a rating of 7). As the 6 stimuli represented the various race x gender positions, the participants' placing of themselves vis-a-vis these stimuli provided insight into their identification at various points in this study.

Two issues that were considered when designing the MDS for this study are time and space effects.

Time effects are those effects associated with the order in which the pairs of stimuli are presented on the list of pairs to be judged (Davison, 1983). Time effects may be balanced for a given stimulus if the pairs in which that stimulus appears are equally balanced throughout the list of pairs. This may be achieved by using a technique called Ross ordering (Ross, 1934). Another way of dealing with time effects is to order the pairs randomly, as was done in this study, so that the order in which the pairs are presented in the list of pairs does not follow any particular sequence (Davison, 1983).

Space effects refer to the fact that the order in which the two stimuli in a pair are presented (for example, black male:self versus self:black male) clearly influences the participants' judgements about the similarities of the two stimuli (Davison, 1983). As with time effects, space effects may be dealt with by randomization. The researcher would need to randomly decide for each pair of stimuli, which one should be presented first. Space effects may also be balanced for a particular stimulus if that stimulus appears as the first member in half of the pairs in which it occurs, and as the second member in the other half of the pairs in which it occurs. Space effects should be balanced in this way for each stimulus. (Davison, 1983). This latter approach was adopted in this study.

8.4.4. The social distance scale (SDS) (See Appendix D)

In this study, the concept of social distance as defined by Lever (1968) was used to develop a scale. Based on his idea that social distance may be defined as the closeness or intimacy that one individual or group is prepared to enter into with another individual or group, a social distance type scale was developed for use in this research. The scale consisted of 4 items referring to various scenarios of involvement/closeness/intimacy with others. These scenarios presented different types of intimacy, as well as varying degrees of intimacy.

The first scenario involved working closely with another person, on a day-to-day basis for an extended time period. The second scenario took a different approach, and considered physical proximity; sitting next to a person on a bus for a long journey. The third scenario involved sharing accommodation with a person at a conference, and the final scenario extended this into travelling overseas with a person for a period of a few weeks. These scenarios were presented to the participants in this study and the participants were required to rank the 6 stimuli presented on the curriculum vitaes (black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male and white female) in order of preference, according to who they would prefer to interact with in each of the 4 scenarios. Ranking ranged from one (most preferred) to 6 (least preferred). Thus each item/scenario had a total score of 21 (1+2+3+4+5+6). If a participant gave 2 stimuli the same score on each item, e.g. 3, each of the stimuli would have their ranking decreased by 0.5 — in this example resulting in a score of 3.5 for the tied stimuli. The ranking below (in this case, 4) would then fall away. Thus the total score for each item on the scale always equalled 21

8.4.5. The personality attributions measure (See Appendix E)

Here the 6 stimuli presented on the curriculum vitaes were again used. The participants were given a list of 40 words describing personality attributes. There were equal numbers of positive and negative words made up of positive words and their negative antonyms. The words had been selected from a bank of 160 words (80 pairs of antonyms). In a previous pilot study, 6 independent judges were asked to rate all 180 words as either positive or negative. Only where there was agreement amongst all 6 judges that a particular word was a positive personality attribute, and that its antonym was a negative personality attribute, was that pair of words used in the final measure. Participants were required to select the 10 words that they felt best described each of the 6 stimuli presented in the curriculum vitaes. In an attempt to deal with any effect that may have resulted from the order in which the stimuli were presented to the participants on the personality attributions measure, six different versions of this measure were used, each presenting the six stimuli in a different order.

8.4.6. The social identity checklist (See Appendix F)

In this measure of identity, participants were given a list of possible identities, related to gender, race, religion, language and class. The participants were required to select the identities that they felt applied to them, and then to rank them in order of importance, 1 being most important, 2 being second most important, and so on. There was no limit placed on the number of identities that a participant could select.

8.4.7. Post-experimental questionnaire (See Appendix G)

A qualitative evaluative questionnaire was given to the participants in order to evaluate how they viewed the research In Question 1 and 2 an attempt was made to assess whether the participants understood the key terms used in the scales/measures. Here, participants were required to give their own definitions of 'personality perception' and 'identity'. Question 3 attempted to explore what the participants thought the purpose of the study was. Question 4 expanded on Question 3, and here participants were required to state what they thought each of the scales/ measures/ questionnaires was attempting to measure. In Question 5, subjects were presented with each of the 6 stimuli from the curriculum vitaes, and were asked to state what race, gender and class they thought each of the stimuli were. This was done in an attempt to ensure that the participants had understood the curriculum vitaes and the nature of the various stimuli presented to them. Questions 6, 7 and 8 focused on situational and experimenter effects. Participants were asked whether any aspect of the research situation or any personal attribute of the researcher had influenced their responses in any way. Finally, in Question 9, participants were given the opportunity to comment on the research.

8.4.8. The experimental intervention (See Appendix H)

Before I administered the posttest measures to them, the participants were given an intervention.

Participants in the experimental group were given the experimental intervention which took the form of an article regarding violence against women. This article was written in the form of a magazine article and focused primarily on rape. Rape was chosen as the topic of this article, because women had said (in Study 1) that in particular physical violence against women made them feel closer to other women and alienated from men, and rape is one of the most common forms of physical violence against women. Thus, the aim of the experimental intervention was to make the gender aspect of the participants' identity salient.

8.4.9. The control intervention (See Appendix I)

Participants in the control group were given a neutral intervention before being given the posttest measures. In order to keep the interventions consistent, this intervention also took the form of an article, and concerned natural healing. This topic was decided upon because it was necessary to choose an intervention that would not lead to the participant considering her identity in any way, and so possibly confounding the results.

8.5. Operationalising the variables

The aim of the study was to explore the effect of making the independent variable (i.e. the issue of 'sexual violence against women') salient on the race/gender identification of South African women of different races.

The independent variable of 'sexual violence against women' was operationalised as an article about rape. Within the context of the individual interview, the participants were given the article to read, and then encouraged to discuss their reactions, feelings and ideas.

The focal issue, that is, the race/gender identification of the female participants, was operationalised in terms of their responses on the multidimensional scales, the social distance scale, the personality attributions questionnaire and the identity checklist. The MDS attempted to measure the degree of identification with people of the same race as

opposed to people of the same gender, but not necessarily of the same race. Practically this means that I was interested in seeing whether a women felt 'closer' to a man of her own race, or to a woman of another race. In the social distance scale, the issue of identification was approached from a different angle, with identification being operationalised as a ranked preference for the six stimuli of different races and genders in a variety of situations. The personality attributions questionnaire attempted to measure identification via the personality traits (positive versus negative) that participants attributed to the different stimuli. Following the tenets of SIT, it was hypothesised that participants would view the groups that they identified with more positively. Finally, the social identity checklist attempted to measure relative identifications via participants' ranked importance of various identity categories (specifically race and gender categories). As the MDS, SDS and personality attributions measure depended on reported 'closeness to', 'preference for' and 'perceptions of' 6 stimuli (black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male and white female) it was also necessary to find a way of presenting these stimuli to the participants in a meaningful way before they encountered them in the various measures. Thus the stimuli were presented to the participants using curriculum vitaes.

8.6. The design of the study

This study took the form of a pretest posttest experimental control group design. At the pretest, all the participants were presented with the race x gender stimuli using curriculum vitaes, and then completed the pretest measures (the multidimensional scale, the social identity scale, the personality attribution measure, the identity checklist and the post-experimental questionnaire). After one month, the participants in the experimental group received the experimental intervention, while those in the control group received the benign intervention. Immediately thereafter, all the participants completed the posttest measures (again, the multidimensional scale, the social identity scale, the personality attribution measure, the identity checklist and the post-experimental questionnaire). This design may be presented diagrammatically as follows:

EXPERIMENTAL	**O1**	**X1**	**O2**
CONTROL	**O1**	**X2**	**O2**

O= Stimuli Presentation

Curriculum vitaes of 6 individuals

(1) black male

(2) black female

(3) coloured male

(4) coloured female

(5) white male

(6) white female

Measures

(1) Multidimensional scale

(2) Social distance task

(3) Personality attributions task

(4) Social identity checklist

(5) Post-experimental questionnaire

O1= Pretest

O2= Posttest

X1= Experimental intervention (information on rape and task

X2= Neutral intervention

The main advantage of the split-plot between- and within-subjects design used in this study, is that participant variables were controlled for to a large extent (Aronson et al, 1990; Keppel, 1982). Because the same participants were in both the pretest and the posttest conditions, the chance that differences between the pretest and posttest condition could occur as a result of differences between the participants in the two groups was eliminated.

However, as a result of using a within-subjects design, the problem of pretesting had to be considered. Pretesting is always problematic, because it means that participants are exposed to the same measures twice, and possibly remember and duplicate their answers from the pretest at the posttest, thereby confounding the effect of the intervention. In addition, pretest sensitization (whereby participants are alerted to the purpose of the study by the pretest) may occur (Aronson et al, 1990). (In this study the latter did not pose a problem as there was no real attempt made to deceive participants as to the purpose of the study.)

In order to deal with the problem of pretesting, a time period of 1 month was allowed to elapse between the time of the pretest and the time of the intervention and posttest. It was reasoned that this long time span would reduce the likelihood of the participants remembering the pretest measures and their pretest answers clearly. Thus, participants would be more likely to respond to the posttest measures and scales independently of their pretest responses.

Finally, as discussed in section 8.4.2. pre-and posttest measures were varied in terms of the names and details of the stimuli in an attempt to deal with the problem of pretesting.

8.7. Administration Procedure

As mentioned in section 8.3., there were equal numbers of black, white and coloured women making up the sample of 120. Each of these groups of women (black, white and coloured) were randomly divided into the experimental or control conditions. The result was 20 black, 20 white and 20 coloured women in the experimental condition, and 20 black, 20 white and 20 coloured women in the control condition.

Initially, I intended to administer the pretest and posttest measures to groups of women. However a pilot administration of this nature, with twenty women, was unsuccessful. The main problem was that participants did not complete the scales/measures correctly, resulting in missing data. Consequently, I decided to administer the experimental measures and intervention on an individual basis, in the form of a structured interview.

According to Aronson et al. (1990) an interview is advantageous over a questionnaire because the interviewer can encourage the participant to pay attention, and therefore has a better chance of getting a serious, honest response. Furthermore, the interviewer can also ensure that the participant interprets the questions correctly and responds in the required amount of detail.

Each participant was visited 3 times at her home. I used the first visit to introduce myself, explain the nature and purpose of the study and ask the potential participant's permission to interview her. The potential participants were informed that the study concerned personality perceptions, and that the data would be used for the completion of my Master's thesis. The potential participants were also assured that the information obtained from them would be kept confidential. If the potential participant agreed to be interviewed, I then set up 2 further appointments with her. This first visit lasted approximately 1 hour.

The second and third visits were scheduled to take place 1 month apart, and lasted 3 to 4 hours each. During the second visit the first set of curriculum vitaes and the pretest measures were administered, in the form of a structured interview. The third visit was then used to administer the intervention to the experimental group and the neutral task to the control group. The intervention tasks were introduced very casually. For both the experimental and control intervention, I introduced the intervention as an interesting article that I had read, and passed it on to the participant to read. After she had read it, I discussed the article with the participant, asking her what she thought of the article. (I encouraged the participant to talk, but I did not express any opinion of my own about the article, as I wished to keep the intervention the same for all the participants and I did not want to bias the participants in any way.) I then said that we should return to the interview. Following the administration of the intervention tasks, the alternate curriculum vitaes and the corresponding posttest measures were administered. These administrations also took the form of a structured interview. The total amount of interviewing time therefore equalled approximately 960 hours.

8.8 Analysing the data

8.8.1. The multidimensional scale

The broad objective of multidimensional scaling is to take a set of experimentally obtained proximity measures (such as similarities or dissimilarities) which are usually of rank order, and to attempt to represent this data geometrically as points in some type of metric space (Green et al., 1989).

In order to represent data points in geometric space and analyze the MDS data, it is necessary to identify the dimensions along which the data is to be represented. Hair et al. (1979) make the point that identifying the subjective dimensions is a very difficult task. Multidimensional scaling has no prescribed procedure for labeling the dimensions, and there are several procedures which may be used by the researcher to identify these dimensions.

One of these procedures is for the researcher to identify the dimensions in terms of objective characteristics of the stimuli (Hair et al., 1979). This approach was adopted in this study, and the dimensions of race and gender were used.

A necessary criterion for obtaining this location of stimuli and/or participants in space, is to find configurations (spatial maps) whose rank orders of estimated ratio-scaled distances between all stimuli most closely resemble input rank orders (Hair et al., 1979). Practically, this means that for each level of dimensionality, a stress measure must be calculated. The researcher should then attempt to find the lowest level of dimensionality producing satisfactory stress (Hair et al., 1979). This criterion was also used in selecting two-dimensional spatial maps for use in this study.

The MDS data in Study 2 was similarities data. As we are dealing with the perceptions of stimuli on a proximity basis of measurement; the output thus consists of representations of the stimuli proximities in t-dimensional space (Hair et al., 1979). As mentioned above, in this study it was decided to represent the stimuli proximities in two-

dimensional space. Hair et al. (1979) note that the researcher may generate this output on an individual basis, so that there is one spatial map per respondent, or the researcher may attempt to limit the number of spatial maps by using some process of aggregation. The approach taken in this study was to aggregate the respondents' approaches to obtain a mean for each of the twenty-one items in the MDS for each of the following twelve groups:

- black participants, experimental condition, pretest
- black participants, experimental condition, posttest
- black participants, control condition, pretest
- black participants, control condition posttest
- coloured participants, experimental condition, pretest
- coloured participants, experimental condition, posttest
- coloured participants, control condition, pretest
- coloured participants, control condition, posttest
- white participants, experimental condition, pretest
- white participants, experimental condition, posttest
- white participants, control condition, pretest
- white participants, control condition, posttest

(It should be noted that there is a danger with this approach, because it assumes a commonality of dimensions and saliences across subjects (Hair et al., 1979). In order to ensure that the means used were representative, a standard deviation was calculated for the scores on each of the items for each of the groups above. The reasoning behind this was the idea that if the standard deviation for a particular group on a particular item was small, then the mean for that particular group on that item would be representative. If however, the standard deviation was big, then the mean would not be representative of the scores for that group on that item.)

The mean for each item for each of these groups was then entered into a stimuli by stimuli rectangular matrix (see Appendix J). The type of matrix used may be referred to as an intact unconditional proximity matrix (Green et al.,1989). The matrix is intact because each cell, excluding the main diagonal, has an entry indicating the degree of

similarity of one pair of stimuli relative to all the other pairs of stimuli (Green at al., 1989). The matrix is unconditional because each cell in the symmetric matrix, whether above or below the main diagonal may be compared to any other cell (Green et al., 1989). Once matrices had been constructed for each of the twelve groups listed above, Statistica for Windows was used to produce a two-dimensional scatterplot (spatial map) for each of these groups (See Chapter 9.2.). The computer programme Statistica provides a full implementation of the non-metric multidimensional scaling procedure (Statistica for Windows, 1984-1995). Non-metric scaling assumes that input data is ordinal (ranked data) and that output data is metric. This means that the distances output by the MDS procedure can be assumed to be at least intervally scaled (Hair et al., 1979).

8.8.2. The social distance scale

The data that was used in this analysis constituted the ranks awarded to each of the stimuli on each of the items by each of the participants.

Data analysis of the four-item social distance scale took the form of four stages. The following procedures were conducted using SAS:

8.8.2.1. A MANOVA on the four social distance items collectively

Before performing ANOVAS on the data, a MANOVA was conducted on the four social distance scale items collectively. The reason for this is that MANOVA is able to examine the relationship between a combination of two or more dependent response measures, presumed to be metrically scaled, and a set of non-metric (categorical) predictor variables, and is not confined to examining a single dependent variable (Hair et al., 1979). Thus, it allows a simultaneous test for the effect on the combination of criterion variables. This is important, because criterion variables are usually not independent, but are correlated as they were obtained from the same participants. When multiple criterion variables (as are present in this study), are studied through repeat applications of the univariate ANOVA on each of the dependent variables (as will be done in this study), the risk of committing a Type 1 error (finding significant interactions

where none exist) is increased. Because MANOVA allows simultaneous testing of all the variables and considers the interrelationships among them, it is particularly useful for examining interrelated criterion variables where an individual ANOVA of each separate criterion may lead to spurious results (Hair et al., 1979). Conversely, MANOVAS are also useful in the situation where a series of univariate ANOVAS on each of the criterion variables might have shown no significant differences yet an overall difference might be shown by a MANOVA (Hair at al., 1979).

The efffects for the MANOVA used in this analysis were as follows: 2 (experimental/ control condition) x 2 (pretest/posttest) x 3 (race of partcipant) x 3 (race of stimuli) x 2 (gender of stimuli). The experimental condition (A) and the race of participants (C) were between groups effects, while the pretest/posttest condition (B), the race of stimuli (D) and the gender of stimuli (E) were the within subjects effects.

8.4.2.2. Four five-way ANOVAS with three repeated measures

After conducting the MANOVA, four five-way ANOVAS were conducted, one on the data for each of the four items. The effects for these ANOVAS were: 2 (experimental condition) x 2 (pretest/posttest) x 3 (race of partcipant) x 3 (race of stimuli) x 2 (gender of stimuli). Again, the experimental condition (A) and the race of participants (C) were between groups effects, while the pretest/posttest condition (B), the race of stimuli (D) and the gender of stimuli (E) were the within subjects effects.

The data for the social distance scale was analysed item by item, because of the possibility that combining the items to get a composite score for the scale might obscure differences that could result from the different scenarios presented in each item.

8.4.3. The personality attributions questionnaire

Although the participants were asked to select the ten words that they felt best described each of the stimuli, many of the participants did not keep to this limit, and responses varied between nine and twelve words per stimulus.

Therefore, in order to analyze the data, the number of positive attributes per stimulus were expressed as a percentage of the total number of words used to describe that stimulus. Using these percentages, a 5-way ANOVA with 3 repeated measures was then conducted in SAS. The effects for the ANOVA were: 2 (experimental condition) x 2 (pretest/posttest) x 3 (race of participant) x 3 (race of stimuli) x 2 (gender of stimuli). The experimental condition (A) and the race of participants (C) were between groups effects/independent measures, while the pretest/posttest condition (B), the race of stimuli (D) and the gender of stimuli (E) were the within subjects effects/repeated measures.

8.8.4. Social identity checklist

The change in participants' ranked importance of gender identity was categorized as follows:

A: Ranking stayed constant from pretest to posttest — this included the situation where the identity was not mentioned at either time.

B: Ranking increased/improved from pretest to posttest. This included the situation where ranking moved closer to 1 (1 indicating the most important rank) and the situation where identity was mentioned at the posttest but not at the pretest.

C: Ranking decreased/deteriorated from pretest to posttest. This included the situation where ranking moved further away from 1 and the situation where identity was mentioned at the pretest but not at the posttest.

The data was then analysed using log-linear analysis.

8.4.4.1. A note on the use of log-linear analysis

Log-linear analysis models were appropriate for analysing this data because they may be used to analyze contingency tables in the presence of sampling zeros, provided that the zero cells are not excessive in number (Kennedy, 1983).

As with traditional chi-square, log-linear analysis is used to analyze categorical data (such as the data in this analysis). Qualitative variables are defined and the categories (or levels) of these variables are structured so that they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Kennedy, 1983). Essentially, the nature of the ensuing enquiry can be one of two forms: either the research is aiming to identify relations between or among variables (i.e. symmetrical enquiry) or the research is attempting to identify differences between or among groups (i.e. asymmetrical enquiry (Kennedy, 1983). The latter was the type of enquiry used in this study, where the focus was on the difference in response between women of different race groups, as well as the difference between the responses of the experimental and the control groups. Statistica for Windows was used to perform the log-linear analysis for each of the contingency tables based on the categories A, B and C.

8.4.5. The post-experimental questionnaire

The analysis of this questionnaire consisted primarily of a content analysis of the participants' replies. This content analysis was structured in terms of the issues addressed by the questions:

As Question 8 examined participants' perceptions of the race and gender of the stimuli in order to ascertain whether the curriculum vitaes had succeeded in making this clear, this question was analyzed differently to the rest of the post-experimental questionnaire. For this question, a frequency count was conducted in order to ascertain the percentage of participants whose perceptions of the race and gender of the participants corresponded with the race and gender intended to be portrayed on the curriculum vitaes.

8.9. Summary

In this chapter, the methodology of study two was outlined. A brief overview of the study was presented. Thereafter, the participants in the study were described, and the materials used in the study as well as the operationalisation of the variables were discussed. The research design, the methodological procedure and finally the data analysis were also described in detail.

CHAPTER 9

STUDY 2: RESULTS

9.1. Multi-dimensional scaling

The results of the MDS procedure may be seen in Figures 1 - 12.

9.1.1. MDS graphs: Pretest

In the pretest graphs, (Figures 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11) it is clear that the stimuli are clustered in terms of race. The black male and black female stimuli are superimposed on top of one another, as are the coloured male and coloured female and the white male and white female stimuli. Furthermore, the self stimuli is superimposed upon the male and female stimuli of the participant's own race. This clustering of stimuli on the basis of their race groups on the pretest MDS graphs supports the hypothesis that at the pretest, race would be more salient than gender. It is however interesting that there is absolutely no differentiation in terms of gender, and that race is the only basis for differentiation. This result was apparent for participants of all three race groups in both the experimental and control conditions at the pretest.

In terms of the dimensions at the pretest, Dimension 1 is difficult to interpret as there is no clear meaning. However, Dimension 2 is clearly a race dimension. In all the pretest graphs, participants place their own race separately at one end of Dimension 1, and the other two races at the other end of the same dimension (see Figure 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11). Thus, it appears that participants perceive a clear distinction between their own race and the other two races. In addition, the other two races are also seen as different from each other on Dimension 2.

9.1.2. MDS graphs: Posttest Control condition

As hypothesised, the posttest MDS graphs for the participants in the control condition suggest that no change occurred between the pretest and posttest for black, coloured or white participants in this condition. (See Figures 2, 4 and 6). There is still a clear clustering in terms of race along Dimension 2, with the self stimulus being superimposed upon the male and female stimuli of the participant's own race.

9.1.3. MDS graphs: Posttest Experimental condition

The MDS graphs of all three races in the experimental group show a distinct change between pretest and posttest. Whereas stimuli were clustered in terms of their race group at the pretest, the posttest MDS graphs suggest that here participants are differentiating between stimuli in terms of gender as well as race. While the differentiation between stimuli on the basis of race is maintained, in addition, the male and female stimuli of each of the three races are now clearly perceived as different. Furthermore, there is a differentiation between the self stimulus and the male and female stimuli of the participant's own race.

In the black experimental posttest condition (Figure 8) there is a clear division in terms of race along Dimension 1 and in terms of gender along Dimension 2. Along the race dimension (Dimension 1) the self is clearly placed closest to the own race (black) group, while along the gender dimension (Dimension 2) the self is placed close to the black female, but separate from the black male.

In the graph for coloured experimental participants at the posttest (Figure 10), there is again a clear division in terms of race along Dimension 1 and in terms of gender along the Dimension 2. (In this graph, the dimensions do not occur directly along the horizontal and vertical axes, and are clearer if one imagines rotating the left hand bottom corner of the graph slightly to the right). For the coloured participants at the posttest, as for the black participants, the self stimulus is placed with own race along the race dimension. Along the gender dimension the self is placed close to the own race (coloured

female) stimulus, and both the self and the coloured female stimuli are clearly perceived as different from the coloured male stimulus.

The pattern of differentiation along race and gender dimensions was repeated for the white participants in the experimental posttest condition. (See Figure 12). Again it is necessary to imagine rotating the graph by moving the left corner lightly to the right in order to more clearly identify the dimensions. In this graph, the gender dimension is along Dimension 1 and the race dimension is along Dimension 2. The self is again placed within the own race group along the race dimension and close to the own race female stimulus along the gender dimension.

To some extent, these graphs support the hypothesis that gender would be more salient than race for women in the experimental group at the posttest. However, it is interesting to note that these participants did not simply reclassify the stimuli in terms of gender; on the other hand, the differentiation between races that was present at the pretest was still maintained. Thus, while the female stimuli were perceived as different from the male stimuli of the same race group by the participants in this condition, the female stimuli of the three different race groups were also perceived as different. This is congruent with the literature which suggests that the meaning of the category women may not be the same for all women. (See Charles, 1996; Walker, 1990). Furthermore it also agrees with the literature which suggests that race and gender identity are inextricably intertwined. (See Bhavnani, 1993; Fowlkes, 1992; McKay, 1993). The participants clearly do not perceive all women as similar, and are making a distinction between women in terms of their race group. For the participants in this condition, it is therefore possible that gender as perceived by them has become more salient, and that their perceptions of gender are qualified by race resulting in the category women being divided into black, white and coloured women.

9.1.4. A note on stress values

As discussed in Chapter 7, the criterion for locating stimuli and/or participants in space, is to find configurations (spatial maps) whose rank orders of estimated ratio-scaled

distances between all stimuli best represents the input rank orders (Hair et al., 1979). For each level of dimensionally, a stress measure is calculated. This stress measure is a measure of how well the ranked distances on the spatial map agree with the ranks given by the participants, and the researcher should attempt to find the lowest level of dimensionally producing satisfactory stress (Hair et al., 1979).

However, the issue of what constitutes satisfactory stress is not completely clear. Hair et al. (1979) suggest that the researcher should set some small cut-off value for acceptable levels of stress. Green et al. (1989) do not give any clear guidelines for interpreting stress, but they note that the interpretation of stress values can be greatly affected by factors such as the number of stimuli and the number of dimensions. Kruskal and Wish (1978) suggest that a stress value of around 0.1 is acceptable.

In this study, 2-dimensional spatial maps were selected, because this was the lowest number of dimensions that provided a satisfactory stress in each case. In the light of the relatively high stress values reported in empirical studies (for example, Deaux et al., 1995), and because the graphs produced were clearly interpretable (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Young, 1987) I decided to accept the stress values for the posttest experimental graphs, even though they were close to, or marginally exceeded the figure of 0.1 suggested by Kruskal and Wish (1978).

9.1.5. A note on degenerate solutions

When the number of distinct points in the solution configuration is small compared to the number of stimuli, a degenerate solution may be indicated. (Davison, 1983). Davison (1983) argues that if such a degenerate solution occurs, it should be discarded.

However, where the objects have a natural clustering (or obvious psychological grouping), usually of three or less clusters, and the dissimilarities between objects in different clusters are all larger than the dissimilarities within each cluster, this phenomena may also occur (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). This was the case for the pretest MDS graphs and the posttest MDS graphs for the control condition in this study, where the stimuli

could naturally be grouped according to race. In such an instance, Kruskal and Wish (1978) argue that while one should be cautious about drawing fixed conclusions, the source of the clustering should be noted and considered (as was done in the analysis above). The main aim is then to determine whether the clustering that occurs provides spatial configurations which are interpretable in terms of the data. According to Kruskal and Wish (1978), interpretability plays a central role in the selection of a particular dimensionality from the range of dimensionalities that are feasible within the goodness-of-fit. As discussed above, the clustering in the MDS graphs of this study is clearly interpretable as a perceived division of the stimuli by the participants on the grounds of race.

9.1.6 Standard deviations for the MDS

As explained in Chapter 8, a standard deviation was calculated for the scores on each of the items for each of the groups in the study. The rationale for this was the idea that if the standard deviation for a particular group on a particular item was small, then the mean for that particular group on that item would be representative. If however, the standard deviation was big, then the mean would not be representative of the scores for that group on that item. These standard deviations may be seen in Tables 1 - 12 in Appendix K.

The standard deviation ranged from 0 - 1.92. This means that the scores of a particular group on a particular item never varied more than 1.92 units from the mean. In the context of a seven-point scale, this indicates that participant responses for each group on each item were fairly stable, suggesting that the mean score for each group on each item (used for the MDS analysis) was representative of the sample.

Figure 1: Black Pretest Control



Stress = 0.0000038

Figure 2: Black Posttest Control



Stress = 0.0000029

Figure 3: Coloured Pretest Control



Stress = 0.0000044

Figure 4: Coloured Posttest Control



Stress = 0.0000039

Figure 5: White Pretest Control



Stress = 0.0000034

Figure 6: White Posttest Control



Stress = 0.0000033

Figure 7: Black Pretest Experimental



Stress = 0.0000049

Figure 8: Black Posttest Experimental



Stress = 0.1159719

Figure 9: Coloured Pretest Experimental



Stress = 0.0000045

Figure 10: Coloured Posttest Experimental



Stress = 0.1274371

Figure 11: White Pretest Experimental



Stress = 0.0000046

Figure 12: White Posttest Experimental



Stress = 0.0915444

9.2. The social distance scale

9.2.1. MANOVA

The table for the MANOVA conducted on the scores for the four items on the social distance scale may be seen in Appendix L. It can be seen from this MANOVA table that the majority of the interactions tested by the MANOVA are significant at the 0.05 level of significance. In addition, two main effects, namely, D (race of stimulus) and E (gender of stimulus) also tested significant at the 0.05 level of significance. It should be noted that the other main effects, that is, A (experimental versus control condition), B (pretest versus posttest condition) and C(race of participant) produced no main effect because of the way in which the scale was scored. Participants in the study were given four items and were required to rank six stimuli (black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male and white female) in order of preference for each of the items. However, their total score on the item had to add up to 21 (the sum of 1+2+3+4+5+6). Thus participants could not differ in terms of their total score on an item (always 21) or their mean score on an item (21/6 = 3.5). Thus the only main effects that could occur involved the participants' ratings of the three race groups of the stimuli in the study (variable D), and their different ratings of the two genders (variable E) and their interactions.

9.2.2. The 5-way ANOVAS with 3 repeated measures

The ANOVA tables of the 5-way ANOVAS performed on each of the 4 items are contained in Appendix M. Table 1 presents the F-ratios of all these ANOVAS, and the ANOVA means tables for these ANOVAS may be seen in Tables 2-5 below.

Table 1: Table of F-ratios for the 5-way ANOVAS performed on the social distance scale data

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4
F Statistics for Effects				
A	-	-	-	-
C	-	-	-	-
A*C	-	-	-	-
B	-	-	-	-
A*B	-	-	-	-
B*C	-	-	-	-
A*B*C	-	-	-	-
D	24.74*	10.24*	26.55*	42.25*
A*D	0.46	0.08	0.88	0.02
C*D	151.32*	137.66*	143.51*	245.2*
A*C*D	1.37	1.32	1.98	3.58*
E	159.67*	218.46*	1255.62*	177.49*
A*E	0.04	4.48*	2.83	8.54*
C*E	6.11*	3.29*	1.31	4.67*
A*C*E	3.28*	2.95	1.84	4.75*
B*D	1.24	1.55	3.08*	4.63*
A*B*D	1.58	3.71*	3.81*	3.66*
B*C*D	0.92	0.73	7.46*	4.68*
A*B*C*D	0.98	0.9	4.02*	4.92*
B*E	23.8*	26.08*	42.87*	75.41*
A*B*E	21.29*	18.93*	27.57*	67.56*
B*C*E	0.21	1.09	2.05	1.67
A*B*C*E	1.07	2.18	0.79	1.95
D*E	4.01*	3.21*	1.09	17.82*
A*D*E	9.04*	3.06*	2.31	0.94
C*D*E	11.41*	17.14*	20.04*	19.57*
A*C*D*E	4.49*	2.88*	1.76	5.1*
B*D*E	0.33	1.06	4.51*	1.2
A*B*D*E	0.04	1.27	1.51	0.42
B*C*D*E	1.17	5.21*	0.59	3.14*
A*B*C*D*E*	2.12	5.07*	0.72	2.65*

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

ANOVA FOR ITEM ONE

Table 2: Table of means for Social Distance Scale on Item 1 ('Working together') *Low score = High rank

	PRE							POST					
Stimulus	**Black**		**Col.**		**White**			**Black**		**Coloured**		**White**	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**		**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Control													
Black	2.375*	1.375	5.425	4.175	4.600	3.050		2.375	1.375	5.450	4.150	4.650	3.000
Coloured	5.400	4.700	2.375	1.700	3.725	3.100		5.425	4.675	2.325	1.700	3.700	3.175
White	5.100	4.200	4.450	3.200	2.425	1.625		5.125	4.175	4.450	3.200	2.425	1.625
Experimental													
Black	2.000	1.700	5.325	4.225	4.275	3.475		2.300	1.625	5.425	4.050	4.300	3.275
Coloured	5.750	4.650	2.225	2.250	3.025	3.100		5.875	4.425	2.525	2.075	3.375	2.725
White	5.175	3.200	4.600	3.400	2.775	1.85		5.600	3.025	4.750	3.150	2.775	1.700

ANOVA FOR ITEM TWO

Table 3: Table of means for Social Distance Scale on Item 2 ('Sitting on a bus')

*Low score = High rank

	PRE							POST					
Stimulus	**Black**		**Col.**		**White**			**Black**		**Coloured**		**White**	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**		**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Control													
Black	2.175*	1.475	5.325	4.300	4.475	3.250		2.200	1.475	5.300	4.150	4.575	3.300
Coloured	5.250	4.250	2.625	2.025	3.800	3.050		5.250	4.175	2.600	2.000	3.875	3.100
White	5.025	3.975	4.125	3.200	2.700	1.975		5.025	3.975	4.125	3.200	2.700	1.975
Experimental													
Black	2.175	1.625	5.150	4.050	4.550	3.450		2.350	1.600	5.275	3.900	4.600	3.275
Coloured	5.475	4.525	2.350	1.650	3.725	3.275		5.675	4.475	2.575	1.650	3.900	2.725
White	5.025	3.225	4.775	3.275	2.775	1.925		5.750	2.875	4.900	2.925	2.850	1.700

ANOVA FOR ITEM THREE

Table 4: Table of means for Social Distance Scale on Item 3 ('Sharing a chalet on a conference')

*Low score = High rank

	PRE							POST					
Stimulus	**Black**		**Col.**		**White**			**Black**		**Coloured**		**White**	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**		**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Control													
Black	3.350*	1.225	5.725	3.250	5.050	2.400		3.425	1.225	5.725	3.200	5.050	2.375
Coloured	5.625	3.775	3.600	1.375	4.400	2.225		5.650	3.575	3.650	1.375	4.525	2.225
White	5.650	3.250	4.975	2.675	3.150	1.300		5.700	3.275	4.925	2.675	3.125	1.300
Experimental													
Black	2.925	1.175	5.550	3.325	5.150	2.875		3.775	1.150	5.750	2.875	5.075	2.375
Coloured	5.825	3.950	3.475	1.350	4.225	2.175		6.000	3.550	3.900	1.300	4.425	1.825
White	5.525	2.525	5.075	2.675	3.775	1.425		5.900	2.350	5.050	2.375	3.925	1.400

ANOVA FOR ITEM FOUR

Table 5: Table of means for Social Distance Scale on Item 4 ('Travelling overseas')

*Low score = High rank

	PRE							POST					
Stimulus	**Black**		**Col.**		**White**			**Black**		**Coloured**		**White**	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**		**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Control													
Black	1.725*	1.550	5.700	4.950	3.600	3.475		1.800	1.425	5.725	4.975	3.675	3.400
Coloured	5.700	4.475	2.375	1.575	3.850	3.025		5.700	4.475	2.300	1.625	3.875	3.025
White	5.300	4.000	4.450	3.200	2.275	1.775		5.350	4.050	4.375	3.225	2.300	1.700
Experimental													
Black	1.725	1.575	5.450	4.375	4.500	3.375		2.700	1.250	5.775	3.800	4.750	2.725
Coloured	5.725	4.875	1.950	2.200	2.975	3.275		6.000	4.375	2.850	1.575	3.700	2.500
White	5.225	3.175	4.925	3.500	2.275	1.900		5.850	2.975	4.950	3.000	2.725	1.500

From the four five-way ANOVA tables, it is evident that for all four the items, no variable only occurs as significant on its own; each variable that is significant occurs in interaction with other variables. Thus as these ANOVAS had more than three levels, it was decided to perform pairwise analysis of the ANOVA means for each item in order to interpret the data. (For the differences between the ANOVA means used in the Tukey's T tests, see Appendix N). Tukey's T-test was used as it provides a powerful means of conducting pairwise tests. The results of these pairwise analyses are discussed in section 9.2.4.

9.2.3. The 4-way ANOVAS with two repeated measures

The analysis of the four 5-way ANOVAS revealed that not only did the ranking of female stimuli by participants in the experimental condition improve at the posttest (move closer to 1), but the ranking of the male stimuli by these participants also deteriorated at the posttest (moved closer to 6). To aid interpretation of the findings, four 4 way ANOVAS with two repeated measures were conducted in order to see whether the difference between the ranking of female and male stimuli increased significantly at the posttest for the participants in the experimental group.(For the full ANOVA tables, see Appendix O. For the table of F-ratios and the tables of ANOVA cell means see Tables 6-10 below.)

In order to obtain the data for the four-way ANOVAS, the ranks of each of the male stimuli were subtracted from the ranks of each of the female stimuli of the same race in order to determine the difference in rank for each pair of different gender stimuli of the same race. Thus, the ranks of the black male and black female stimuli were reduced to one number by subtracting the rank awarded the black male stimulus by a particular respondent from the rank awarded the black female stimulus by the same respondent. The same was done for coloured and white stimuli. It should be noted that negative numbers resulted because females were ranked more favourably (closer to 1) than males. These 'difference scores' (hereafter referred to as gender differential scores) were then compared in order to determine whether the size of the difference in rank between male and female stimuli of the same race changed from the pretest to the posttest.

The effects for these 4-way ANOVAS were 2(experimental versus control condition) x 2 (pretest versus posttest condition) x 3 (race of participant) x 3 (race of the stimuli presented to the participant). The experimental versus control condition (A) and the race of participants (C) were the between groups effects, while the pretest/posttest condition (B) and the race of stimuli (D) were the within subjects effects.

After conducting the 4-way ANOVAS on each of the social distance scale items, pairwise analyses of the ANOVA means for each item were again conducted using Tukey's t-test.(See Appendix P for tables of differences between ANOVA cell means used in this pairwise analysis).

Table 6: Table of F-ratios for the 4-way ANOVAS performed on the gender differential scores for the social distance scale

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4
F Statistics for Effects				
A	0.04	4.48*	2.83	8.54*
C	6.11*	3.29*	1.31	4.67*
A*C	3.28*	2.95	1.84	4.75*
B	23.8*	26.08*	42.87*	75.41*
A*B	21.29*	18.93*	27.57*	67.56*
B*C	0.21	1.09	2.05	1.67
A*B*C	1.07	2.18	0.79	1.95
D	4.01*	3.21*	1.09	17.82*
A*D	9.04*	3.06*	2.31	0.94
C*D	11.41*	17.14*	20.04*	19.57*
A*C*D	4.49*	2.88*	1.76	5.1*
B*D	0.33	1.08	4.51*	1.2
A*B*D	0.04	1.27	1.51	0.42
B*C*D	1.17	5.21*	0.59	3.14*
A*B*C*D	2.12	5.07*	0.72	2.65*

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

Table 7: Table of means for social distance scale gender differential scores on Item 1 ('Working together')

	PRE				POST		
	Black	**Coloured**	**White**		**Black**	**Coloured**	**White**
Control							
Black	-1.000*	-1.250	-1.550		-1.000	-1.300	-1.650
Coloured	-0.700	-0.675	-0.625		-0.750	-0.625	-0.525
White	-0.900	-1.250	-0.800		-0.950	-1.250	-0.800
Experimental							
Black	-0.300	-1.100	-0.800		-0.675	-1.400	-1.025
Coloured	-1.100	0.025	0.075		-1.450	-0.450	-0.650
White	-1.975	-1.200	-0.925		-2.575	-1.600	-1.075

Table 8: Table of means for Social distance scale gender differential scores on Item 2 ('Sitting on a bus')

	PRE				POST		
	Black	**Coloured**	**White**		**Black**	**Coloured**	**White**
Control							
Black	-0.700*	-1.025	-1.225		-0.725	-1.150	-1.275
Coloured	-1.000	-0.600	-0.750		-1.075	-0.600	-0.775
White	-1.050	-0.925	-0.725		-1.050	-0.925	-0.725
Experimental							
Black	-0.550	-1.100	-1.100		-0.750	-1.375	-1.325
Coloured	-0.950	-0.700	-0.450		-1.200	-0.925	-1.175
White	-1.800	-1.500	-0.850		-2.875	-1.975	-1.150

*Negative gender differential scores are the result of the means for male stimuli (low rank/high score) being subtracted from the means for female stimuli (high rank/low score).

Table 9: Table of means for social distance scale gender differential scores on Item 3 (Sharing a chalet at a conference)

	PRE				POST		
	Black	**Coloured**	**White**		**Black**	**Coloured**	**White**
Control							
Black	-2.125*	-2.475	-2.650		-2.200	-2.525	-2.675
Coloured	-1.850	-2.225	-2.175		-2.075	-2.275	-2.300
White	-2.400	-2.300	-1.850		-2.425	-2.250	-1.825
Experimental							
Black	-1.750	-2.225	-2.275		-2.625	-2.875	-2.700
Coloured	-1.875	-2.125	-2.050		-2.450	-2.600	-2.600
White	-3.000	-2.400	-2.350		-3.550	-2.675	-2.525

Table 10: Table of means for Social distance scale gender differential scores on Item 4 ('Travelling overseas)

	PRE				POST		
	Black	**Coloured**	**White**		**Black**	**Coloured**	**White**
Control							
Black	-0.175*	-0.750	-0.125		-0.375	-0.750	-0.275
Coloured	-1.225	-0.800	-0.825		-1.225	-0.675	-0.850
White	-1.300	-1.250	-0.500		-1.300	-1.150	-0.600
Experimental							
Black	-0.150	-1.075	-1.125		-1.450	-1.975	-2.025
Coloured	-0.850	0.250	0.300		-1.625	-1.275	-1.200
White	-2.050	-1.425	-0.375		-2.875	-1.950	-1.225

*Negative gender differential scores are the result of the means for male stimuli (low rank/high score) being subtracted from the means for female stimuli (high rank/low score).

9.2.4. Results of the pairwise analysis item by item

9.2.4.1. Item 1: 'Working Together'

As hypothesised, the pairwise comparison of the social distance scale scores revealed no significant change in the rankings of the same stimulus from pretest to posttest for participants in the control condition. However, in the experimental condition, there was support for the hypothesis that the intervention would lead to participants in this condition ranking women higher (i.e. closer to 1) at the posttest than at the pretest (with rank indicating preference). From the means table for Item 1 (Table 2), it is apparent the rankings of all the female stimuli by participants of all three the race groups were higher (closer to 1) in the experimental posttest condition than in the experimental pretest condition. For coloured and white women's ranking of the black female stimulus, this increase was significant ($p<0.05$). Black, white and coloured women's ranking of coloured women, and black and coloured women's ranking of white women also showed a significant upward shift in the experimental posttest condition.

In addition to the increase in the ranking of female stimuli, the rankings of all the male stimuli by participants of all three the race groups were lower (further away from 1) in the experimental posttest condition. Both black and white women in the experimental condition showed a significantly decreased preference for black men at the posttest. Similarly, coloured women in the experimental condition displayed a significantly decreased preference for men of their own race as well as for white men at the posttest ($p < 0.05$).

One very interesting result that emerged was the fact that the majority of the participants ranked the female stimulus of their own race highest, followed by the male stimulus of their own race. Even when the rankings of female stimuli improved at the posttest, this ranked order was maintained, with the own race male stimulus being consistently rated higher than the female stimuli of other races. This result reinforces the idea that emerged from the multidimensional scaling results, that is, that the intervention led to

differentiation between genders within race groups, but did not result in gender stimuli of different races 'moving together' in terms of their perceived similarities of participants' preference. (The exception to this result was the coloured experimental group who ranked coloured men higher than coloured women and white men higher than white women at the pretest. At the posttest this ranking changed around, with the coloured female being ranked highest, followed by the coloured male stimulus, the white female stimulus, the white male stimulus, the black female stimulus and the black male stimulus. Despite this variation, the division in terms of race group, with own race group stimuli of both genders being favoured above all other stimuli is also evident for this group).

With regard to the gender differential scores, the results supported the above idea that the size of the difference between the ranking of male and female stimuli of each race group would increase between the pretest and the posttest for the experimental group. For item one, the size of the difference between the rank of the male and female stimuli increased from pretest to posttest for all participants in the experimental group with regard to all pairs of stimuli. This increase in difference was significant in all cases except black and white participants rankings of white males versus white females (which constitute only two of the nine paired gender differential scores at the experimental level) ($p < 0.05$). In these latter cases, although the increase in difference did not reach significance, it still occurred. For the control group, there was no significant change in the gender differential scores between pretest and posttest.

9.2.4.2. Item 2 :'Sitting on a bus'

The results of the analysis of this item were very similar to the results of the analysis of Item 1. With regard to the control group, results revealed no significant changes in rankings between the pretest and the posttest. Again, there was an increase in the rankings of all female stimuli by participants of all races in the experimental condition between the pretest and the posttest, as well as a decrease in the rankings of all male stimuli. White women displayed a significantly increased ranking/preference for the black and coloured female stimuli at the posttest and black white and coloured women displayed a significantly increased interest for white women at the posttest. The rating of black men by participants of all three race groups in the experimental condition dropped

significantly between pretest and posttest, as did the rating of coloured men by coloured women ($p < 0.05$).

The participants of all three race groups ranked the female stimulus of their own race highest, followed by their own race male stimulus. This ordering was maintained at the posttest for both the control and the experimental group. Thus, the results again suggest that the intervention produced differentiation between male and female stimuli of the same race, but did not result in a regrouping in terms of gender rather than race.

The results of the ANOVA of the gender differential scores for this item are congruent with the above suggestion. From the table of means for the gender differential scores on Item 2 (Table 8), it is apparent that in the experimental group, the size of the difference between the rankings of the male and female stimuli of the same race increased in favour of women for the participants of all three the race groups between the pretest and the posttest. This increase in the size of the gender differential scores was significant for black participants' ranking of coloured male and female stimuli, coloured participants' rankings of black male and black female stimuli, and white participants' ranking of black, white and coloured male and female stimuli ($p< 0.05$). As hypothesised, there was no significant increase in the size of the gender differential scores for the control group from pretest to posttest.

9.2.4.3. Item 3: 'Sharing a chalet on a conference'

Results for the control group showed no significant change between pretest and posttest. Results for the experimental group with regard to rankings were similar to those for Items 1 and 2: Again, for the experimental group, the trend was for the rankings of the female stimuli to be higher (closer to 1) at the posttest and the rankings of the male stimuli to be lower (further away from 1). Coloured and white women in the experimental condition showed a significantly increased rank for black women at the posttest. while black and white women significantly increased their ranking of coloured women and black and coloured women significantly improved their ranking of white women. Black white and coloured women in the experimental group significantly decreased their ranking of black men at the posttest, while black and coloured women

significantly decreased their ranking of coloured men, and coloured women significantly decreased the ranking of white men ($p <= 0.05$). The exceptions to this general trend were black women's ranking of the white male stimulus and white women's ranking of the coloured male stimulus, both of which increased slightly from pretest to posttest. However, neither of these increases reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

One of the interesting results to emerge for this item was with regard to the order in which stimuli were ranked. Similar to the ordering for Item 1, participants all rated their own race female stimulus most highly (closest to 1). However, unlike the ordering for Items 1 and 2, participants' on this item did not rank their own race male stimulus above the female stimuli of the other races. At the pretest level, and the posttest control level, participants all ranked at least one female stimulus of another race between their own race female stimulus and their own race male stimulus. At the posttest experimental level, participants of all three races ranked the female stimuli of the other two races after their own race female stimulus, and ahead of any of the male stimuli. The fact that participants ranked stimuli in terms of gender on this item, without retaining the differentiation in terms of race which was apparent in Items 1 and 2, is probably due to the intimate nature of the interaction presented in this scenario.

With regard to the gender differential scores, as hypothesised, results revealed no significant change in the 'difference scores' between pretest and posttest for the control group. In the experimental group, the size of the gender differential scores for the male and female stimuli of all races increased significantly between pretest and posttest for all participants, with the exception of the white participants' ratings of their own race stimuli ($p < 0.05$). This latter result may be because white women in the experimental condition already ranked stimuli primarily in terms of gender at the pretest, with the three female stimuli being ranked highest and the three male stimuli being ranked lowest. Thus, for white women there was little room for the gender differential scores to increase, as opposed to black and coloured women in the experimental condition who only moved their own race male stimuli into the lower three rankings at the posttest.

9.2.4.4. Item 4: 'Travelling overseas'

As hypothesised, there was no significant change in the mean rankings between pretest and posttest for participants in the control group. Again, for the participants in the experimental condition, the ranking of all the female stimuli improved from pretest to posttest. Likewise, the rankings of all the male stimuli dropped, with the exception of white participants' ratings of the white male stimulus which stayed the same from pretest to posttest. For black and coloured women's ranking of the black female stimulus, the increase in ranking from pretest to posttest in the experimental group was significant. Black, white and coloured women in the experimental group also displayed a significant improvement in their ranking of white and coloured women at the posttest. With regard to men, the black male stimulus was ranked significantly lower at the posttest by black, white and coloured women in the experimental group, as was the white male stimulus. The ranking of the coloured male stimulus by black and coloured participants in the experimental group also worsened significantly between the pretest and the posttest ($p < 0.05$).

The upward shifts in the rankings of the female stimuli and the downward shifts in the rankings of the male stimuli in the experimental posttest condition, which are discussed above, are also seen clearly in the results of the gender differential scores analysis for this item. This analysis revealed a significant increase in the size of the difference between the rankings of male versus female stimuli of all races for participants of all races ($p< 0.05$). As hypothesised there was no significant change in the difference scores for the control group.

With regard to the order in which stimuli were ranked by the participants, this item resembled Item 1 and 2, in that participants in both the experimental and control conditions at the pretest and the posttest ranked their own race male stimulus higher than the female stimuli of the other two races The exception was coloured women in the experimental condition at the posttest, who ranked the white female stimulus after the coloured female stimulus and above the coloured male stimulus. This result was particularly interesting because the coloured participants in this group had placed the coloured male stimulus ahead of the coloured female stimulus at the pretest — the only

case in all four the items in any of the conditions where the own race female stimulus was not the most preferred.

9.3. The personality attributions measure

9.3.1. Five-way ANOVA with three repeated measures

For the ANOVA table of the five-way ANOVA performed on the data of the personality attributions measure, refer to Appendix Q. (For the table of F-statistics for the personality attributions measure, see Table 11 below; for the ANOVA means table see Table 12 below.) The analysis indicated that all effects were involved in significant interactions, thus pairwise analyses of the ANOVA means were conducted using Tukey's T-test. (For tables of differences between ANOVA means used in the Tukey's T tests, see Appendix R.)

Table 11: Table of F-statistics for the personality attributions measure

Personality Attributions	
F Statistics for Effects	
A	0.27
C	0.96
A*C	0.13
B	22.61*
A*B	22.77*
B*C	8.27*
A*B*C	1.07
D	14.67*
A*D	2.51
C*D	85.43*
A*C*D	1.43
E	94.19*
A*E	11.51*
C*E	13.47*
A*C*E	2.26
B*D	10.77*
A*B*D	0.31
B*C*D	1.8
A*B*C*D	0.74
B*E*	78.74*
A*B*E	70.13*
B*C*E	1.12
A*B*C*E	0.34
D*E	19.65*
A*D*E	2.2
C*D*E	4.56*
A*C*D*E	3.16*
B*D*E	0.44
A*B*D*E	1.1
B*C*D*E	1.03
A*B*C*D*E	1.63

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

ANOVA FOR THE PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS MEASURE

Table 12: Table of means for the personality attributions measure (Mean percentage of positive attributes attributed to each stimulus in each condition)

	PRE							POST					
Stimulus	**Black**		**Col.**		**White**			**Black**		**Coloured**		**White**	
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**		**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Control													
Black	95.500	100.000	62.500	72.665	72.5.00	69.555		94.500	100.000	65.915	74.845	76.635	73.550
Coloured	54.220	59.115	88.890	100.000	81.000	80.000		51.320	55.760	89.000	100.000	81.545	79.405
White	61.500	65.000	70.000	86.5.000	87.450	98.000		58.775	64.200	69.090	87.450	85.500	97.000
Experimental													
Black	95.500	100.000	66.935	82.835	70.305	60.630		88.545	100.000	61.355	87.225	64.815	64.310
Coloured	51.730	58.445	91.000	100.000	79.505	73.017		42.270	59.210	84.535	99.500	71.295	80.635
White	61.510	83.780	69.825	84.835	81.135	99.500		50.555	84.090	60.260	87.270	71.130	100.000

9.3.2. Pairwise comparisons of the personality attributions measure means using Tukey's T-test

In this pairwise analysis, as in the analysis of the social distance scale items, the focus was on changes from pretest to posttest (B). As hypothesised, this analysis revealed the general trend of an increase from pretest to posttest in the percentage of positive words used to describe female stimuli by the experimental group. For black participants' descriptions of coloured and white female stimuli, and coloured participants' descriptions of white female stimuli, this increase was significant. In addition, similar to the results of the social distance scale, the analysis of the personality attributions measure revealed that the percentage of positive words used to describe male stimuli decreased from pretest to posttest for participants in the experimental condition. Across the board, for the black, coloured and white participants' descriptions of black, coloured and white male stimuli this, this decrease was significant ($p<0.05$). Contradictory to the hypothesis, the black participants in the control group displayed a significant increase between pretest and posttest in the percentage of positive words used to describe the coloured male and the white male and female stimuli. In addition the coloured participants in the control group displayed a significant decrease between the pretest and the posttest in the percentage of positive words used to describe the black female stimulus.

With regard to the ordering of stimuli in terms of the percentage of positive words used to describe them, participants of all race groups used the highest percentage of positive attributes to describe the female stimulus of their own race. In addition, black and coloured participants in the experimental and control conditions at the pretest and the posttest, and white participants in the control condition at the pretest used the next highest percentage of positive words to describe the male stimulus of their own race. Again this reflects the idea that while the intervention may have produced differentiation between the genders (as indicated by the increased positive attributes for female stimuli, and the decreased positive attributes for male stimuli in the posttest experimental condition), divisions in terms of race still exist. Interestingly, white participants in the experimental condition at both the pretest and the posttest, used the second and third highest percentage of positive words to describe the coloured and black female stimulus respectively, and white women in the control condition at the posttest used the second

highest percentage of positive characteristics to describe coloured women. One way in which this might be understood is in term s of the argument that white women find it easier to feel solidarity with women of other races, because gender is their primary oppression, while black and coloured women find it difficult to fell a solidarity with white women because they are oppressed in term s of their race as well as their gender.

A further examination of the ANOVA cell means for the personality attributions measure revealed one possible problem: many of the subjects at the pretest level had already chosen almost entirely positive attributes to describe the stimuli. Thus, there was not much 'room' to move to a more positive evaluation at the posttest. This phenomenon is known as the ceiling effect (Aronson et al, 1990).

As a result of this effect, a different data analysis approach, similar to the one used for the social distance scale, was used in addition to the five-way ANOVA. This approach worked as follows: For each subject the percentage of positive attributes for the male stimulus of a particular race was subtracted from the percentage of positive attributes for the female stimulus of the same race. This meant that for each subject, the percentage of positive attributes associated with each of the 6 stimuli was reduced to three gender differential scores. These gender differential scores were obtained in the following way: The percentage of positive attributes perceived as belonging to the black female minus the percentage associated with the black male; the percentage of positive attributes for the coloured female minus that for the coloured male and the percentage of positive attributes for the white female stimulus minus that for the white male stimulus. Using these gender differential scores, a 4-way ANOVA with two repeated measures was conducted, again using SAS. The effects for this ANOVA were: 2(experimental versus control condition) x 2 (pretest versus posttest condition) x 3 (race of participant) x 3 (race of the stimuli presented to the participant). The experimental versus control condition (A) and the race of participants (C) were the between groups effects/independent measures, while the pretest/posttest condition (B) and the race of stimuli (D) were the within subjects effects/repeated measures.

A pairwise analysis of the ANOVA means using Tukey's t-test was again conducted. The aim was to determine whether the size of the difference in the percentage of positive attributes awarded the stimuli changed (increased) significantly for the experimental

group between the pretest and the posttest. The following was expected based on the hypotheses:

(1)For the control group, the size of the difference in the percentage of positive attributes associated with the male and female stimuli would stay the same in the posttest condition as it had been in the pretest condition.

(2) For the experimental group, it was expected that this difference would increase between the pretest and the posttest. Thus the expectation for the posttest experimental group was that more positive attributes would be associated with female stimuli than at the pretest, and less positive attributes would be associated with male stimuli than at the pretest. Thus, I was interested in ascertaining whether the size of the difference in the percentage of positive attributes associated with male stimuli versus the percentage of positive attributes awarded female stimuli, increased significantly for the experimental group at the posttest.

9.3.3. The four way ANOVA of the gender differential scores for the personality attributions measure

For the ANOVA table of the 4-way ANOVA performed on the data of the personality attributions measure, refer to Appendix S. (For a table of F-statistics, see Table 13 below; for the table of ANOVA means for the four-way ANOVA see Table 14 below.) Again, no variable occurred as significant on its own in isolation from another variable, consequently, pairwise analyses of the ANOVA means were conducted using Tukey's T-test. (Refer to Appendix T for the tables of the differences between the means used in this analysis.)

Table 13: Table of F-statistics for the gender differential scores on the personality attributions measure

Personality Attributions	
F Statistics for Effects	
A	11.52*
C	13.48*
A*C	2.26
B	78.71*
A*B	70.09*
B*C	1.12
A*B*C	0.34
D	19.66*
A*D	2.2
C*D	4.56*
A*C*D	3.15*
B*D	0.44
A*B*D	1.1
B*C*D	1.03
A*B*C*D	1.63

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

Table 14 : Table of means for the gender differential scores of the personality attributions measure

	PRE				POST		
	Black	**Coloured**	**White**		**Black**	**Coloured**	**White**
Control							
Black	4.500	10.167	-2.945*		5.500	8.934	-3.091
Coloured	4.889	11.111	-1.000		4.435	11.000	-2.136
White	3.500	16.500	10.550		5.429	18.364	11.500
Experimental							
Black	4.500	15.899	-9.667		11.455	25.869	-0.510
Coloured	6.712	9.000	-6.338		16.949	14.965	9.333
White	22.278	15.015	18.364		33.540	27.011	28.864

* As the percentage of positive characteristics attributed the male stimulus of a particular race was subtracted from the percentage of positive attributes awarded the female stimulus of the same race in order to obtain the gender differential scores, a negative score indicates that the male stimulus was awarded more positive characteristics than the female stimulus

9.3.4. Pairwise comparisons of the gender differential scores for the means of the personality attributions measure using Tukey's T-test

The results of this analysis clearly supported the hypotheses. No significant change was revealed between the pretest and posttest in the difference of the percentage of positive characteristics attributed to males versus females by participants in the control group. However, participants of all races in the experimental group consistently displayed a significantly greater difference in the percentage of positive characteristics that they awarded male versus female stimuli at the posttest than at the pretest. This means that at the posttest, participants in the experimental group attributed female stimuli (women) with significantly more positive attributes relative to men than at the pretest. Conversely, men were attributed significantly less positive attributes relative to women at the posttest than at the pretest by participants in the experimental group. ($P< 0.05$). The most extreme example of this may be seen in the coloured participants' ratings of white male versus white female stimuli. Interestingly, coloured and black participants' in the control condition and in the experimental pretest condition attributed a greater percentage of positive attributes to the white male stimulus then to the white female stimulus. Coloured participants at the experimental pretest level attributed the white female stimulus 6.34% less positive attributes than they did the white male stimulus; after the experimental intervention this swung around and the white female stimulus was attributed 9.33% more positive attributes than white men, an increase of close to 16%.

9.3.5. A note on ANOVAS

The analysis of variance procedure is based on two assumptions:

(1) The first assumption is that the individual treatment populations, from which the participants in each treatment group are assumed to be randomly drawn, are normally distributed.

(2) The second assumption is that the variances of the different treatment populations are equal (Keppel, 1982).

With regard to the first assumption, because of the ceiling effect, the data for the personality attributions measure formed a J-shape rather than a normal distribution.

However, statisticians have been aware for a long time that if the sample distributions are of approximately the same non-normal shape, or even if the sample distributions appear to have been drawn from populations with qualitatively different distributions, this affects the F distribution very little. In the Monte Carlo experiments, Norton (1952), drew samples from distributions that were normal, leptokurtic, rectangular, moderately skewed, markedly skewed and J-shaped (Keppel, 1982). He found that with homogenous distributions, there was a close match between the F-distributions for his samples and the theoretical F-distribution.

Thus, as Keppel (1982) argues that violating either of the above assumptions has little effect on the resulting sampling distribution of the F statistic, I decided to use ANOVAS for the analysis of the personality attributions measure.

9.4. The social identity checklist

The contingency tables for each of the loglinear analyses below were produced by a frequency count which made use of the following categorizations:

A: Ranking of gender stayed constant from pretest to posttest — this included the situation where the identity was not mentioned at either time.

B: Ranking of gender increased/improved from pretest to posttest. This included the situation where ranking moved closer to 1 (1 indicating the most important rank) and the situation where identity was mentioned at the posttest but not at the pretest.

C: Ranking of gender decreased/deteriorated from pretest to posttest. This included the situation where ranking moved further away from 1 and the situation where identity was mentioned at the pretest but not at the posttest.

The aim of Analysis 1 and 2 below was to investigate whether there was any significant contingency in the pretest to posttest categorizations (A, B and C) of the participants of all three race groups. These analyses were conducted for participants in both the experimental and control groups.

Analysis 1: Gender identity across the races for the experimental group

	A	**B**	**C**
Black	8	12	-
Coloured	8	12	-
White	9	11	-

Maximum likelihood Chi-Square	0.1298959	p=0.9979799
Pearson's chi-square	0.1302662	p=0.9979686
	df = 4	

Analysis 2: Gender identity across the races for the control group

	A	**B**	**C**
Black	17	-	3
Coloured	16	-	4
White	19	-	1

Maximum likelihood Chi-Square:	1.881183	p=0.7576001
Pearson's Chi-square:	1.735366	p=0.7842824
	df = 4	

For both Analysis 1 and 2, $p > 0.05$ for both statistics (the maximum likelihood chi-square and the Pearson's chi-square). From these analyses, it is therefore possible to conclude that there is no significant contingency in terms of response categorizations for

gender identity for participants in different race groups within the different conditions. Thus, for Analysis 3, it was possible to amalgamate the black, coloured and white participants into experimental and control categories, without being concerned that participants within these categories may produce systematically different responses which are congruent with their race group.

The aim of Analysis 3 was to explore whether there was any significant contingency/association in the response categorizations of participants in the experimental versus the control group for gender identity. The hypothesis was that significantly more participants in the experimental group would fall within Category B (ranking of gender improved) than in the control group. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the majority of the participants in the control condition would fall within Category A (ranking of gender stayed constant).

Analysis 3: Differences in change of gender identity from pretest to posttest for the experimental versus the control group

	A	B	C
Experimental	25	35	-
Control	52	-	8

Maximum likelihood Chi-Square	62.79386	p=0.0000000
Pearson's Chi-Square	50,48504	p=0.0000000
	df = 2	

This analysis confirmed an association between the experimental condition and an increase in the ranked importance of gender identity from pretest to posttest ($p < 0.05$ for both the maximum likelihood chi-square and Pearson's chi-square). This supports the hypothesis that the experimental intervention would cause an upward shift from pretest to posttest in the ranked importance of gender identity for women in the experimental group. Furthermore, as hypothesised, the majority of women within the control group fell within Category A (i.e. their ranking of their gender identity stayed constant).

9.5. The post-experimental questionnaire

Participants' responses to Question 2, which asked participants' what they understood by the term 'identity', suggested that participants seemed to have some understanding of the concept 'identity'. In general, participants' understanding of this concept seemed to be in terms of their own identity, with definitions such as 'who I am', 'what makes me me', 'what I am like really', and ''my personality' being used.

Participants' responses to Question 3, which asked what they thought the purpose of this research was, were particularly informative of the possible effects of the socio-political context on this study. An overwhelming majority of the participants perceived the research as politically motivated, with the intention of investigating inter-racial attitudes and perceptions. Some of the responses to this question were as follows:

> To see how I feel about others politically...I mean people of other races. (Coloured participant, experimental pretest condition.)

> To investigate attitudes to different race groups in South Africa. (White participant, experimental pretest condition.)

> To do research on inter-racial attitudes and attitudes. (Black participant, pretest control condition).

> To see whether there is a greater attitude of reconciliation and closeness between blacks and whites in the wake of the elections. (White participant, experimental posttest condition.)

> To look at inter-racial attitudes in South Africa. (Black participants, control posttest condition).

The idea that this study was specifically aimed at assessing inter-racial attitudes and perceptions again emerged in Question 4, which asked participants' what they thought the purpose of each scale/measure used in the studies was. The majority of the participants thought that the scales/measures were used to assess their attitudes and feelings about members of other race groups.

Question 5, 6 and 7 on situational effects, experimenter effects and cueing were poorly answered with most participants simply saying that these effects did not occur. Two potential experimenter effects that were mentioned were my race and my age. A few black participants felt awkward being interviewed by a white woman, and one Muslim participant said that she felt uncomfortable talking to someone outside of her religion. A few of the participants also said that they would have preferred being interviewed by someone older.

The results of the frequency count for Question 8 indicated that there was consensus that the race and gender of the stimuli were as intended. With regard to class, although the stimuli were set up as middle-class, while some of the participants rated them as middle class, other participants perceived them to be upper class. Interestingly, often white stimuli were rated as upper class, and clack and coloured stimuli were rated as middle class, despite the fact that the curriculum vitaes were very similar.

Question 9 was again answered by very few of the participants. However, a few consistent comments on the research did emerge. Participants felt that the interviews were very long, and after the posttest, they also questioned the necessity of repeating everything. Other complaints were that participants felt that they should have been able to choose their own characteristics in the personality attribution measure rather than be forced to make a choice from characteristics presented to them, and that they felt that a less structured interview would have been more enjoyable. Finally, a few of the participants felt that they should have been paid for their time (even though I made it quite clear at the beginning that they would not be).

CHAPTER 10

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

10.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to summarise and integrate the findings of this thesis. The broad aim of this thesis was to explore the identity (specifically the gender versus race identity) of South African women resident in the Western Cape. In order to do this, four focus group discussions were held with black and white women. A content analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that both black and white women perceived 'sexual violence against women' (specifically rape) to be an issue which made them feel a sense of solidarity with all women. As this questioned the arguments within feminist literature that race would always be more salient than gender for black women (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984), as well as the idea that rape is an issue that causes deep division between black and white women (McKay, 1993; Omolade, 1990), Study 2 (the main study of this thesis), was conducted in order to further explore this result.

In Study 2, an experimental pretest-posttest experimental control group design was used in order to investigate the effect of the issue of 'sexual violence against women' (operationalised as an article about rape) on the gender identity of South African women (explored using a multi-dimensional scale, a social distance type scale, a personality attributions questionnaire and a social identity checklist). The results of each of these measures will be summarised and discussed below.

10.2. The multidimensional scale (MDS)

The MDS explored race versus gender identity in terms of participants' perceived similarity between the six stimuli presented in curriculum vitaes, and the stimulus of self. (These six stimuli consisted of six hypothetical personalities which represented a black

male, a black female, a coloured male , a coloured female, a white male and a white female). With regard to the MDS, the following main findings emerged:

(1) At the pretest, black, white and coloured women in both the experimental and control condition distinguished between the black male, black female, coloured male, coloured female, white male, white female and self stimuli in terms of race only. On the MDS graphs for the pretest condition, the male and female stimuli of each race group were superimposed upon each other, and the self stimulus was superimposed on top of the male and female stimulus of the participants' own race. Thus, of the two dimensions on the MDS graph, the one dimension was clearly race/perceived differences between race groups, with the participants' own race group being placed at one end of the dimension, and the two other race groups being placed at the other end of the dimension, separately from each other. There was no clear interpretation for the second dimension at the pretest level.

(2) As hypothesised, there was no change in the MDS graphs for the control group from the pretest to the posttest.

(3) It was found that gender was more salient at the posttest than at the pretest for black, white and coloured participants in the experimental condition. However, this did not result in a complete regrouping of the stimuli in terms of their gender, as race remained a dimension in terms of which the participants differentiated between the stimuli. Thus the MDS graphs for black, white and coloured women in the experimental group at the posttest show a differentiation between the gender stimuli of each race, with the male and female stimuli being placed apart within their race group, and the self stimulus being placed closest to the own race female stimulus. In these graphs, the two dimensions on the MDS graph may be interpreted as race and gender dimensions.

In terms of the literature, the clear differentiation in terms of race at the pretest was expected, particularly for black and coloured women. This result may be understood in terms of the argument within black feminist literature that race will always be more

salient than gender for black and coloured women, because race constitutes their primary oppression (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981, 1984; Fowlkes, 1992).

It is however interesting, that white women, for whom it has been argued that gender is the only oppression, also perceived race as their most salient identity at the pretest level. Furthermore, on the multi-dimensional scale at the pretest, black white and coloured women appeared to identify themselves only in terms of their race, and not at all in terms of their gender. Considered within a social context in which more attention and media exposure is being given to women's rights and women's issues this apparent absence of gender salience is surprising.

One way of explaining the identification of women of all race groups solely in terms of race is to consider this result within the South African societal context. As argued by Tajfel and Wilkes (1964), if a given ingroup/outgroup categorization has a particularly strong emotional or value significance , this is likely to increase its relative accessibility and hence its salience. Furthermore, this effect may be apparent throughout a culture. In the light of the apartheid regime, during which the whole of South African society was structured in terms of racial divisions, race in South Africa may be understood to constitute such an accessible and salient category.

The above explanation is further supported if one considers the specific socio-political context in which this study was conducted, that is, during and just after South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994. At this time participants would have been exposed to a variety of racial and political issues via the media. In addition, South African political parties, which enjoyed extensive media coverage at this time, are basically divided along racial lines. Thus, the issue of race was certainly very topical at this time, and for the whites who feared black domination, the blacks who were looking forward to a long awaited majority rule, and the coloureds who had their own concerns about their possible marginalisation under the new government, race may also be seen as emotionally significant..

Linked to the above argument, the pretest participants' identification in terms of race may also be understood as the result of a sense of 'common fate'. 'Common fate' has been named as one of the factors which encourages differentiation between groups and, consequently, the salience of ingroup category membership. If one accepts the idea that blacks, whites and coloureds each had their own 'race-specific' interpretation of the 'meaning' of the elections for their race group, then it may be argued that the race identification was salient because of a sense of 'common fate'.

Finally, the salience of the race categorization at the pretest may be understood simply in terms of awareness. Empirical studies (Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Festinger, 1947; Kelley, 1955; Lambert, Libman & Poser, 1960) suggest that awareness of a category often leads to its becoming salient. In the light of the above discussion concerning the socio-political context of the study, it may certainly be argued that participants would have been very aware of the category 'race'.

The increased salience of gender identity at the posttest for the experimental group is also not unexpected in terms of the literature. As hypothesised, the intervention resulted in a marked increase in the salience of gender identity. However, the results (specifically of the multi-dimensional scale) also indicate that this did not produce the unified gender identity among women of different races suggested by Study 1. The fact that participants in the experimental group at the posttest maintained a differentiation in terms of race, despite the increase in the salience of their gender identity may be understood in terms of the argument that the category 'women' does not have a homogenous meaning for all women (see, for example, Skevington & Baker, 1989b) and the argument that the categories of race and class are inextricably intertwined (see Bhavnani, 1993; McKay, 1993). In terms of these arguments, this result may be understood as caused by the fact that women perceive the group gender as divided on the basis of race. Thus, when participants envisaged the group women, it is possible that they envisaged this group as consisting only of women of their own race. Consequently, when the salience of their gender category increased, it may have been only in so far as the category included women of their own race.

This result may also be understood in terms of the salience literature. Again, as for the salience of the race classification, the simplest way of understanding the increased salience of 'gender' is in terms of 'awareness'. It is possible that the rape article acted as a 'vivid reminder' of the category 'woman' for the experimental group, resulting in an increased awareness of this category and consequently increased salience. The fact that the differentiation in terms of race was maintained, despite the fact that the salience of gender was increased, may be considered in terms of Kelley's (1955) work on 'vivid reminders', which suggested that the effects of 'vivid reminders' may depend on an interaction with other factors such as the strength of group identification. It is possible that participants' identification with their race group was as strong or stronger than their identification with their gender group, thus prohibiting gender identification from entirely overriding race identification.

Another way of understanding this result in terms of the salience literature is with regard to accessibility. It is possible that as a result of the rape article, participants in the experimental condition were made aware of the category 'gender', which resulted in their expecting to perceive the categorization 'gender'. Thus at the posttest, when presented with the stimuli which fit both a race and gender categorization, the gender category was more accessible and therefore more salient to the participants (Turner at al., 1987).

Finally, similarly to the race categorization at the pretest, the increased salience of the category 'gender' at the posttest may be understood in terms of 'common fate'. It is likely that the article on rape may have reminded the participants that as women, they shared common fears, concerns and fates, and that consequently, in some sense, they shared a common female group identity.

10.3. The social distance scale (SDS)

The social distance scale explored the participants' race versus gender identity in terms of their ranked preference for the six race x gender stimuli in four interaction situations. It should be noted that while social distance scales have traditionally been used as a

measure of prejudice, the social distance scale in this study was based on Lever's (1968) idea that social distance may be defined as the closeness or intimacy that one individual or group is prepared to enter into with another individual or group. Thus, the social distance scale in this study attempts to measure the participants' liking/preference for the race x gender groups represented by the six stimuli.

The results on Item 1 ('working together'), Item 2 ('sitting next to someone on a bus') and Item 4 ('travelling overseas') reflected those of the multi-dimensional scale. At the pretest level, black, white and coloured participants in both the experimental and control condition showed a preference for stimuli on the basis of race for these items, consistently ranking the male stimulus of their own race just below the female stimulus of their own race, and ahead of the female stimuli of the other two races. At the posttest level, the experimental group's ranked preference of female stimuli improved (move closer to one) and the ranked preference of male stimuli deteriorated (moved away from one.). This shift was also demonstrated by the analysis of the 'difference scores' for Item 1, 2 and 4, which showed that the trend was for the size of the difference in rank between the male and female stimuli of each race to increase between the pretest and posttest. Despite this shift, the order of stimuli remained the same at the experimental posttest level, with the own race male stimulus still occupying second place ahead of the female stimuli. This was constant across all race groups with the exception of the coloured participants on Item 4 who ranked the white female stimulus after the coloured female stimulus but ahead of the coloured male stimulus. As mentioned in Chapter 9, this result was particularly interesting because the coloured participants in this group had placed the coloured male stimulus ahead of the coloured female stimulus at the pretest — the only case in all four the items in any of the conditions where the own race female stimulus was not the most preferred.

As discussed with regard to the MDS, it is likely that the experimental intervention resulted in an increased salience of the category 'women' On the basis of the 'minimal group' studies which show that mere awareness of a group is enough to produce ingroup preference, and the maximisation of differences between ingroup and outgroup (Tajfel et al. 1971) this increased salience of the category 'women' may be understood as the

primary basis for the differentiation between genders that occurred at the posttest experimental level in the form of an increase in ranked preference of the female stimuli and a decrease of ranked preference of the male stimuli. As for the results of the MDS, the fact that the differentiation in terms of race was maintained, may be understood in terms of the argument that the group 'women' is not homogenous, and is intertwined with other group memberships such as race and class.

The one item on the social distance scale that did not fit the pattern of the other results was Item 3 ('sharing a chalet on a conference'). On this item, unlike on the other items, participants of all three races ranked at least one female stimulus other than their own race female stimulus ahead of their own race male stimulus at the pretest. At the posttest, participants of all three races in the experimental group ranked the two other race female stimuli after their own race female stimulus, ahead of the male stimuli of all three races. The fact that this item produced such a clear gender differentiation is probably due to the content of the item (sharing a chalet on a conference). Because of the close physical proximity implied by this item, the fact that participants showed a preference for the female stimuli, particularly after the rape intervention is not surprising.

With regard to the control group, as hypothesised, there was no change from pretest to posttest. This highlights the strength of the effect that the intervention had on the gender identity of participants in the experimental group.

10.4. The personality attributions measure

The personality attributions measure explored race and gender identity in terms of the percentage of positive versus negative personality characteristics attributed to the race x gender stimuli by the participants. Based on the tenet of SIT that the individual strives towards a positive self-image, the idea was that the groups with which the participants identified would be perceived positively.

The results followed the trends that emerged from the MDS and Item 1, 2 and 4 of the social distance scale. Participants in the experimental and control group again tended to

show a preference for their own race female stimulus, followed by their own race male stimulus at the pretest (expressed in terms of the percentage of positive characteristics attributed to these stimuli).

An analysis of the differences between the percentage of positive attributes awarded the male and female stimuli of each race group reveals that the size of these differences tended to increase at the posttest for the experimental group (with the female stimuli being awarded a greater percentage of positive attributes and the male stimuli being awarded a smaller percentage of positive attributes). However, as with Item 1, 2 and 4 of the SDS, the order of the ranking did not change, with the own race male stimulus still being viewed more positively (awarded a greater percentage of positive attributes) than the female stimuli of other races. This reinforces the idea that while the intervention may have produced differentiation between the genders, divisions in terms of race still exist.

The exception to the above discussion were the white participants. As noted in Chapter 9, white participants in the experimental condition at both the pretest and the posttest, used the second and third highest percentage of positive words to describe the coloured and black female stimulus respectively, and white women in the control condition at the posttest used the second highest percentage of positive characteristics to describe coloured women. One way in which this might be understood is in terms of the argument that white women find it easier to feel solidarity with women of other races, because gender is their primary oppression, while black and coloured women find it difficult to feel a solidarity with white women because they are oppressed in term s of their race as well as their gender (McKay, 1993).

Once again, with regard to the control group, the trend was for no change to occur between the pretest and the posttest.

10.5. The social identity checklist

In this measure, the focus was on gender identity, which was explored in terms of the change in its ranked importance between pretest and posttest. The results revealed that

significantly more subjects in the experimental group than in the control group increased the ranked importance of their gender identity from pretest to posttest. This again supports the hypothesis that the experimental; intervention would increase the salience of 'gender' for the participants in the experimental group.

10.6. Summary of the main results

Based on the above discussion, the results of Study 2 may be summarised as follows:

(1) At the pretest, the participants tended to distinguish between the stimuli on the basis of race, and displayed a strong identification with the stimuli of their own race group, irrespective of gender.

(2) At the posttest, participants in the control group displayed no change from the pretest.

(3) Participants in the experimental condition showed a marked increase in the salience of their gender identity at the posttest. However, the result was not a complete regrouping in terms of gender: While participants distinguished between the male and female stimuli of each race, the differentiation between the female participants of the three races was maintained.

10.7. Post experimental questionnaire

The aim of the post-experimental questionnaire was to attempt to check for factors which may have impacted on the results and to give participants the chance to express their views about this research.

The results of the content analysis of the post-experimental questionnaire were very informative for understanding the rest of the results within the context in which they occurred. In particular, they provide some insight into why the race identification of participants was so dominant.

The idea that the socio-political conditions of the election may have influenced participants' perceptions and responses is emphasised by participants replies to Question 3 of the post-experimental questionnaires. The content analysis of this question revealed the majority of the participants thought the study was 'political', and aimed at assessing how the different race groups in South Africa felt about each other. The clear differentiation of stimuli in terms of race, particularly at the pretest may be understood in light of this analysis; clearly for these participants, race was a very accessible category.

Interestingly, also with regard to Question 3, even at the posttest participants in the both the experimental and control group answered this question in political terms. Thus, the marked effect of the experimental intervention on the gender identity of the experimental group occurred even though these participants appeared unaware that one of the main foci of the study was gender identity.

The fact that although the curriculum vitaes were constructed in such a way as to suggest that all the stimuli came from similar socio-political backgrounds, the participants still tended to perceive the white stimuli as upper class and black and coloured stimuli as middle class, suggests a further reason for the strong differentiation between races. In South Africa, because apartheid was until recently legally entrenched, race and class divisions have historically been congruent. Thus, the division of race has been reinforced by that of class. In addition, another reinforcement to the race division within South Africa, is that of language.

The post-experimental questionnaire was also useful in that it highlighted some of the problem areas with the study. The first of these area was with regard to the researcher (i.e. myself). The main problems that were mentioned were with regard to my age and my race. A few of the participants said that they would have preferred being interviewed by an older woman; other participants said that they felt awkward talking to a white woman.

This is problematic because the researcher can never be assured that participants are being open and truthful, or in fact trust her enough to provide accurate information. With

regard to this study this is even more of a problem than usual, as participants who did not feel comfortable with me would have found it difficult to be open and honest. Clearly, in order to better understand the identity of black and coloured women, there is a need for black and coloured women to be trained as researchers and to conduct research.

Another problem which was mentioned consistently by participants is the fact that the interviews took a very long time, and had to be repeated twice. Participants complained that the interviews took a lot of concentration and were tiring. The impact of this on the results of the study was probably lessened by the fact that I was present with each participant to ensure that the questionnaires were properly completed. However, with hindsight, I should have structured my interviews differently (perhaps a few shorter sessions) out of consideration for participants.

10.8. Other considerations

One issue that cannot be ignored is that of language. Both studies for this thesis were conducted in English, which was not a home language for many of the participants. While English did provide a common language in which all the participants said they felt comfortable communicating, it is quite possible that participants for whom English was not a home language may have experienced some difficulty in expressing themselves.

Secondly, the issue of the generalisability of the results of this thesis has to be considered. It must be noted that this is limited because of the fact that this thesis constitutes one piece of research within a limited geographical area, at a very specific historical time in South Africa. In addition, as with all experimental research the generalisability beyond the context of the study must be questioned. These problems with regard to generalisability are compounded by the fact that the participants were recruited primarily via door-to-door canvassing and do not constitute a random sample.

Thirdly, the measures used in the study must be considered. By its nature, ranking (used in the social distance scale and the social identity checklist) allows only a limited expression of identification, as it is not clear how differences between ranks should

be interpreted. With regard to the personality attributions measure, the ceiling effect was a problem, because it prohibited the full shift between the pretest and the posttest in the percentage of positive attributes awarded each stimulus to be displayed.

Finally, it is necessary to comment on the experimental intervention. I decided to operationalise the issue of 'sexual violence against women' as an article of rape based on the results of Study 1. However, the choice of 'rape' specifically may have been partly responsible for the fact that differentiation in terms of race was maintained so clearly at the posttest. It has been argued in the literature that the issue of 'rape' entrenches the divide between black and white women because so many black women have been raped by white men (McKay, 1993), and because it is one of the areas in which white feminists have been accused of being racist, due to the fact that their formulation of rape excludes black women (Omolade, 1985). Furthermore, many white women erroneously view rapists as black. Other studies have been reported in the literature where an issue relevant to women has resulted in increased salience of gender identity. An example of this is Bargad and Hyde's (1991) study, where women's studies courses were found to affect women's feminist identity. Possibly, if the intervention had concerned another women's issue, other than 'sexual violence against women', the results may have shown a clearer shift to gender identification and lessening of race identification.

10.9. Suggestions for further research

In this discussion an attempt has been made to suggest explanations, based on the salience literature, for how this sort of shift in identity might occur. However, a space clearly exists for further research to explore specifically how these changes in identity occur. The question of how long such a change in identification lasts is also important.

From the discussion in this chapter, it is also clear that their is a need for black and coloured women researchers to research the identity of women of their own race.

10.10. Conclusion

In conclusion, despite the above limitations, this thesis has made a contribution to the literature on SIT in that it adds to an area which is under researched, that is, the identity of women. Furthermore it makes a contribution to the feminist literature in that it is a thesis about women, and for women. Within this latter context, perhaps the most important contribution that this thesis makes, is that it once again highlights the fundamental differences between women (specifically women of different races), and calls attention to the difficulties associated with the conceptualisation of a unified women's movement.

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APPENDIX A

FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Question 1:

Tell me about the different groups to which you belong.

Question 2:

Which of the groups to which you belong has the most influence on your life: your actions, your decisions, your expectations?

Question 3:

Of the groups to which you said you belong, which group membership do you enjoy the most? What group do you most enjoy being a member of?

Question 4:

Consider the group 'women': What different kinds of women do you get? Which kinds of women are similar to you? Why? Which kinds of women are different to you? Why? Which kinds of women do you like/feel comfortable with? Why? Which kinds of women do you not like/make you feel uncomfortable? Why? Which kinds of women do you most admire/do you most want to be like? Why? Which kinds of women do you least admire/do you least want to be like? Why?

(Obviously, this whole battery of questions were not all asked at the same time but were integrated into the discussion, and used to stimulate discussion within the focus groups).

Question 5:

What situations make you aware of the fact that you are a woman/ make you remember that you are female? What situations make you want to defend all women? What situations make you feel angry on behalf of all women?

(As with question four this series of questions was not all asked at once, but was used to stimulate discussion).

Question 6:

Are there situations where you feel closer to (own race) males than to (other race) women? What are these situations? Are there situations where you feel closer to (other race) females than to (own race) males? What are these situations?

Question 7:

What does the term 'women' mean to you? If I ask you to think of 'women', what comes into your mind ? Who do you think of? Do you think of women of your own race only or do you think of all women?

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF BLACK FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	Lindiwe Anne Ndluvu
ADDRESS:	45 Parrish Road Constantia Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	2 July 1954
AGE:	40 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Guguletu High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1972

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Commerce
DATE COMPLETED:	1975

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife Works as the treasurer of a local charity
INTERESTS	Reading, cycling, travelling

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF BLACK MALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	Sipho Paul Ngobi
ADDRESS:	24 Forest Crescent Tokai Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	24 August 1951
AGE:	43 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Langa High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1969

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Commerce
DATE COMPLETED:	1972

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Middle management at Caltex

INTERESTS	Reading, cricket, travelling

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF WHITE FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	Mary Frances Robertson
ADDRESS:	14 Newlands Avenue Newlands Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	29 January 1954
AGE:	41 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Cape Town High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1972

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Arts
DATE COMPLETED:	1975

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife
	Chairperson of the PTA at Rustenberg Junior School
INTERESTS	Reading, tennis, travelling

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF WHITE MALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	John Ian Macleod
ADDRESS:	50 Belvedere Road Rondebosch Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	9 December 1952
AGE:	42 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Westerford High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1970

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Science (Engineering)
DATE COMPLETED:	1974

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Middle management at Siemens Engineering
INTERESTS	Squash, travelling, stock-market

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF COLOURED FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	Deborah Mary Booi
ADDRESS:	40 Forest Drive Pinelands Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	3 March 1955
AGE:	40 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Manenberg High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1973

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Science (Computer Science)
DATE COMPLETED:	1976

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife Works twice a week as a volunteer instructress at a community employment project
INTERESTS	Reading, aerobics, pottery

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF COLOURED MALE STIMULUS (TYPE A)

FULL NAME:	William Brian Alexander
ADDRESS:	13 Protea Drive Bergvliet Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	16 December 1950
AGE:	44 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Athlone High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1967

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Arts
DATE COMPLETED:	1970

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Middle management at Maskew Miller Publishing
INTERESTS	Gardening, jogging, reading

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF BLACK FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	Pindi Cynthia Motlaba
ADDRESS:	94 Philips Road Rondebosch Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	12 January 1955
AGE:	40 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Langa High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1973

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Library Science
DATE COMPLETED:	1977

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife Works as a volunteer twice weekly at the library at the local community centre
INTERESTS	Reading, painting, jogging

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF BLACK MALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	Phumlani Patrick Manikivana
ADDRESS:	14 River Avenue Newlands Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	15 July 1951
AGE:	43 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Guguletu High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1969

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Business Science
DATE COMPLETED:	1973

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Middle management at Old Mutual
INTERESTS	Travelling, cricket, chess

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF WHITE FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	Stella Bronwyn Taylor
ADDRESS:	45 White Oak Avenue Claremont Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	9 September 1952
AGE:	42 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Westerford High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1970

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Science (Physiotherapy)
DATE COMPLETED:	1974

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife Works as a volunteer twice weekly at the local hospital
INTERESTS	Aerobics, travelling, jazz music

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF WHITE MALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	David Robert Butler
ADDRESS:	13 The Drive Constantia Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	4 May 1954
AGE:	40 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Pinelands High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1972

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Arts (Fine Art)
DATE COMPLETED:	1976

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Manager in charge of book illustration at a publishing company
INTERESTS	Reading, gardening, tennis

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF COLOURED FEMALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	Sarah Bianca Reynolds
ADDRESS:	13 Chester Road Rondebosch Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	10 February 1955
AGE:	40 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Bishop Lavis High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1973

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Science (Pharmacy)
DATE COMPLETED:	1977

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Housewife Works as a volunteer twice weekly at the Red Cross Children's Hospital
INTERESTS	Travelling, squash, ballet

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF COLOURED MALE STIMULUS (TYPE B)

FULL NAME:	Nolan Mark Johnson
ADDRESS:	17 Aliwal Road Wynberg Cape Town
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
DATE OF BIRTH:	14 August 1951
AGE:	43 years
NATIONALITY:	South African

SCHOOLING

NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:	Lotus River High School
STANDARD ATTAINED:	Matric
DATE ATTAINED:	1969

TERTIARY EDUCATION

NAME OF INSTITUTION:	University of Cape Town
COURSE COMPLETED:	Bachelor of Commerce
DATE COMPLETED:	1972

EMPLOYMENT

CURRENT OCCUPATION:	Middle management at Metropiltan Life
INTERESTS	Travelling, soccer, reading

APPENDIX C

MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALE (TYPE A)

You have been given brief curriculum vitaes of various people. Please decide how alike the following pairs of people are on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 being very different and 7 being very similar), by ticking the appropriate box

1. Lindiwe Ndluvu and Sipho Ngobi

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

2. Sipho Ngobi and Mary Robertson

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

3. Mary Robertson and John Macleod

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

4. John Macleod and Deborah Booi

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

5. Deborah Booi and William Alexander

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

6. Mary Robertson and Lindiwe Ndluvu

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

7. John Macleod and Sipho Ngobi

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

8. Deborah Booi and Mary Robertson

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

9. William Alexander and John Macleod

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

10. Yourself and Deborah Booi

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

11. Lindiwe Ndluvu and John Macleod

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

12. Sipho Ngobi and Deborah Booi

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

13. Mary Robertson and William Alexander

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

14. John Macleod and Yourself

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

15. Deborah Booi and Lindiwe Ndluvu

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

16. William Alexander and Sipho Ngobi

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

17. Yourself and Mary Robertson

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

18. Lindiwe Ndluvu and William Alexander

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

19. Sipho Ngobi and Yourself

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

20. Yourself and Lindiwe Ndluvu

Very Different							Very Similar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

21. William Alexander and Yourself

Very Different							Very Similar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

APPENDIX C

MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALE (TYPE B)

You have been given brief curriculum vitaes of various people. Please decide how alike the following pairs of people are on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 being very different and 7 being very similar), by ticking the appropriate box.

1. Pindi Motlaba and Phumlani Manikivana

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

2. Phumlani Manikivana and Stella Taylor

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

3. Stella Taylor and David Butler

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

4. David Butler and Sarah Reynolds

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

5. Sarah Reynolds and Nolan Johnson

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

6. Stella Taylor and Pindi Motlaba

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

7. David Butler and Phumlani Manikivana

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

8. Sarah Reynolds and Stella Taylor

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

9. Nolan Johnson and David Butler

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

10. Yourself and Sarah Reynolds

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

11. Pindi Motlaba and David Butler

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

12. Phumlani Manikivana and Sarah Reynolds

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

13. Stella Taylor and Nolan Johnson

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

14. David Butler and Yourself

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

15. Sarah Reynolds and Pindi Motlaba

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

16. Nolan Johnson and Phumlani Manikivana

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

17. Yourself and Stella Taylor

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

18. Pindi Motlaba and Nolan Johnson

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

19. Phumlani Manikivana and Yourself

Very Different | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Very Similar

20. Yourself and Pindi Motlaba

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

21. Nolan Johnson and Yourself

Very Different

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Very Similar

APPENDIX D

SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (TYPE A)

Read the following scenarios carefully. Try to imagine yourself in the situation that is portrayed and then answer the questions. With regard to ranking, if you cannot choose between two people, or you feel the same about everyone with regard to a specific scenario, then give them the same rank

A: You are serving on the committee of a local charity organization. You are told that your portfolio is fundraising, and you have to choose one person to assist you. You will work closely with this person, on a day-to-day basis for your term of office i.e. one year. With whom would you choose to work? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Lindiwe Ndluvu		John Macleod	
Sipho Ngobi		Deborah Booi	
Mary Robertson		William Alexander	

B: The chairperson of your organization decides that the members of the committee are to be sent on a conference to learn about organizational and leadership skills. You are to be transported to the conference on a bus. The journey will take three hours. Next to whom would you choose to sit? Rank the following people in order of preference from1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
John Macleod		Lindiwe Ndluvu	
Deborah Booi		William Alexander	
Sipho Ngobi		Mary Robertson	

C: When you arrive at the conference, you collect your luggage and go to inspect the accommodation. You are being housed in two bedroomed chalets. Each bedroom has its own bathroom-en-suite. With whom would you choose to share a chalet? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Sipho Ngobi		William Alexander	
Mary Robertson		Lindiwe Ndluvu	
John Macleod		Deborah Booi	

D: At the end of the conference it is announced that two people from the committee are to be selected to attend an overseas conference. The length of the overseas conference is three weeks. You are one of the people selected. If you could choose, whom would you like the other person to be? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Mary Robertson		Sipho Ngobi	
Deborah Booi		John Macleod	
Lindiwe Ndluvu		William Alexander	

APPENDIX D

SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (TYPE B)

Read the following scenarios carefully. Try to imagine yourself in the situation that is portrayed and then answer the questions. With regard to ranking, if you cannot choose between two people, or you feel the same about everyone with regard to a specific scenario, then give them the same rank

A: You are serving on the committee of a local charity organization. You are told that your portfolio is fundraising, and you have to choose one person to assist you. You will work closely with this person, on a day-to-day basis for your term of office i.e. one year. With whom would you choose to work? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Pindi Motlaba		David Butler	
Phumlani Manikivana		Sarah Reynolds	
Stella Taylor		Nolan Johnson	

B: The chairperson of your organization decides that the members of the committee are to be sent on a conference to learn about organizational and leadership skills. You are to be transported to the conference on a bus. The journey will take three hours. Next to whom would you choose to sit? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
David Butler		Pindi Motlaba	
Sarah Reynolds		Nolan Johnson	
Phumlani Manikivana		Stella Taylor	

C: When you arrive at the conference, you collect your luggage and go to inspect the accommodation. You are being housed in two bedroomed chalets. Each bedroom has its own bathroom-en-suite. With whom would you choose to share a chalet? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Phumlani Manikivana		Nolan Johnson	
Stella Taylor		Pindi Motlaba	
David Butler		Sarah Reynolds	

D: At the end of the conference it is announced that two people from the committee are to be selected to attend an overseas conference. The length of the overseas conference is three weeks. You are one of the people selected. If you could choose, whom would you like the other person to be? Rank the following people in order of preference from 1 to 6.

NAME	RANK	NAME	RANK
Stella Taylor		Phumlani Manikivana	
Sarah Reynolds		David Butler	
Pindi Motlaba		Nolan Johnson	

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 1

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

Mary Robertson:

Deborah Booi:

Sipho Ngobi:

John Macleod:

William Alexander:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 2

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

William Alexander:

Mary Robertson:

John Macleod:

Deborah Booi:

Sipho Ngobi:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 3

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Deborah Booi:

John Macleod:

Sipho Ngobi:

Mary Robertson:

William Alexander:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 4

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

John Macleod:

Sipho Ngobi:

Deborah Booi:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

Mary Robertson:

William Alexander:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 5

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

William Alexander:

Mary Robertson:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

John Macleod:

Sipho Ngobi:

Deborah Booi:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE A)

ORDER 6

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Sipho Ngobi:

Lindiwe Ndluvu:

Deborah Booi:

William Alexander:

John Macleod:

Mary Robertson:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 1

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Pindi Motlaba:

Stella Taylor:

Sarah Reynolds:

Phumlani Manikivana:

David Butler:

Nolan Johnson:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 2

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Pindi Motlaba:

Nolan Johnson:

Stella Taylor:

David Butler:

Sarah Reynolds:

Phumlani Manikivana:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 3

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Sarah Reynolds:

David Butler:

Phumlani Manikivana:

Stella Taylor:

Nolan Johnson:

Pindi Motlaba:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 4

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

David Butler:

Phumlani Manikivana:

Sarah Reynolds:

Pindi Motlaba:

Stella Taylor:

Nolan Johnson:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 5

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Nolan Johnson:

Stella Taylor:

Pindi Motlaba:

David Butler:

Phumlani Manikivana:

Sarah Reynolds:

APPENDIX E

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (TYPE B)

ORDER 6

BELOW IS A LIST OF FORTY WORDS WHICH DESCRIBE VARIOUS PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES:

Attractive	Kind
Moody	Cold
Unsuccessful	Naive
Humourless	Educated
Ambitious	Unreliable
Dishonest	Helpful
Popular	Reliable
Shrewd	Boring
Vain	Industrious
Serious	Modest
Unattractive	Unhappy
Good-natured	Sensitive
Warm	Unkind
Happy	Unhelpful
Intelligent	Honest
Uneducated	Interesting
Lazy	Unintelligent
Insensitive	Frivolous
Humorous	Unambitious
Successful	Unpopular

HAVING READ THEIR CURRICULUM VITAES, CHOOSE THE TEN WORDS WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BEST DESCRIBE YOUR PERCEPTION OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE:

Phumlani Manikivana:

Pindi Motlaba:

Sarah Reynolds:

Nolan Johnson:

David Butler:

Stella Taylor:

APPENDIX F

SOCIAL IDENTITY CHECKLIST

Here we are going to ask you to tell us something about your identity. Everyone has a number of identities, for example you might be a mother and an accountant and a member of your local sports club. Some of your identities will be more important to you than others. A good way of deciding how important an identity is to you is to consider how difficult it would be for you to give up that particular identity - obviously the more difficult it would be for you to give up a particular identity, the more important that identity is to you. Based on this idea, we are going to ask you to consider the identities below. In the second column, mark any of the identities that apply to you. Then, in the column headed 'rank', rank them in order of importance (1 being most important, 2 second most important, etc).

IDENTITY		**RANK**
AFRICAN		
AFRIKAANS		
AZANIAN		
BLACK		
COLOURED		
ENGLISH		
FEMALE		
INDIAN		
MIDDLE CLASS		
SOTHO		
SOUTH AFRICAN		
UPPER CLASS		
WHITE		
WORKING CLASS		
XHOSA		
ZULU		

If any identities apply to you/ are important to you that are not in the above table, write in your missing identities in the bottom spaces of the above table and rank them.

APPENDIX G

POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE (TYPE A)

Please answer the following questions:

1. What do you understand by the term 'personality perception'?

2. What do you understand by the term 'identity'?

3. What, exactly, do you think the purpose of this research was?

4. What, exactly, do you think the different scales and questionnaires were measuring? Describe each questionnaire or scale that you completed, and then say what you think it was measuring/assessing.

5. Situational variables are circumstantial variables, such as the time of day, the length of the test, the temperature, the presence or absence of other people etc. Do you think any situational variables affected your response in any way? If your answer is yes, please elaborate.

6. Experimenter effects are the personal attributes of the experimenter/researcher which may have some effect on subjects' responses. Examples of these are the experimenter/researcher's age, sex, manner, status, personality, etc. Do you feel that your responses were affected by any such factors? If so, please elaborate.

7. To cue someone means to indicate in very subtle, possibly unconscious ways how one wishes them to respond or react. Did you feel the experimenter/ researcher was cuing you to respond in any particular way? Elaborate.

8. Below are the names of the people whose curriculum vitaes you were given. In the columns headed race, tick the race you think the person is (B stands for Black, W stands for White and C stands for Coloured); in the columns headed class tick what you think their class is (U stands for upper, M stands for middle and L stands for lower class), and in the column headed gender, tick what gender you think they are (F stands for female and M stands for male).

NAME	RACE			CLASS			GENDER	
Lindiwe	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Mary	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Deborah	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Sipho	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
John	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
William	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M

9. Do you have any other comments you wish to make about this research?

APPENDIX G

POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE (TYPE B)

1. What do you understand by the term 'personality perception'?

2. What do you understand by the term 'identity'?

3. What, exactly, do you think the purpose of this research was?

4. What, exactly, do you think the different scales and questionnaires were measuring? Describe each questionnaire or scale that you completed, and then say what you think it was measuring/assessing.

5. Situational variables are circumstantial variables, such as the time of day, the length of the test, the temperature, the presence or absence of other people etc. Do you think any situational variables affected your response in any way? If your answer is yes, please elaborate.

6. Experimenter effects are the personal attributes of the experimenter/researcher which may have some effect on subjects' responses. Examples of these are the experimenter/researcher's age, sex, manner, status, personality, etc. Do you feel that your responses were affected by any such factors? If so, please elaborate.

7. To cue someone means to indicate in very subtle, possibly unconscious ways how one wishes them to respond or react. Did you feel the experimenter/ researcher was cuing you to respond in any particular way? Elaborate.

8. Below are the names of the people whose curriculum vitaes you were given. In the columns headed race, tick the race you think the person is (B stands for Black, W stands for White and C stands for Coloured); in the columns headed class tick what you think their class is (U stands for upper, M stands for middle and L stands for lower class), and in the column headed gender, tick what gender you think they are (F stands for female and M stands for male).

NAME	RACE			CLASS			GENDER	
Pindi	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Stella	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Sarah	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Phumlani	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
David	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M
Nolan	B	W	C	U	M	L	F	M

9. Do you have any other comments you wish to make about this research?

APPENDIX H

EXPERIMENTAL INTERVENTION

Rape

Even tonight and I need to take a walk and clear
my head about this poem and why I can't
go out without changing my clothes my shoes
my body posture my gender identity my age
my status as a woman alone in the evening/
alone on the streets/alone not being the point/
the point being that I can't do what I want
to do with my own body because I am the wrong
sex the wrong age the wrong skin and
suppose it was not here in the city but down on the beach
or far into the woods and I wanted to go
there by myself thinking about God/or thinking
about children or thinking about the world/all of it
disclosed by the stars and the silence:
I could not go and I could not think and I could not
stay there
alone
as I need to be
alone because I can't do what I want to with my own
body and
who in the hell set things up
like this
and in France they say if the guy penetrates
but does not ejaculate then he did not rape me
and if after stabbing him if after screams if
after begging the bastard and if even after smashing
a hammer to his head if even after that if he
and his buddies fuck me after that
then I consented and there was
no rape because finally you understand finally
they fucked me over because I was wrong I was
wrong again to be me being me where I was/wrong
to be who I am
which is exactly like South Africa
penetrating into Namibia penetrating into
Angola and does that mean I mean how do you know if
Pretoria ejaculates what will the evidence look like the
proof of the monster jackboot ejaculation on Blackland
and if
after Namibia and if after Angola and if after Zimbabwe
and if after all of kinsmen and women resist even to
self-immolation of the villages and if after that
we lose nonetheless what will the big boys say will they
claim my consent:
Do You Follow Me: We are the wrong people of
the wrong skin on the wrong continent and what
in the hell is everybody being reasonable about...

(excerpt from "Poem About My Rights" by June Jordan)

For some years now, women have been coming to Rape Crisis to talk with us about their experience of sexual violence. There have been thousands of voices - each one different, each one bringing her own values, strengths, pain, and ideas. Despite the huge and important differences among the women who've spoken with us about their lives, one thing resonates through nearly all their stories. That is the utter loneliness which was felt after their experience of sexual assualt; in different languages, tones, and words, women say, "I thought I was the only one; I thought nothing like this had ever happened to anyone else; I felt so alone".

When you realize that in almost every culture we know about, for as far back as we can discover, women have been vulnerable to rape, this feeling of terrible alienation is worth thinking about. In People and Violence in South Africa, a chapter on rape estimates that over 1000 women are raped daily in the country. What does it mean that sexual violence can be something that's been (in various ways) part of society for so long and that, nonetheless, those who are attacked feel as though they are the only ones to whom a sexual assault could ever have happened?

There is a chasm between the kind of information about sexual violence that is readily available (from newspaper stories, from the things we learn casually as children and adolescents by listening to other people, from things like stories, TV or movies) and the kind of knowledge about what sexual violence **is** that is part and parcel of what someone experiences after (and during!) an assault. One of the reasons that a survivor feels so alone has to do with this chasm - nothing has ever prepared her for what it means to be raped.

In Rape Crisis we think of rape as a term that describes all levels of sexual violence. Stereotypes about what rape involves tend to portray "rape" as one specific kind of attack - in the following section, these

stereotypes will be discussed in detail. In the law too, rape is very narrowly defined. But if one defines rape as an assault against someone that **uses** sexual behaviour as a weapon of domination, rather than as a means of interactive pleasure, then there are a range of "rapes" in our society. Naming each type of abuse through sexual behaviour as **rape** is a way of highlighting the coherence of different forms of abuse. When we look at what happens to:

- women who are sexually exploited by a "date" or "someone they're seeing"
- women "hi-jacked" and raped by groups of young men
- women attacked by a man they don't know
- women threatened by "I'll get you; I know where you live",
- women in situations where men in authority use their official power to harass them
- women whose family members want to disempower and humiliate them.

It's clear that, despite the complexities of contextual and cultural difference, what is happening constitutes a network of extremely powerful, malevolent and dangerous means of disempowering women.

Our emphasis on the way in which many different forms of rape are politically linked is not intended to suggest that all women experience rape in the same way, or even that all those vulnerable to rape are "women" in some easily definable category.

For one thing, gender is not enough to protect one from rape - men and young boys in particular contexts are often sexually assaulted (see later discussion).

Secondly, the way in which gender does make women the primary targets of rape doesn't mean that all women are similarly vulnerable. Because rape is a crime of opportunity, women who are poor and/or whose access to social power is limited by race, language, and resources are much more likely to be targets of sexual violence than women whose privileges give them a safer relation to male power. In South Africa, what this boils down to is that black women are estimated to be three times more vulnerable to rape than (most) white women - this will be discussed in the section entitled "Rape and Racism".

Stereotypes about Rape

The term **stereotype** gets used a lot to describe ideas that are in some way crude or reductive. One hears about "the stereotypic poet" who is skinny, sensitive, and distinctly lacking in practical commonsense, or the "stereotypic psychotherapist" who is a bearded man who says, "Mmm-hmmm; how did that make you feel"? When we talk about **stereotypes** about rape, what is being referred to are really **stories** - very thread-bare, cliche-type stories with set characters and set plots.

Rape stereotypes involve ideas about:

- who gets raped
- who does the raping
- how rape happens
- why rape happens

- **who gets raped** — the stereotype is that young women get raped; the women are wearing "provocative" or "sexy" clothing; they are drunk or hitch-hiking; they are "leading the man on"; and that they are "attractive"/"naive"/"stupid".

  The facts are: women and girls (babies) of all ages have been sexually assaulted; their appearance and clothing has absolutely nothing to do with it, and nor does their personality. Neither does being in a particular social context ("drunk" or "hitch-hiking"): more women are raped in their homes and local neighbourhoods than anywhere else.

- **who does the raping** — the stereotype is that strangers are the ones who rape. The stereotypic identity of rapists is also wrapped up in masses of racism and classism: stereotypic rapists are likely to be poor, "degenerate" or "abnormal" in some way, black rather than white, and "dangerous-looking".

  The facts are that about 80% of rapes are perpetrated by someone the survivor knows in some way. Most white South Africans believe that rapes are done by black men to white women - in most cases, the race of the rapist is the same as that of the survivor, and where "cross-racial" rape occurs, rapes of black women by white men are reported ten times more often than the other way around. And it's impossible to "tell" a rapist by his appearance - he can look like a teacher, a friend, a supervisor, anyone!

- **how rape happens** — the stereotype is that rape occurs when women are walking late at night in ill-lit streets, and that a woman who gets attacked was either in a situation where she was "asking for it" (flirting, or simply being at a party or bar) or was too "silly" to notice that she was at risk. The basic stereotype here is that rape happens in situations where women cause it.

I should like to write
that I think it is a crime
that womengrow up afraid
of open windows
of evening streets
of passersby
of their own kind



The facts are that for every story of survival, there is a new "context" of place and occasion. Although it's true that a woman's home, workplace, and familiar neighborhood are more dangerous to her than other places, it's also true that no situation is automatically "safe" (and no situation is predictably "absolutely risky").

The "**how it happens**" stereotype also tends to imagine rape as rough-but-basically-benign heterosexual intercourse.

The act of rape (which can last anything from 20 minutes to days) is nothing but a physical attack which uses sexual organs, but can also use guns, knives, other objects or weapons. It is often accompanied by verbal abuse and its sole aim is the degradation of the survivor. It's the degradation which offers the rapist whatever "satisfaction" he gets. Gang rapes and other scenarios in which combinations of sexual and physical violence get used against a woman aren't represented by the stereotypes at all.

- **why it happens** — the stereotype mostly approaches "why" through the idea that women are to blame - for provoking men, for being in the wrong place, or for being the wrong kind of person. There is another aspect to this stereotype - and that is that men rape because they cannot control the lust women excite in them. The rape happens because the man gets overwhelmed by a temporary moment of being "out of control".

  The facts are that most rapes are planned, and don't have anything to do with sudden "out of control" feelings of desire. But even if one takes the notion of strong lust seriously, there's no basis to the idea that male lust is somehow uncontrollable or that lust can be satisfied by rape. It's just not true that men can't control their bodies.

Describing the difference between the **stereotype-stories** and the realities of

survivors' experiences is a way of highlighting the difference between the world of misinformation we live in and the actual event of a rape. The function of the **stereotype-stories** is two fold - firstly, they disguise the real nature of perpetration (by blaming "bad" women for rape and by suggesting that rapists are easily identifiable). Secondly, they contribute to a vast web of ideas about **who "women" are** (what roles they should play, what they should look like, how they should behave) which promote women's lack of importance.

When someone is sexually assaulted, both general ideas in the culture about why women are of lesser value than men and specific stereotypes about rape combine to create a climate in which women's descriptions of rape are easily dismissed.

Some Feminist Explanation about Why Rape Occurs

Since the early 70s, many different feminists have written about ways of conceptualizing the place of rape in society. Because of the complexity of the issue, the fact that we are still in the process of learning about what rape is (as more women's stories are heard), and because the feminist writers come themselves from different backgrounds and perspectives, there are various ideas about the prevalence of rape. Some of them are described below (briefly!), but without an attempt to turn all the ideas into one or resolve differences between them. At Rape Crisis, we believe that it's important to value the work of different women's minds and pens, and to give ourselves room to explore a range of feminist thinking before (as individuals) we may commit ourselves to one theory rather than another.

So, some ideas about why rape happens within the societies we know involve:

A. What we are dealing with is **permission** for sexual violence; the ways in which human beings are socialised into "boys" and "girls" involves a differentiation of roles and an insistence that male power over women is normal. This creates a social climate in which violence is automatically part of men's understanding of women (and vice versa). Given that the most basic social relation organised between "boys" and "girls" involves reproduction, and that reproduction is always assumed to involve something called "sex", what gets created is the constant possibility of the violence already in male/female relations to express itself through sexual interaction, as well as through economic or physical interaction. The **permission** for sexual violence comes from the same place as social permission for men to "own" women legally (as fathers, husbands, or sons), and to be in control of women's options.

B. Rape is one of the most powerful weapons of patriarchal control over women. The way it functions is to exercise control over **all** women, regardless of whether or not they've experienced rape. The control works in three main ways:

- the fear of being raped constrains women's and girls' behaviour in many

ways - dress, movement, who they're "allowed" to see, and so on

- women and girls (men and boys too, for that matter) who have been sexually assaulted are badly hurt, and frequently silenced. Given how many of us there are, this amounts to a lot of "controlled" people!

- definitions of what constitutes "rape" and what punishments should be accorded to known rapists are entirely in the hands of men as law-makers, judges, and so on. In some cultures, the "honourable" way of dealing with a raped woman is for male members of her family to attack the rapist (some people might say this is an improvement upon some older approaches which involved marrying the woman to the rapist to redeem the "good name" of the family) - this is about men's negotiations for power over other men (not about women's experience) - the woman's body is simply something over which the negotation occurs.

C. Rape is a systematic social violence that interacts with other forms of social violence, sometimes so dramatically that one word can be seen to refer, simultaneously, to two different forms of violence - "rape" gets used to refer to the abuse of women and it also refers to the abuse of land. June Jordan's poem, on page 1, takes this point of view: for her, imperialism (by which she means the urge to dominate, subjugate, and exploit) goes hand-in-hand with rape. Thus, an individual man's act of rape repeats and renews colonial structures of "expansion" and cruelty, in which both men **and** women are agents. Agency differs across the classifications of race and class, but in this point of view, responsibility for rape cannot be laid simply at the door of one group - "all men".

D. There are too many differences between the **contexts** in which, both historically and at present, rape is experienced to come up with an overarching explanation of why rape occurs. What must be done is to explore how, in different cultures and communities, sexual violence occurs (as a possibility hanging over everyone's heads) to maintain the way - **in those cultures** - that people become "men" and "women", "masculine" and "feminine". It's assumed that power will be contested between "men" and "women", and that the shape of "male" power is usually extremely dangerous to women's minds and bodies. But it isn't assumed that there's one form of "patriarchy" or that the way in which one woman's rape controls her within her culture is exactly the same as the way a woman in a different context will be controlled by rape.

Rape and Racism

Before turning to talking about what happens for individual women who survive rape, it's important to complete these opening sections on ideas about rape by looking at the relationship between rape and racism.

Many people describe **racism** and **misogyny** (sexism) as separate systems that have little to do with one another. We live in a country whose whole history has involved depriving certain people of resources and opportunity because of their racial "classification", and the new 1993 Constitution is explicitly commited to eradicating racism. Rather than seeing the battle for women's freedom from violence and exploitation as something separate from the need to liberate our communities from all forms of racism, we need to understand how these commitments are linked.

One way of doing this is to work out how something like rape (definitely an act rooted in misogyny) is connected to racism. In the introductory section, the fact that rape is a crime of opportunity was

raised. This means that the vulnerability of women to sexual assault varies in direct relation to our resources - for example, women who have to travel alone by public transport during the dark are more vulnerable than women who have cars. Women who are first-language English speakers and "well-educated" get taken more seriously by the law than other women.

In South Africa, the relationship between poverty and racism means that the "opportunity" for rape is created much more frequently for black women than for others. Fighting racism amounts therefore to a fight against those situations of radical disempowerment which give would-be-perpetrators a chance.

Another obvious link between rape and racism involves the fact that when women are raped, we are profoundly destabilised. What this means (for this argument) is the continual destabilisation of black women — the more black people are disempowered, the stronger the roots and reality of white South African racism can grow.

In addition, the violence of rape **between** black men and black women creates the kind of stress, tension, and fear which terrorises black communities but leaves white institutions of power intact.

Where white women are raped, their disempowerment equally prevents them from taking up the challenge of fighting racism. It is very hard to commit oneself fully and seriously to the work of understanding and "undoing" privilege if one is struggling to get through the day alive.

What Happens When Someone is Raped?

In the introductory section, we said that for every experience of rape, we have a new story about what happened and what the survivor went through. There is no "one way" of understanding how rape feels, but it is important to try and put some general ideas into words because the effects of rape are so serious.

So, without suggesting that all survivors feel the same way, it is crucial to say that rape is a life-threatening event.

It is life-threatening in two ways: firstly, rape literally threatens the woman's life. According to police reports, about 10% of those raped are killed and many more are threatened with death before and during the assault.

Secondly, rape threatens life because the attack destroys (usually temporarily) everything the survivor has used to make sense of her reality - she loses **a sense of herself**. This feels like dying.

Rape Trauma Syndrome

One of the things those unsympathetic to survivors say is that we should "get over it" - "it's over now, you must get on with the rest of your life". What is not understood is that there's a way in which the rape **begins** when the act, called "rape" is over. While someone is being assaulted, every fibre of their body and mind is concentrating (consciously or not) on surviving.

After the assault, its **meaning** floods over like a lethal wave erasing them, and the woman is plunged into a huge struggle to return to her life, her body, and her self. The rape is just as much this destruction of "self" as it is an act of physical invasion. The battle between this "mind-rape", which remains in the body long after the rapist is gone, and the woman's **will** to find her self again is what we call "survival". The way a particular survivor fights for her self after an assault has a lot to do with her context, her personality, and the choices she has to make in order to keep living. After years of listening to survivors, activists and some feminist psychologists have coined the phrase **Rape Trauma Syn-**

drome to describe what can happen emotionally and physically for someone after rape.

Before describing **Rape Trauma Syndrome**, it's important to say that the information it highlights isn't inclusive of everything a survivor might feel. We continue to learn more about this every day.

It's also important to be clear that everything described as a "symptom" of **Rape Trauma Syndrome** plays a **double-role** for the survivor struggling out of the death of being raped back into her life.

On the one hand, the "symptom" (say, sleeplessness or a feeling of being filthy) is an absolutely accurate internal interpretation of what has happened: it makes complete sense not ever to sleep again if rapists are out there, and something filthy did wrap itself round the survivor's life. In this light, the "symptom" can be seen as the body and mind's way of controlling the event - trying to protect, understand, and survive it.

On the other hand, the "symptom" causes the survivor intense pain, and in the case of something like sleeplessness, endangers her health in major ways. Feeling filthy may reflect the truth of what a rapist forced onto you, but when it feels like **you** are the filthy one, it is nearly impossible to get through the day.

Understanding the "symptoms" of **Rape Trauma Syndrome** as two-sided is useful to counselling. A survivor who is feeling so afraid that she can't leave her room isn't crazy (as she may feel she is) - **her reaction is a normal and logical response to the appalling thing she's experienced.** Being told this may be enormously helpful. At the same time, it's true that the fear is paralysing her life and making her feel terrible, so hearing a counsellor's respect and concern for her pain is a place from which to start working out how to reduce the terror.

Some people put the "symptoms" of **Rape Trauma Syndrome** into three categories: **physical, psycho-physical,** and **psychological.** This seems like a useful way of approaching them, but it needs to be remembered that minds and bodies are not that easily separable!

Physical symptoms of RTS

- any injuries inflicted during the rape - broken bones, cuts, trauma to the vagina, mouth or anus, etc
- bruises and grazes sustained by being made to lie in uncomfortable ways, being pushed, held down, or knelt on
- muscle stress - this may not be noticeable immediately after a rape, but the tension caused by rape as well as direct physical pressure can create severe muscle distress, especially in the spinal region
- damage to the urethra
- susceptibility to illness, due to massive lowering of immune-protection system because of stress
- sexually-transmitted diseases, pregnancy, HIV.

Psycho-physical symptoms of RTS

(These are symptoms that express themselves mostly through the body, but which are caused by the mind's response to the rape)

- sleeplessness, or extremely disturbed sleep
- nightmares
- vomiting, or a continual desire to throw up
- a sense of choking
- severe stomach ache
- headaches
- patches of "going blind," or "seeing" the rapist(s) everywhere
- intense dizziness, feeling "hazy"
- inability to eat (or, sometimes, drink - this is particularly dangerous because dehydration happens fast)

- a feeling of being cold all the time, or having clammy skin
- involuntary "acting" of what happened during the rape - this is called being in/ going into **a fugue state**
- inability to concentrate
- feelings of numbness across various parts of body
- feeling that the rapist is still there, inside the body.

Psychological symptoms of RTS

- intense fear - sometimes, the fear is attached to things that feel "illogical" to the survivor, like a particular sound, colour, phrase, object. Usually, the reason the fear is attached to something specific is because that thing reminds the survivor of the rape.
- a feeling of being dirty; shame; guilt
- having poor, or no, memory of the sequence of events during the rape
- anger — at specific things and/or at everything
- feelings of worthlessness
- despair
- loss
- loneliness
- wanting to die
- feeling as though one has gone mad
- intense disturbance of one's sexual feelings - this can range from a feeling of loathing at the thought of sexual touching to wanting to have sex all the time.

Survivors experience many other emotions and ideas after sexual assaults, but not all of these should be thought of as RTS.

For example, a feeling that one's family no longer knows about one is natural if the survivor can't tell anyone in the family what has happened; the feeling of alienation isn't something that she can resolve simply from within her own resources because it needs something that isn't in her life - like a different family.

The psychological symptoms of RTS are those feelings directly caused by being raped, and many of these can be resolved (usually over some time) by a combination of the survivor's own will, her inner resources, and an opportunity to talk as much as she needs to about what is happening inside her heart and head.

RTS affects the lives of most survivors severely in the weeks and months immediately after a rape. The circumstances of the assault, and the amount of support available to the survivor, have a lot to do with the degree of severity and with how long the symptoms last. A survivor going through RTS has to spend practically all her time just getting through her day minute by minute; she may do things very uncharacteristic of her, her relationships are likely to suffer, and she may be unable to plan, make decisions, or cope with all the things she used to do without even thinking about them.

Symptoms of RTS can also affect survivors years after the rape, especially if at the time of the rape there was no chance for the survivor to express what was happening for her to people who didn't judge or condemn her.

Survivors of child sexual abuse, and of gang rape, are particularly susceptible to experiencing symptoms "out of the blue" long after the assault(s) is over. The most frequently recurring symptoms are:

- "trigger"-memories - small things, like noises, smells, or images, that throw one back into the event of the rape
- nightmares
- body-memories - where certain forms of touch, especially certain forms of sexual touching, also remind one of being raped
- feelings of worthlessness.

In October, 1992, for the first time ever in the world, a South African Supreme Court accepted a description of RTS (given by Desiree Hansson, as an **expert witness**) as

sufficient explanation for a survivor's behaviour after a rape.
Even though this description was only allowed into the courtroom at the point where the perpetrator was being sentenced, this was still a huge achievement on the part of South African feminists working against rape. So many times before (and it is still happening) the court's inability to understand what happens to a person who is raped has led directly to their being disbelieved and dismissed.

Contexts

Throughout this booklet, we have suggested that the effect of being raped on an individual survivor has a lot to do with her (or his) context. Two kinds of contexts can be discussed - one about types of rape, and one about some different influences over people's lives.

Types of Rape

Acquaintance rape (date rape)

The majority of survivors to whom we listen at Rape Crisis have been survivors of a rape by one man. When the man is someone they've known, this can raise special issues for the survivor. Feelings of self-blame are often stronger, and so is the feeling of complete mistrust - if someone you trusted can hurt you in this way, what does that mean?

In addition, rape by someone you know raises complicated questions about retaliation if you choose to tell anyone about the rape, or if you want to report the rape. A survivor may choose not to tell anyone in their community about what's happened because the dangers of "exposing" someone to the legal system (or other systems of "revenge" - like a family's anger) are too great.

Acquaintance rape also means the survivor often has to see the rapist again - whether as a fellow-student on a campus, a co-worker, a "family friend", or just someone she passes in the street. Every time a survivor encounters their rapist is deeply traumatic - it can make the world feel completely crazy if things are all going along looking normal (the sun is shining, newspapers are being sold, buses are running) and you are being expected to share the same pavement, dinner table, or room as someone who raped you.

Rape by a lover

Being raped by someone whom you've defined as your partner (boyfriend, lover, husband), like acquaintance rape, also violently destroys trust and can plunge a survivor into huge self-hatred and despair. If someone who "loves" you hurts you in this way, are you worth anything at all?

In addition, survivors in intimate relationships with the people who rape them may share homes (and children) with the rapist. This means that the survivor may have to deal with questions about where she is going to live, or questions about how to continue sharing space with the rapist.

Clearly, the kind of intimate relationship involved will have an enormous influence on the issues raised for the survivor. **Marital rape** raises different problems to being raped by a boyfriend who doesn't live with the survivor - each context will bring its own issues. The one thing to bear in mind for counselling someone who's been assaulted by a lover is that their feelings about the rapist are likely to be extremely complex. This deserves very careful listening on the part of the counsellor.

Many people don't think about the fact that just as sexual violence occurs with heterosexual relationships, it can also occur within lesbian and gay relationships. If one remembers that rape is a form of violent domination that uses sexual actions as weapons, clearly men in gay relationships are vulnerable to all the weapons to which

men traditionally have access. And it is quite possible for a woman to deliberately hurt and dominate another woman by abusing sexual actions.

The main issue here is that homophobia is so strong in South African society that many gay men and lesbians keep silent about sexual violence they experience as a result of "dating" and having relationships. A counsellor who is listening to what has happened for someone in a lesbian or gay relationship needs to remember the profoundly disempowering context of social homophobia in which all lesbian and gay relationships are lived - this obviously affects the resources available to lesbian and gay survivors of **date/lover-rape.**

It also affects these survivors' sense of safety in the world in very profound ways - they were already unsafe in a world dominated by heterosexual values and expectations, now their safety in a lesbian or gay world has also been shattered.

Multiple rape

This is a very broad term and covers three main areas - 1. being raped and forced to endure a whole range of sexual actions 2. being raped by more than one person at the same time 3. being raped by someone who returns again and again to attack you.

1. Most rapes involve a variety of "action" - abusive or coercive speech, physical violence of different degrees, and actions forced onto the body of the woman. But sometimes, a rapist will "capture" the woman in some way (by locking her inside a room or car, or by threatening to kill her if she tries to get away) for lengthy periods of time in which the woman is forced to endure several different forms of sexual action - anal penetration, forced fellatio, vaginal penetration by penises and/or objects.

   All the normal agony of being raped obviously occurs for someone who has endured multiple violation of this kind. But there are a couple of special issues which also apply.

   Firstly, someone who has gone through a prolonged physical experience of rape is in danger of serious internal injury. They should be strongly encouraged to see a doctor (not necessarily the District Surgeon) as a matter of urgency.

   Secondly, because the rape involved so many different appalling things, the survivor may feel that you, the counsellor, won't be able to hear the full range of what happened for her. It's very important to let a survivor know that you are there for her, and able to take care of yourself - she doesn't have to "protect" you from the specificities of her attack.

   Something that goes along with this (and may in fact apply to any survivor of rape) is that the actual description of acts that a survivor endured may be hard for her because she may have to use words that she doesn't normally use easily. Many people find explicit reference to genitals or "sex" difficult, and the context of rape makes it that much more humiliating for them.

2. There are many ways in which rape by more than one person can occur. Like being raped through the use of lots of different acts, rape by several people is extremely traumatic to the body.

   Group or **gang rape** often occurs as an explicit act of "male-bonding" within a culture - fraternity "gang-bangs" on U.S. campuses and "jackrolling" in so-called townships are examples of these. In a situation like this, there is usually very little attempt made at any sort of conversational or human interaction with the woman; her body is the "object" shared. Those who participate in this type of rape tend to be young men, or even teenagers; it is difficult not to see

this kind of behaviour as deeply linked to the processes whereby cultures encourage boys to become "men".

3. Being vulnerable to sexual assault by the same person over a period of time usually happens in the context of an abusive relationship with that person. It could be a family member, an employer, a landlord, an official in a jail or psychiatric hospital, or someone who has power over you so that you cannot escape the context in which it is safe for them to rape you.

   This type of situation usually creates a sense of extreme helplessness and despair for the survivor, and their feelings are often linked to the circumstances by which they're trapped. On the whole, survivors in this kind of situation deserve more in-depth and long-term counselling than Rape Crisis can offer; it may be necessary to give a referral for this kind of help.

Rape involving the use of guns, knives, etc

Sometimes, a rapist forces a woman to do what he wants by either showing her a weapon or by using one. Being tied up and/ or threatened with deadly weapons obviously constitutes a whole new layer of assault. In situations like this, the threat of murder is not implicit, it's explicit, and the survivor may feel that she has had to "agree" to the rape as a way of saving her life.

Rape involving alcohol or drugs

This type of rape is where the survivor themself had had too much to drink, or was in some altered state of consciousness because of taking drugs of one kind or another. In a situation like this, it is quite easy for a rapist to overpower someone.

Sometimes a survivor of this type of rape will have particular feelings of shame because of having been "out of control". But being drunk or high doesn't mean you should be raped; if anything, it means you should be more carefully treated than usual!
Another serious thing that can happen when the survivor is not fully conscious in some way is that although the full force of the rape does impinge on her body, her mind may not be able to remember what happened afterwards. This can make someone feel a bit crazy - their body is telling them one thing but they can't recall the event in any way that makes sense.

People's Lives

The last thing we would ever want to do at Rape Crisis is suggest that it's possible to think of people in simple categories. Although we believe that the kinds of social stratifications imposed on lives (like ethnic origin or gender) have enormous influence on how lives can be shaped, we also believe that everyone has choices about their relationship to their stratification. The way you relate to being "female" or "Indian" is a very complex thing, and one makes generalisations only in very special circumstances. And all generalisations tend to obscure the way in which people are unique, themselves.

The comments below, therefore, should be treated warily - they are intended only to open some areas you need to think about as a counsellor.

Age

The age of a survivor is likely to have a lot of influence over what happens for them during and after a sexual assault.
Very young survivors (children) aren't usually counselled at Rape Crisis because of the particular training and time required. In order to understand more about child sexual abuse, see the booklet on Child Sexual Abuse.

Adolescents or teenagers who are survivors of rape (rather than of an on-going abuse situation at home) often face a special level of pain about the difference between "sex"

and "sexual violence". Teenagers are usually at a point in their lives where bodies, sexuality, and questions about relationships are already causing them confusion. Throwing rape into this makes things very difficult. The most important thing to remember about listening to teenagers is to ensure that your respect for their experience, opinions, and decisions is clear.

Survivors who consider themselves as "older" women may experience particularly intense feelings of shame about being raped. In addition, many elderly women have less mobility and fewer resources than other women, so the rape may horribly increase feelings of helplessness and fear about the future. Again, the amount of respect and support offered to an elderly survivor is extremely important to helping her recognise her strength in surviving the assault.

Sexual orientation

An important thing to remember about lesbians and gay men is that because they live in a world which usually pathologises them as "not normal" (best!) to "evil" (worst!), identifying oneself openly as lesbian or as gay is not a simple thing. This raises several issues specific to the rape of lesbians and gay men.

Firstly, because our society is so homophobic, all women are perceived as heterosexual. That means that, just like heterosexual women, lesbian women walk around in bodies that are vulnerable to rape. In addition, however, direct homophobia can cause a known lesbian to be raped, simply because she **is** lesbian. This form of attack can occur in many ways - at Rape Crisis, we have listened to lesbian women attacked outside a gay bar in order to "punish" them, and to lesbian women raped by men in their family community as an attempt to "force" them to be heterosexual.

Secondly, many lesbians and gay men in South Africa live "in the closet". Apart from anything else, this means that when counselling someone, it should never be assumed that they are heterosexual.

Religious affiliation

Many survivors are deeply affiliated to their religion. The values, norms, and expectations of this religion are often central to the way they make sense of reality. It is crucial to realise that it's impossible to tell when you first meet someone whether or not they are religious and, if so, what that religion means to them.

One implication of this (bossy as it sounds!) is that when counselling, it's important to avoid using religious terms as exclamations or emphatic terms - e.g., "O god"! It is not helpful to a survivor to have to explain to you that she finds that kind of thing wrong.

At another level, the issue of religious affiliation is obviously very complex and different affiliations link powerfully into different cultural systems. It would be silly to imagine that an outsider to a particular religion can understand the full range of a believer's position - what is clearly important is respect, an attentive ear, and open mind. If it is clear that a survivor's religious affiliation is absolutely central to her in a way that makes it hard for you to understand where she is, it may be important for her to be counselled by someone who shares her basic frame of reference.

Primary issues raised by rape for a religious survivor may well involve:

- questions about the absence, or loss, of god
- questions about the sancticty of the survivor's body (some religions place heavy emphasis on the value of virginity, and the importance of having "sex" only in marriage)
- questions about how to think about the perpetrator.

If these are not issues you feel comfortable listening to and discussing, it would be better for you to find a different counsellor for the survivor.

Disability

Women (and men) who are disabled already live in a world mostly indifferent to both their vulnerabilities and their strengths. Even though someone may have developed excellent skills to cope with a particular disability (say, blindness or difficulty in walking) over the years, rape can plunge a disabled survivor back into a feeling of being unable to cope. In addition, the hostility of the environment in which disabled people live (largely one of neglect and ignorance) makes them especially vulnerable targets of rapists.

Incarceration

People imprisoned either in jail, in reformatories, or in psychiatric hospitals are extremely vulnerable to sexual abuse. Firstly, in all three situations, the dynamics of power both between "guards" and inmates and between inmates themselves are very volatile, and easily lead to situations where "sex" can be forced from people.

Secondly, in all three contexts (but particularly in psychiatric hospitals), people who are inmates have been classified as unreliable in some way. Complaints, therefore, are easily dismissed, and cultures of threat and reprisal make survivors' silence almost inevitable.

Secondary Rape (or Secondary Victimisation)

The term **secondary rape** has been coined by feminists to describe what often happens to survivors after they've been raped. The way that people react to survivors often involves:-

- disbelief from friends or family members
- anger or blame from friends or family members
- if the survivor reports the rape to the police, she is treated as though she was the criminal
- doctors behaving roughly, asking questions about "what she did to get raped", and giving internal examinations that feel exactly like being raped again - cold speculums into damaged vaginas, having to take off one's clothes, etc
- journalists asking invasive questions, making one a "spectacle".

These forms of treatment create a climate in which the survivor is degraded, insulted, disrespected, and where the control of her life is given to (say) prosecutors or social workers. This is, in a way, a direct repetition of the situation in which the survivor was treated by the rapist. **Secondary rape** or **secondary victimisation** is a very powerful way of keeping the survivor within RTS and preventing her from rediscovering her own strength and identity.

At Rape Crisis, we see the work of counselling not only as giving survivors the opportunity to talk about what has happened to them in whatever way they need to, but also as a systematic effort to combat secondary victimisation. The way in which a survivor is responded to has the capacity either to deepen her trauma or to empower her. It is incredibly important that we are on the side of the empowerers.



Produced by Rape Crisis (Cape Town)

P O Box 13110
Mowbray
7705
Cape Town

Tel: (021) 47 1467 Education and Training
(021) 47 9762 Counselling and Advice
Fax: (021) 47 5458

APPENDIX I

CONTROL INTERVENTION

NATURAL HEALING

Lately, more and more people are discovering that alternative health remedies can work just as well as prescription drugs. Here's the low-down on the types of natural healing treatments that are available as well as suggestions for some natural remedies.

Natural healing treatments and how they work

The are four main types of natural healing treatments:

Aromatherapy: This treatment is based on the use of pure essential oils taken from plants. The idea is that these oils can affect our emotional and physical state through our sense of smell. These essential oils are highly concentrated, for example it takes 5000 roses to produce one teaspoon of pure rose oil. These oils may be added to a bath or diluted into a base vegetable oil and used for massage.

Herbalism: This is the most popular form of natural healing in the world, with over 80 % of the world's population making use of herbs as 'home' medicine. Herbs may be placed directly onto the area needing treatment or may be made into herbal teas.

Homeopathy: This is the newest of the natural medicines, and is based on the idea that "like cures like". In order to stimulate the body's natural healing powers, the patient is given a very diluted dose of whatever they're trying to fight off.

Naturopathy: In this approach, the body's natural healing abilities are encouraged and facilitated through a combination of diet and exercise.

Making herbal treatments:

Hot oil infusions

Herbs can be infused in a light vegetable oil such as sunflower or almond oil, and then used to make creams and ointments, or for massage. To make a hot oil infusion, you need to heat the herb and the oil together over a pot of simmering water for a few hours. Afterwards, remove from the heat and strain the mixture through muslin into a container. Wring the muslin to get as much oil out as possible and ensure that the extract is strong. Store in a cool place in a sealed bottle.

Other infusions

Place the herb in a pot of boiling water, and then leave it to draw for ten minutes. Strain the infusion through a tea strainer. This liquid should be kept in the fridge and may be kept for up to three days.

Poultices

Place enough of the herb to cover the affected area into a pot with a little water and heat gently for a few minutes. Squeeze out the water, and place the herb on the affected area, holding it in place with a bandage. Keep the area covered with the poultice for three to four hours.

Warm and cold compresses

Soak a clean cloth in a hot or cold infusion, and place on the affected area. Tie firmly in place with a towel or bandage.

What natural remedies to use

For acne: Bergamot, geranium, lavender and lemon oils are antiseptic and promote healing of the skin. The skin may also be cleaned by wiping it with an infusion of elderflower, marigold or lavender.

For arthritis: Put lemon, camomile, lavender or rosemary oils in your bath, or make them into a hot oil infusion and massage the affected areas. Parsley tea will help remove acidic toxins, and feverfew either in tea or tablet from will help inflammation.

For bruising: Rosemary-based massage oil helps heal bruises, as do ice-cold compresses made with witch-hazel.

For cold sores: Various essential oils may help here, including bergamot, eucalyptus, lavender, lemon or tea-tree. Oils may be applied neat, or a few drops diluted in a teaspoon of alcohol before dabbing on.

For eczema: Try camomile, geranium or lavender oil in an aqueous cream base. For itching, use chickweed in aqueous cream, and for weeping skin, try a compress made from an infusion of heartsease or nettle. Evening primrose also soothes and heals.

For migraine: Camomile tea will ease the dull, throbbing type of migraine which is accompanied by nausea. Feverfew taken daily will prevent the type of migraine where it feels as if there is a band around your head. Rosemary is useful for alleviating stress-induced migraines.

For stress: Use essential oils such as rose and lavender in your bath, or for massage. Drinking a lavender or lemon balm infusion will also help stress.

For indigestion: Apply a warm compress of lavender or camomile oil to the abdomen, or try massaging these oils into the abdomen. Drinking an infusion of camomile will soothe indigestion caused by overeating or stress, while a peppermint infusion helps indigestion accompanied by flatulence or nausea. For acid indigestion, try meadowsweet.

For insomnia: Place a few drops of the following oils into your bath, or on a paper tissue under your pillow: camomile, clary sage and lavender. Drinking an infusion of lavender or lemon balm may also help you sleep.

APPENDIX J

MATRICES OF MEANS FOR MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SCALING

Table 1: Black Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.85	3.35	1.2	3.55	1.35	4.5
BF	5.85	0	1.3	3.45	1.45	3.65	5.35
WM	3.35	1.3	0	6.2	3.5	1.45	1.3
WF	1.2	3.45	6.2	0	1.35	3.55	3.15
CM	3.55	1.45	3.5	1.35	0	6.3	1.35
CF	1.35	3.65	1.45	3.55	6.3	0	3.3
S	4.5	5.35	1.3	3.15	1.35	3.3	0

Table 2: Black Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.95	3.35	1.15	3.6	1.3	4.7
BF	5.95	0	1.3	3.45	1.45	3.55	5.55
WM	3.35	1.3	0	6.3	3.5	1.2	1.3
WF	1.15	3.45	6.3	0	1.35	3.55	3.25
CM	3.6	1.45	3.5	1.35	0	6.25	1.35
CF	1.3	3.55	1.2	3.55	6.25	0	3.35
S	4.7	5.55	1.3	3.25	1.35	3.35	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 3: Coloured Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	6.3	3.7	1.75	3.55	1.75	1.55
BF	6.3	0	1.75	3.7	1.75	3.65	3.25
WM	3.7	1.75	0	6.2	4.2	1.9	1.8
WF	1.75	3.7	6.2	0	2	4.2	3.9
CM	3.55	1.75	4.2	2	0	6.2	4.4
CF	1.75	3.65	1.9	4.2	6.2	0	5.2
S	1.55	3.25	1.8	3.9	4.4	5.2	0

Table 4: Coloured Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	6.3	3.8	1.65	3.5	1.65	1.5
BF	6.3	0	1.65	3.8	1.65	3.6	3.2
WM	3.8	1.65	0	6.25	4.15	1.8	1.7
WF	1.65	3.8	6.25	0	1.85	4.2	3.85
CM	3.5	1.65	4.15	1.85	0	6.3	4.4
CF	1.65	3.6	1.8	4.2	6.3	0	5.4
S	1.5	3.2	1.7	3.85	4.4	5.4	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 5: White Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.9	3.05	1.65	3.4	1.75	1.65
BF	5.9	0	1.7	3	1.75	3.35	2.55
WM	3.05	1.7	0	5.75	3.2	1.7	3.65
WF	1.65	3	5.75	0	1.75	3.15	4.45
CM	3.4	1.75	3.2	1.75	0	5.9	1.65
CF	1.75	3.35	1.7	3.15	5.9	0	2.75
S	1.65	2.55	3.65	4.45	1.65	2.75	0

Table 6: White Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.9	3.15	1.65	3.45	1.75	1.6
BF	5.9	0	1.8	3.15	1.75	3.4	2.6
WM	3.15	1.8	0	5.8	3.25	1.65	3.8
WF	1.65	3.15	5.8	0	1.75	3.25	4.6
CM	3.45	1.75	3.25	1.75	0	5.9	1.65
CF	1.75	3.4	1.65	3.25	5.9	0	2.85
S	1.6	2.6	3.8	4.6	1.65	2.85	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 7: Black Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	4.8	3.75	1.1	3.5	1.15	4.45
BF	4.8	0	1.1	3.55	1.1	4.05	6.55
WM	3.75	1.1	0	5.55	4.2	1.15	1.05
WF	1.1	3.55	5.55	0	1.15	4	4.1
CM	3.5	1.1	4.2	1.15	0	5.35	1.1
CF	1.15	4.05	1.15	4	5.35	0	4
S	4.45	6.55	1.05	4.1	1.1	4.	0

Table 8: Black Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.5	2.6	1.3	2.75	1.4	4.95
BF	5.5	0	1.3	2.7	1.4	3.2	5.9
WM	2.6	1.3	0	6.1	2.95	1.35	1.3
WF	1.3	2.7	6.1	0	1.35	3.1	2.7
CM	2.75	1.4	2.95	1.35	0	5.85	1.4
CF	1.4	3.2	1.35	3.1	5.85	0	3.25
S	4.95	5.9	1.3	2.7	1.4	3.25	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 9: Coloured Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.45	2.75	1.15	2.75	1.15	1.2
BF	5.45	0	1.15	2.8	1.2	2.75	3
WM	2.75	1.15	0	5.55	3.6	1.25	1.35
WF	1.15	2.8	5.55	0	1.35	3.65	3.65
CM	2.75	1.2	3.6	1.35	0	5.55	5.1
CF	1.15	2.75	1.25	3.65	5.55	0	5.55
S	1.2	3	1.35	3.65	5.1	5.55	0

Table 10: Coloured Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.2	4	1.05	3.4	1	1
BF	5.2	0	1.05	3.75	1.05	3.65	3.75
WM	4	1.05	0	4.95	4.3	1.1	1.2
WF	1.05	3.75	4.95	0	1.05	4.8	4.85
CM	3.4	1.05	4.3	1.05	0	4.9	3.8
CF	1	3.65	1.1	4.8	4.9	0	6.2
S	1	3.75	1.2	4.85	3.8	6.2	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 11: White Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.2	3.65	1.45	3.55	1.5	1.45
BF	5.2	0	1.5	3.7	1.45	3.4	3.4
WM	3.65	1.5	0	5.15	3.7	1.55	4.15
WF	1.45	3.7	5.15	0	1.55	3.75	4.95
CM	3.55	1.45	3.7	1.55	0	5.35	1.45
CF	1.5	3.4.	1.55	3.75	5.35	0	3.35
S	1.45	3.4	4.15	4.95	1.45	3.35	0

Table 12: White Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM	0	5.2	4.85	1	4.65	1	1
BF	5.2	0	1.1	4.6	1.1	4.65	4.35
WM	4.85	1.1	0	3.95	4.9	1	2.9
WF	1	4.6	3.95	0	1	4.95	6.4
CM	4.65	1.1	4.9	1	0	5.1	1
CF	1	4.65	1	4.95	5.1	0	4.65
S	1	4.35	2.9	6.4	1	4.65	0

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

APPENDIX K

TABLES OF STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING

Table 1: Black Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.93						
WM	1.39	0.47					
WF	0.41	1.23	0.70				
CM	1.23	0.76	1.24	0.49			
CF	0.49	1.23	0.60	1.15	0.66		
S	1.19	1.09	0.47	1.39	0.49	0.34	

Table 2: Black Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.89						
WM	1.31	0.47					
WF	0.49	1.36	0.66				
CM	1.19	0.76	1.19	0.49			
CF	0.47	1.19	0.41	1.15	0.64		
S	1.26	1.05	0.47	1.33	0.49	1.35	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 3: Coloured Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.66						
WM	1.08	1.02					
WF	1.02	1.08	0.62				
CM	100	1.02	0.83	0.92			
CF	1.02	0.88	0.97	0.83	0.62		
S	0.69	1.12	0.62	0.97	1.19	1.11	

Table 4: Coloured Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.66						
WM	0.89	0.88					
WF	0.88	0.89	0.72				
CM	1.05	0.88	0.67	0.81			
CF	0.88	1.10	0.83	0.70	0.66		
S	0.69	1.12	0.66	0.93	1.14	0.94	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 5: White Pretest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.79						
WM	1.28	0.92					
WF	0.88	1.30	0.85				
CM	0.99	0.91	1.24	1.02			
CF	0.91	1.04	0.92	1.27	0.79		
S	0.88	1.32	1.04	0.89	0.88	1.25	

Table 6: White Posttest Control

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	0.85						
WM	1.39	1.06					
WF	0.88	1.39	0.95				
CM	1.00	1.02	1.29	1.02			
CF	1.02	0.99	0.88	1.29	0.85		
S	0.88	1.39	1.15	0.75	0.88	1.46	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 7: Black Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.15						
WM	1.92	0.31					
WF	0.31	1.64	1.15				
CM	1.91	0.31	1.67	0.37			
CF	0.37	1.47	0.37	1.45	1.09		
S	1.05	0.60	0.22	1.45	0.31	1.65	

Table 8: Black Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.05						
WM	1.31	0.66					
WF	0.66	1.26	0.91				
CM	1.48	0.75	1.39	0.67			
CF	0.75	1.44	0.67	1.41	0.88		
S	1.05	1.02	0.66	1.30	0.68	1.48	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 9: Coloured Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.19						
WM	1.16	0.49					
WF	0.49	1.20	1.19				
CM	1.02	0.52	1.10	0.59			
CF	0.49	1.12	0.55	1.09	1.19		
S	0.52	1.21	0.59	1.18	1.21	0.89	

Table 10: Coloured Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.67						
WM	1.72	0.22					
WF	0.22	1.48	1.73				
CM	1.47	0.22	1.63	0.22			
CF	0	1.60	0.45	1.40	1.68		
S	0	1.33	0.70	1.35	1.54	1.32	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

Table 11: White Pretest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.32						
WM	1.39	0.61					
WF	0.60	1.38	1.27				
CM	1.43	0.60	1.34	0.60			
CF	0.61	1.64	0.60	1.33	1.39		
S	0.60	1.5	1.35	1.32	0.60	1.42	

Table 12: White Posttest Experimental

	BM	BF	WM	WF	CM	CF	S
BM							
BF	1.54						
WM	1.31	0.45					
WF	0	1.39	1.50				
CM	1.42	0.45	1.21	0			
CF	0	1.23	0	1.19	1.48		
S	0	1.46	1.41	0.68	0	1.31	

BM = Black Male

BF = Black Female

WM = White Male

WF = White Female

CM = Coloured Male

CF = Coloured Female

S = Self

APPENDIX L

SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE: MANOVA TEST CRITERIA AND F APPROXIMATIONS FOR THE HYPOTHESIS OF NO EFFECT

WILKS' LAMBDA	VALUE	F	NUM DF	DEN DF	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1.000				
C (Race of participant)	1.000				
A*C	1.000				
B (Pre- & posttest)	1.000				
A*B	1.000				
B*C	1.000				
A*B*C	1.000				
D (Stimulus Race)	0.688	11.586	8	450	**0.001**
A*D	0.967	0.938	8	450	0.485
C*D	0.175	33.061	16	688.024	**0.001**
A*C*D	0.856	2.245	16	688.024	**0.0035**
E (Stimulus gender)	0.075	340.444	4	111	**0.001**
A*E	0.873	4.040	4	111	**0.0043**
C*E	0.848	2.380	8	222	**0.0177**
A*C*E	0.797	3.343	8	222	**0.0012**
B*D	0.943	1.674	8	450	0.1204
A*B*D	0.930	2.093	8	450	**0.0352**
B*C*D	0.834	2.632	16	688.024	**0.0005**
A*B*C*D	0.864	2.099	16	688.024	**0.0071**
B*E	0.503	27.433	4	111	**0.0001**
A*B*E	0.556	21.151	4	111	**0.0001**
B*C*E	0.904	1.437	8	222	0.1823
A*B*C*E	0.882	1.791	8	222	0.0799
D*E	0.849	4.790	8	450	**0.0001**
A*D*E	0.898	3.108	8	450	**0.002**
C*D*E	0.521	10.219	16	688.024	**0.001**
A*C*D*E	0.803	3.210	16	688.024	**0.001**
B*D*E	0.932	2.004	8	450	**0.0444**
A*B*D*E	0.963	1.080	8	450	0.3759
B*C*D*E	0.849	2.368	16	688.024	**0.0019**
A*B*C*D*E	0.869	2.029	16	688.024	**0.0099**

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Wilks Lambda values and F values are rounded off to three decimal places.

APPENDIX M
ANOVA TABLES FOR ITEMS 1 TO 4 OF THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ANOVA TABLE FOR ITEM 1 (WORKING TOGETHER)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	0	0		
C (Race of participant)	2	0	0		
A*C	2	0	0		
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	0	0		
A*B	1	0	0		
B*C	2	0	0		
A*B*C	2	0	0		
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	141.74	70.87	24.74	**0.0001**
A*D	2	2.65	1.33	0.46	0.6299
C*D	4	1733.89	433.47	151.32	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	15.68	3.92	1.37	0.2456
Error = D*S*(A*C)					
E (Gender of stimulus)	1	356.01	356.01	159.67	**0.0001**
A*E	1	0.1000	0.1000	0.04	0.8327
C*E	2	27.23	13.62	6.11	**0.0030**
A*C*E	2	14.64	7.32	3.28	**0.0411**
Error = E*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.20	0.10	1.24	0.2908
A*B*D	2	0.25	0.13	1.58	0.2075
B*C*D	4	0.29	0.07	0.92	0.4550
A*B*C*D	4	0.31	0.08	0.98	0.4180
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					
B*E	1	3.8	3.8	23.8	**0.0001**
A*B*E	1	3.4	3.4	21.29	**0.0001**
B*C*E	2	0.07	0.03	0.21	0.8085
A*B*C*E	2	0.34	0.17	1.07	0.3453
Error = B*E*S(A*C)					
D*E	2	3.84	1.92	4.	**0.0194**
A*D*E	2	8.64	4.32	9.04	**0.0002**
C*D*E	4	21.83	5.46	11.41	**0.0001**
A*C*D*E	4	8.59	2.15	4.49	**0.0016**
Error = D*E*S(A*C)					
B*D*E	2	0.05	0.02	0.33	0.7206
A*B*D*E	2	0.01	0	0.04	0.9562
B*C*D*E	4	0.34	0.09	1.17	0.3261
A*B*C*D*E	4	0.62	0.16	2.12	0.0797
Error = B*D*E*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

ANOVA TABLE FOR ITEM 2 (SITTING ON A BUS)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	0	0		
C (Race of participant)	2	0	0		
A*C	2	0	0		
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	0	0		
A*B	1	0	0		
B*C	2	0	0		
A*B*C	2	0	0		
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	57.73	28.87	10.24	**0.0001**
A*D	2	0.44	0.22	0.08	0.9252
C*D	4	1552.69	388.17	137.66	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	14.85	3.71	1.32	0.2647
Error = D*S*(A*C)					
E (Gender of stimulus)	1	402.17	402.17	218.46	**0.0001**
A*E	1	8.25	8.25	4.48	**0.364**
C*E	2	12.1	6.05	3.29	**0.0409**
A*C*E	2	10.86	5.43	2.95	0.0564
Error = E*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.49	0.25	1.55	0.2146
A*B*D	2	1.18	0.59	3.71	**0.0260**
B*C*D	4	0.46	0.12	0.73	0.5741
A*B*C*D*	4	0.56	0.14	0.90	0.4645
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					
B*E	1	4.56	4.56	26.08	**0.0001**
A*B*E	1	3.306	3.306	18.93	**0.0001**
B*C*E	2	0.38	0.19	1.09	0.3412
A*B*C*E	2	0.76	0.38	2.18	0.1174
Error = B*E*S(A*C)					
D*E	2	22.03	1.02	3.21	**0.0423**
A*D*E	2	1.94	0.97	3.06	**0.0488**
C*D*E	4	21.73	5.43	17.14	**0.0001**
A*C*D*E	4	3.65	0.91	2.88	**0.0235**
Error = D*E*S(A*C)					
B*D*E	2	0.12	0.06	1.06	0.3488
A*B*D*E	2	0.14	0.07	1.27	0.2834
B*C*D*E	4	1.14	0.28	5.21	**0.0005**
A*B*C*D*E	4	1.10	0.28	5.07	**0.0006**
Error = B*D*E*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

ANOVA TABLE FOR ITEM 3 (SHARING A CHALET ON CONFERENCE)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	0	0		
C (Race of participant)	2	0	0		
A*C	2	0	0		
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	0	0		
A*B	1	0	0		
B*C	2	0	0		
A*B*C	2	0	0		
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	93.09	46.55	26.55	**0.0001**
A*D	2	3.07	1.53	0.88	0.4181
C*D	4	1006.46	251.61	143.51	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	13.89	3.47	1.98	0.0983
Error = D*S*(A*C)					
E (Gender of stimulus)	1	2018.77	2018.77	1255.62	**0.0001**
A*E	1	4.56	4.56	2.83	0.0950
C*E	2	4.21	2.1	1.31	0.2741
A*C*E	2	5.93	2.96	1.84	0.1629
Error = E*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.78	0.39	3.08	**0.0477**
A*B*D	2	0.97	0.48	3.81	**0.0237**
B*C*D	4	3.79	0.95	7.46	**0.0001**
A*B*C*D*	4	2.04	0.51	4.02	**0.0036**
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					
B*E	1	7.08	7.08	42.87	**0.0001**
A*B*E	1	4.56	4.56	27.57	**0.0001**
B*C*E	2	0.68	0.34	2.05	0.1339
A*B*C*E	2	0.26	0.13	0.79	0.4544
Error = B*E*S(A*C)					
D*E	2	0.41	0.20	1.09	0.3391
A*D*E	2	0.86	0.43	2.31	0.1018
C*D*E	4	15.00	3.75	20.04	**0.0001**
A*C*D*E	4	1.32	0.33	1.76	0.1371
Error = D*E*S(A*C)					
B*D*E	2	0.53	0.26	4.51	**0.0120**
A*B*D*E	2	0.18	0.09	1.51	0.2240
B*C*D*E	4	0.14	0.03	0.59	0.6726
A*B*C*D*E	4	0.17	0.04	0.72	0.5808
Error = B*D*E*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

ANOVA TABLE FOR ITEM FOUR (TRAVELLING OVERSEAS)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	0	0		
C (Race of participant)	2	0	0		
A*C	2	0	0		
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	0	0		
A*B	1	0	0		
B*C	2	0	0		
A*B*C	2	0	0		
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	176.76	88.38	42.25	**0.0001**
A*D	2	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.9849
C*D	4	2051.57	512.89	245.2	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	29.95	7.49	3.58	**0.0075**
Error = D*S*(A*C)					
E (Gender of stimulus)	1	365.02	365.02	177.49	**0.0001**
A*E	1	17.56	17.56	8.54	**0.0042**
C*E	2	19.20	9.6	4.67	**0.0113**
A*C*E	2	19.53	9.76	4.75	**0.0105**
Error = E*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	1.01	0.51	4.63	**0.0107**
A*B*D	2	0.80	0.40	3.66	**0.0274**
B*C*D	4	2.05	0.51	4.68	**0.0012**
A*B*C*D*	4	2.16	0.54	4.92	**0.0008**
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					
B*E	1	24.28	24.28	75.41	**0.0001**
A*B*E	1	21.76	21.76	67.56	**0.0001**
B*C*E	2	1.08	0.54	1.67	0.1926
A*B*C*E	2	1.25	0.63	1.95	0.1474
Error = B*E*S(A*C)					
D*E	2	14.58	7.29	17.82	**0.0001**
A*D*E	2	0.77	0.38	0.94	0.3919
C*D*E	4	32.02	8.01	19.57	**0.0001**
A*C*D*E	4	8.34	2.08	5.10	**0.0006**
Error = D*E*S(A*C)					
B*D*E	2	0.27	0.13	1.20	0.3045
A*B*D*E	2	0.09	0.05	0.42	0.6547
B*C*D*E	4	1.40	0.35	3.14	**0.0153**
A*B*C*D*E	4	1.18	0.3	2.65	**0.0343**
Error = B*D*E*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

APPENDIX N

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANOVA CELL MEANS FOR ITEMS ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 1: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (WORKING TOGETHER)

In the following tables, as the pretest scores were subtracted from the posttest scores, a negative score indicates that the stimulus' ranking improved (moved closer to 1) at the posttest.

Table 1: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.3*	-0.075	0.1	-0.175*	0.025	-0.2*
Control	0	0	0.025	-0.025	0.05	-0.05

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 2: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.125	-0.225*	0.3*	-0.175*	0.35*	-0.375*
Control	0.025	-0.02	-0.05	0	-0.025	0.075

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.425*	-0.175*	0.15	-0.25*	0	-0.15
Control	0.025	-0.025	0	0	0	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR ITEMS ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 2: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (SITTING ON A BUS)

In the following tables, as the pretest scores were subtracted from the posttest scores, a negative score indicates that the stimulus' ranking improved (moved closer to 1) at the posttest.

Table 4: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.175	-0.025	0.125	-0.15	0.05	-0.175
Control	0.025	0	-0.025	-0.15	0.1	0.05

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 5: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.2*	-0.05	0.225*	0	0.15	-0.55*
Control	0	-0.075	-0.025	-0.025	0.075	0.05

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.725*	-0.35*	0.125	-0.35*	0.075	-0.225*
Control	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR ITEMS ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 3: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (SHARING A CHALET)

In the following tables, as the pretest scores were subtracted from the posttest scores, a negative score indicates that the stimulus' ranking improved (moved closer to 1) at the posttest.

Table 7: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.85*	-0.025	0.2*	-0.45*	-0.075	-0.5*
Control	0.075	0	0	-0.05	0	-0.025

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.175	-0.4*	0.425*	-0.05	0.2*	-0.35
Control	0.025	-0.2*	0.05	0	0.125	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.375*	-0.175	-0.025	-0.3*	0.15	-0.025
Control	0.05	0.025	-0.05	0	-0.025	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR ITEMS ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 4: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (TRAVELLING TOGETHER)

In the following tables, as the pretest scores were subtracted from the posttest scores, a negative score indicates that the stimulus' ranking improved (moved closer to 1) at the posttest.

Table 10: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.975*	-0.325*	0.325*	-0.575*	0.25*	-0.65*
Control	0.075	-0.125	0.025	0.025	0.075	-0.075

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants in the on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.275*	-0.5*	0.9*	-0.625*	0.725*	-0.775*
Control	0	0	-0.075	0.05	0.025	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 12: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	0.625*	-0.2	0.025	-0.5*	0.45*	-0.4*
Control	0.05	0.05	-0.075	0.025	0.025	-0.075

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

APPENDIX O

ANOVA TABLE FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON ITEM 1 OF THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (WORKING TOGETHER)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	0.2	0.2	0.04	0.8327
C (Race of participant)	2	54.47	27.23	6.11	**0.0030**
A*C	2	29.28	14.64	3.28	**0.0411**
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	7.61	7.61	23.80	**0.0001**
A*B	1	6.81	6.81	21.29	**0.0001**
B*C	2	0.14	0.07	0.21	0.8035
A*B*C	2	0.67	0.34	1.07	0.3453
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	7.68	3.84	4.01	**0.0194**
A*D	2	17.29	8.64	9.04	**0.0002**
C*D	4	43.66	10.91	11.41	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	17.19	4.3	4.49	**0.0016**
Error = D*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.10	0.05	0.33	0.7206
A*B*D	2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.9562
B*C*D	4	0.69	0.17	1.17	0.3261
A*B*C*D	4	1.25	0.31	2.12	0.0797
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					

ANOVA TABLE FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON ITEM 2 OF THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (SITTING ON A BUS)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	16.5	16.5	4.48	**0.0364**
C (Race of participant)	2	24.22	12.11	3.29	**0.0409**
A*C	2	21.72	10.86	2.95	0.0564
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	9.11	9.11	26.08	**0.0001**
A*B	1	6.61	6.61	18.93	**0.0001**
B*C	2	0.76	0.38	1.09	0.3412
A*B*C	2	1.53	0.76	2.18	0.1174
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	4.07	2.03	3.21	**0.0423**
A*D	2	3.88	1.94	3.06	**0.0488**
C*D	4	43.46	10.86	17.14	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	7.31	1.83	2.88	**0.0235**
Error = D*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.23	0.12	1.06	0.3488
A*B*D	2	0.28	0.14	1.27	0.2834
B*C*D	4	2.28	0.57	5.21	**0.0005**
A*B*C*D	4	2.22	0.55	5.07	**0.0006**
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

ANOVA TABLE FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON ITEM 3 OF THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (SHARING A CHALET ON CONFERENCE)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	9.11	9.11	2.83	0.0950
C (Race of participant)	2	8.42	4.21	1.31	0.2741
A*C	2	11.86	5.93	1.84	0.1629
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	14.17	14.17	42.87	**0.0001**
A*B	1	9.11	9.11	27.57	**0.0001**
B*C	2	1.35	0.68	2.05	0.1339
A*B*C	2	0.53	0.26	0.79	0.4544
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	0.81	0.41	1.09	0.3391
A*D	2	1.73	0.86	2.31	0.1018
C*D	4	30.0	7.5	20.04	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	2.64	0.66	1.76	0.1371
Error = D*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	1.05	0.53	4.51	**0.0120**
A*B*D	2	0.35	0.18	1.51	0.2240
B*C*D	4	0.27	0.07	0.59	0.6726
A*B*C*D	4	0.34	0.08	0.72	0.5808
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					

ANOVA TABLE FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON ITEM 4 OF THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE (TRAVELLING OVERSEAS)

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental versus control)	1	35.11	35.11	8.54	**0.0042**
C (Race of participant)	2	38.4	19.2	4.67	**0.0113**
A*C	2	39.06	19.53	4.75	**0.0105**
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	48.57	48.57	75.41	**0.0001**
A*B	1	43.5	43.5	67.56	**0.0001**
B*C	2	2.15	1.08	1.67	0.1926
A*B*C	2	2.51	1.25	1.95	0.1474
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	29.17	14.58	17.82	**0.0001**
A*D	2	1.54	0.77	0.94	0.3919
C*D	4	64.05	16.01	19.57	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	16.68	4.17	5.10	**0.0006**
Error = D*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	0.53	0.27	1.20	0.3045
A*B*D	2	0.19	0.09	0.42	0.6547
B*C*D	4	2.81	0.70	3.14	**0.0153**
A*B*C*D	4	2.36	0.59	2.65	**0.0343**
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

APPENDIX P

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANOVA CELL MEANS FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES FOR EACH ITEM ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 1: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (WORKING TOGETHER)

In the following tables, a negative value indicates that the female stimulus is more favoured over the male stimulus at the posttest than at the pretest

Table 1: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.375*	-0.3*	-0.225
Control	0	-0.05	-0.1

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

Table 2: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.365*	-0.475*	-0.725*
Control	-0.05	0.05	0.1

* Indicates significance, $p< 0.05$

Table 3: Table of pairwise differences between the means of the gender differential scores comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.6*	-0.4*	-0.15
Control	-0.05	0	0

* Indicates significance, $p< 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR THE DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR EACH ITEM ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 2: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (SITTING ON A BUS)

In the following tables, a negative value indicates that the female stimulus is more favoured over the male stimulus at the posttest than at the pretest

Table 4: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.2	-0.275*	-0.225
Control	-0.025	-0.125	-0.05

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 5: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.25	-0.225	-0.725*
Control	-0.075	0	-0.025

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Table of pairwise differences between the means of the gender differential scores comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-1.075*	-0.475*	-0.3*
Control	0	0	0

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR THE DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR EACH ITEM ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 3: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (SHARING A CHALET ON CONFERENCE)

In the following tables, a negative value indicates that the female stimulus is more favoured over the male stimulus at the posttest than at the pretest

Table 7: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.875*	-0.65*	-0.425*
Control	-0.075	-0.05	-0.025

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.575*	-0.475*	-0.55*
Control	-0.225	-0.05	-0.125

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Table of pairwise differences between the means of the gender differential scores comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.55*	-0.275*	-0.175
Control	-0.025	0.05	0.025

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR THE DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR EACH ITEM ON THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

ITEM 4: PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION (TRAVELLING OVERSEAS)

In the following tables, a negative value indicates that the female stimulus is more favoured over the male stimulus at the posttest than at the pretest

Table 10: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-1.3*	-0.9*	-0.9*
Control	-0.2	0	0.15

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Table of pairwise differences between the means of gender differential scores comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.775*	-1.525*	-1.5*
Control	0	0.125	-0.025

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 12: Table of pairwise differences between the means of the gender differential scores comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	-0.825*	-0.525*	-0.85*
Control	0	0.1	-0.1

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

APPENDIX Q

ANOVA TABLE FOR PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS, BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF POSITIVE WORDS ATTRIBUTED TO A PARTICULAR STIMULI

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental/control)	1	472.55	472.55	0.27	0.6028
C (Race of participant)	2	3343.65	1671.82	0.98	0.3847
A*C	2	441.82	220.91	0.13	0.8806
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Prestest versus posttest)	1	796.39	796.39	22.61	**0.0001**
A*B	1	802.05	802.05	22.77	**0.0001**
B*C	2	582.87	291.43	8.27	**0.0004**
A*B*C	2	75.55	37.78	1.07	0.3455
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	19810.39	9905.2	14.67	**0.0001**
A*D	2	3395.56	1697.78	2.51	0.0832
C*D	4	230858.12	57714.53	85.45	**0.0001**
A*C*D	4	3857.9	964.47	1.43	0.2255
Error = D*S*(A*C)					
E (Gender of stimulus)	1	35087.15	36087.15	94.19	**0.0001**
A*E	1	4411.79	4411.79	11.51	**0.0010**
C*E	2	10323.26	5161.63	13.47	**0.0001**
A*C*E	2	1733.28	866.64	2.26	0.1088
Error = E*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	464.90	232.45	10.77	**0.0001**
A*B*D	2	13.33	6.66	0.31	0.7347
B*C*D	4	155.64	38.91	1.80	0.1292
A*B*C*D	4	63.72	15.93	0.74	0.5669
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					
B*E	1	2474.56	2474.56	78.74	**0.0001**
A*B*E	1	2203.96	2203.96	70.13	**0.0001**
B*C*E	2	70.23	35.11	1.12	0.3307
A*B*C*E	2	21.54	10.77	0.34	0.7106
Error = B*E*S(A*C)					
D*E	2	7152.9	3576.45	19.65	**0.0001**
A*D*E	2	798.94	399.47	2.2	0.1137
C*D*E	4	3319.66	829.91	4.56	**0.0015**
A*C*D*E	4	2297.01	574.25	3.16	**0.0150**
Error = D*E*S(A*C)					
B*D*E	2	18.36	9.18	0.44	0.6431
A*B*D*E	2	45.7	22.85	1.10	0.3343
B*C*D*E	4	85.37	21.34	1.03	0.3934
A*B*C*D*E	4	135.66	33.92	1.63	0.1665
Error = B*D*E*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

APPENDIX R

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANOVA CELL MEANS FOR THE PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS MEASURE (MEANS OF PERCENTAGE POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES AWARDED EACH STIMULUS IN EACH CONDITION)

PRETEST/POSTTEST CONDITION

In the following tables, a negative indicates that the percentage of positive attributes awarded a particular stimulus dropped from pretest to posttest, while a positive indicates that the percentage of positive attributes awarded that stimulus increased

Table 1: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	-6.955*	0	-5.6*	4.39*	-4.59*	3.68*
Control	-1	0	3.415*	2.18	4.135*	3.995*

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 2: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	-9.4595*	0.765	-6.4650*	-0.5	-8.21*	7.465*
Control	-2.9	-3.355*	0.11	0	0.545	-0.595

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

Table 3: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black male	Black female	Coloured male	Coloured female	White male	White female
Experimental	-10.955*	0.31	-9.565*	2.435	-10.005*	0.5
Control	-2.725	-0.8	-0.91	0.95	-1.95	-1

* Indicates significance, $p<0.05$

APPENDIX S

ANOVA TABLE FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON THE PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS MEASURE

SOURCE	DF	ANOVA SS	Mean Sq	F	Pr>F
A (Experimental/control)	1	8824.52	8824.52	11.52	**0.000**
C (Race of participant)	2	20653.85	10326.92	13.48	**0.000**
A*C	2	3466.73	1733.37	2.26	0.108
Error = S(A*C)					
B (Pretest versus posttest)	1	4948.07	4948.07	78.71	**0.000**
A*B	1	4405.68	4405.68	70.09	**0.000**
B*C	2	140.69	70.34	1.12	0.330
A*B*C	2	43.31	21.65	0.34	0.709
Error = B*S(A*C)					
D (Race of stimulus)	2	14312.57	7156.28	19.66	**0.000**
A*D	2	1600.88	800.44	2.20	0.113
C*D	4	6636.18	1659.04	4.56	**0.001**
A*C*D	4	4591.59	1147.90	3.15	**0.015**
Error = D*S(A*C)					
B*D	2	36.39	18.19	0.44	0.645
A*B*D	2	91.04	45.52	1.10	0.335
B*C*D	4	171.1	42.77	1.03	0.392
A*B*C*D	4	271.07	67.77	1.63	0.167
Error = B*D*S(A*C)					

- Values in **bold** denote significant interactions, $p < 0.05$.
- Sums of squares and mean squares are rounded off to two decimal places.

APPENDIX T

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANOVA CELL MEANS FOR THE GENDER DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ON THE PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS MEASURE

PRETEST/POSTEST CONDITION

In the following tables, a positive value indicates that the female stimulus is more favoured over the male stimulus at the posttest than at the pretest

Table 1: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the black participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	6.9545*	9.9692*	9.1565*
Control	1	-1.2325	-0.1469

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 2: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the coloured participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	10.2373*	5.9647*	15.6716*
Control	-0.4545	-0.1111	-1.1362

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Table of pairwise differences between the means comparing the white participants on the pretest/posttest condition

	Black gender differential	Coloured gender differential	White gender differential
Experimental	11.2629*	11.9964*	10.5001*
Control	1.9293	1.8636	0.9495

* Indicates significance, $p < 0.05$